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THE DISINTERESTED LOVE OF GOD
ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AND SOME OF HIS MODERN INTERPRETERS

THE problem of how man can and should love God has always been one of great interest. It has been asked whether or not it is possible to love God more than self, or, in other words, if one can love God with a love which is not, in reality, a mere seeking of personal happiness. If a truly disinterested love for God is admitted as possible, what then, is the precise relation of such a love to the natural desire for happiness and perfection? For the Scholastics, admitting the possibility of a love of God above self, a difficulty arose from the acceptance of Aristotle's teaching that anything is loved insofar as it constitutes a "good" for the lover. In technical terms, the question was whether the pursuit of happiness, of one's "proper good," was the formal, or only the material motive of the love of God. St. Thomas affirmed the possibility

of a love of God above self, and devoted his attention to proving why this was so.

In addition to this primary problem, there arises the question of the relation of the natural to the supernatural love for God. In the first place, St. Thomas held, as we shall attempt to show, that a free, explicit act of love for God is possible in the natural order, without grace. But what, then, is the relation of supernatural charity to this natural love? The essential principle of the Thomistic response is that grace does not destroy, but rather perfects the natural orientation of the will to God.

In considering these various problems we intend to present a study of the doctrine of St. Thomas himself, which will be introduced, however, by an examination of several modern interpretations of various aspects of this teaching. First there will be a discussion of different opinions on the principles of the Thomistic solution. This will be followed by a consideration of the natural love for God itself, seen as a free act or as a physical tendency. Finally will come a treatment of the relation of the natural to the supernatural love for God. The second part of this article will deal with the Thomistic doctrine itself, as well as its principles and consequences.

I. The Principles of the Thomistic Doctrine

A. Pierre Rousselot, S. J.

When, in 1907, Père Rousselot, S. J., published his study, *Pour l'Histoire du Problème de l'Amour au Moyen Age*, he focused attention on the problem of the pure love of God in the Scholastics and gave the impetus for most of the modern treatments of this doctrine.[1] For this reason, the positions taken by this author, both as to the existence in the Middle Ages of two " schools " of love—the " physical " and the " ecstatic "—and as to the proper understanding of the teaching of St. Thomas, form a necessary starting point for a discussion

[1] P. Rousselot, S. J., " Pour l'Historie du Problème de l'Amour au Moyen Age," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* (Münster, 1908), VI, 6.

of the modern history of this question. As we are concerned only with St. Thomas, we may pass over the historical part of this work, and consider only the exposition given of the "physical" or "Greco-Thomist" theory. This theory seeks to reconcile egoistic love, the seeking of happiness, with a "pure" love for God, and claims that this latter, if properly understood, is not affected adversely by the legitimate seeking of what is the proper good of the lover. The Ecstatic Theory, on the other hand, asserted that a true love for God had to be a complete self-giving, to such a degree that any reference at all to the lover's own good would taint its purity.

Fundamental in the Physical Theory is that, the object of the human will being beatitude, all human striving is thus directed to seeking one's own happiness, so that self-love is the most powerful form of love, by which all other love is to be measured.[2] St. Thomas could thus go so far as to define love as the "relation or adaptation to something as to one's own proper good."[3] How then would it be possible to love God more than self? It seems that God could be loved only as the source of one's greatest happiness. "To avoid such a reduction," says P. Rousselot, "it would be necessary to find a principle which would lead man to tend to the good of God just as spontaneously, just as naturally, just as *directly* as he tends to his own good."[4] St. Thomas here uses the principle of unity, for the basis of love is unity, and a thing is loved insofar as it is united to the lover.[5]

Aristotle had said that the root of frendship was "communication," a sharing, and St. Thomas accepted this position. However, according to Rousselot, this communication cannot be a merely external thing, a mere harmony, but there must be a unity "properly so-called"[6] at the basis of love. The reason given for this is that the similarity, resulting from such external

[2] P. 9; cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.*, 9, 4 and St. Thomas, *Quodl.* V, q. 3, a. 2 (ed. Spiazzi, 1949); *III Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 6; *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 25, a. 4

[3] *De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 9.

[4] P. 10.

[5] P. 11; cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 1, a. 8.

[6] P. 25.

communication is in reality " a form of multiplicity; and as such, does not give the reason for its unity." [7] Rather, as the ultimate basis of unity, a unique being must be found. Aristotle had pointed out the way to a closer form of unity, stating that " friendship felt towards others seems to have come from friendship to self," on which St. Thomas comments that a friend is like another self.[8] St. Thomas pushed the idea of unity in love beyond that of a mere social relationship to the point where so close was the union that the lover considered the object of his love as a part of himself. He went further, however, to see the love of God as " the typical affection, that which measures the others, it being that in which the good of the lover depends totally, exclusively, on the beloved." [9] In love, the closest unity is found in a love of unequals, in which the inferior is to the superior as determinable to determinant.[10] The basis of unity here would be the absolute dependence of creature on Creator.

With this background, St. Thomas uses, in treating of the love of God, the notion of the relation of part to whole: the part, as such, tends more strongly to the good of the whole, of which it is a part, than to its own proper, separate good.[11] Unity is still the fundamental principle, according to Rousselot, " as long as one does not restrict it (unity) to the egoistic and closed unity of the individual." [12] The unity of individuals in the same species is no less real than that of the individual supposit,[13] and St. Thomas has " destroyed the notion of the " closed individual." [14] P. Simonin believes Rousselot has exaggerated his criticism of the individual,[15] yet it would seem

[7] *Ibid.*, n. 2.

[8] Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.*, 9, 4; St. Thomas, *IX Ethic.*, lect. 4.

[9] P. 28.

[10] P. 29, and n. 1.

[11] *Quodl.* I, q. 4, a. 3; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 60, a. 5; I-II, q. 109, a. 3, II-II, q. 26, a. 3, etc.

[12] P. 11.

[13] *Ibid.*, n. 2.

[14] Pp. 31-32, with reference to *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 3.

[15] H. D. Simonin, O.P., " Autour de la Solution Thomiste du Problème de l'Amour," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age*, VI (1931), 261, and n. 2.

that Rousselot is merely stressing the fact that a restrictive egoism is not a truly natural tendency, that the notion of "*natura curva in seipsam*" is not a Thomistic one. By stopping at the notion of individual unity, one would end with a fragmentary view, and Rousselot emphasizes that "everything, by nature, by all that it is, belongs to another." [16] Rousselot would enlarge the notions of "part" and "whole" to include those of "participant" (*participans*) and "participated" (*participatum*), and he states that "what St. Thomas says of *parts*, he means even more with regard to participations." [17]

Applying this to the question of the love of God, St. Thomas says, "Every creature, naturally, by all that it is, is of God." [18] Man, as a creature, is bound to God by a bond of unity more strong than that by which he is one with himself, and he is united to God in love, in the strongest of all unions, in a love of unequals.

Thus, the love of desire (*amor concupiscentiae*), considered as an instrument of the individual's own good, is in harmony with the love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*) in which the individual considers himself in function of the object loved, because "my natural love constitutes me as part of a vast ensemble which surrounds me, or as a participation of a superior being who gives me existence." [19] It is by a fully natural tendency that man loves God above self.

In brief, Rousselot sees unity as the basis of all love. This unity is not a matter of mere social relationship, but a unity "properly so-called," and thus the individual unity is the reason for love of self. But the individual is to be seen as having closer bonds of unity with the species, the universe and with God, and thus God is loved above self. This is proved by use of the "part and whole" principle, interpreted in the light of participation, so that the part is the participant, the whole is the participated. God is the "whole" to which man is related

[16] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 60, a. 5; cf. I-II, q. 26, a. 4; II-II, q. 58, a. 5; q. 64, a. 5.
[17] P. 13.
[18] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 60, a. 5.
[19] Pp. 13-14, with reference to *De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 9-10.

as a " part," and, as a part, he tends more to the whole than to self.

Without considering two other points treated by Rousselot in regard to the general principles of the Thomistic position, we may note only that he examines the special difficulties found in man, endowed with free will. The author points out that the opposition of the individual good to that of God is contingent upon the disorders arising from original sin.[20] There are, we are told, two levels of appetition: one natural, incorrupted and incorruptible, the other rational, translating the love of God to a love of the good " *in communi*," and capable of being directed against the natural love of God.[21] However, Rousselot adds, this rational appetite, centering first on the individual, " then translates itself, by a natural and insensible change, into a love of friendship." [22] The point of this, in spite of some confusions, is that God is really the ultimate object of all appetitions, of all movements of the will, therefore, there is no opposition in willing one's own good and in loving God. There is a " unique object " specifying all love.[23]

The interpretation of the doctrine of St. Thomas, as given by P. Rousselot, is seen, even in this brief summary, to touch on matters of fundamental importance. He has given only the main lines of his own interpretation, and, as a result, there is some doubt on the full and exact meaning of some of his statements.

With regard to specific points, we wrote that Rousselot considers unity almost exclusively as the basis of love. In this there seems to be a neglect of the explicit doctrine of St. Thomas that the good and similitude are the proper causes of love.[24] St. Thomas speaks precisely of a union of similitude as the basis of love, and not merely of unity.[25] While we may agree with P. Simonin that Rousselot " was completely right in

[20] Pp. 16-17; cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 3.

[21] P. 18.

[22] *Ibid.*, cf. *III Sent.*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3; *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 153; *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 27, a. 3.

[23] P. 18, n. 1. [24] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 26, a. 3. [25] *Ibid.*, q. 28, a. 1, ad 2.

bringing back the problem of love to that of the one and the multiple," [26] there remains much to be said on this matter of the cause of love.

A similar criticism may be offered of Rousselot's view that it is a formal " communication " that is at the basis of friendship. While there has been much controversy on this point, the opinion of Rousselot (that of J. Keller, O.P.) must be somewhat modified, for a merely formal communication seems to found only a possible, and not an actual love.[27]

Clearly, however, the question of fundamental importance is the interpretation of the principle of the " part and whole." That this principle is constantly invoked by St. Thomas on this problem there can be no doubt, but its precise meaning is not easy to discover. It seems certain that Rousselot has avoided the danger of pantheism, which would follow from a too literal interpretation of this principle, but some precisions will have to be offered as to the exact meaning attributed to it by St. Thomas. As we shall see, Gilson completely rejects the principle on the grounds that man is not a " part " of God. We may note, too, that the " whole " need not always be taken as God, but may refer also to the individual's relation to the common good of all creation, so that the principle is not alawys seen in the light of formal participation, but also in that of finality.

In spite of these criticisms, however, Rousselot has given a sound, if incomplete, view of the Thomistic teaching, and negative criticism is not needed as much as further explanation.

B. Etienne Gilson.

The learned historian, M. Etienne Gilson, in his work, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*,[28] while discussing " Love and

[26] *Op. cit.*, p. 261, n. 2.

[27] Cf. M. Th. Coconnier, O.P., " La Charité d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Révue Thomiste*, XIII (1905), 641-660; XIV (1906), 5-30; XV (1907), 1-17; Joseph Keller, O.P., " De Virtute Caritatis ut Amicitia quaedam Divina," *Xenia Thomistica* (Rome, 1925), II, 233-279; H. D. Simonin, O.P. in a " Compte-rendue," *Bulletin Thomiste*, VII (1930), n. 77.

[28] *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York, 1936).

Its Object" (Chapter XIV) has given his interpretation of St. Thomas' solution to the problem of love. His special hope is to show the fundamental unity between the "Physical" or Thomistic doctrine and that called "Ecstatic" by Rousselot, who had so sharply distinguished them. In considering the latter Gilson discusses especially the teachings of St. Bernard of Clairvaux and of William of St. Thierry, and devotes a special appendix to Rousselot's view that both conceptions appear in different writings of St. Bernard.[29]

Between both the Cistercian, "Ecstatic" and the Thomist or "Physical" schools lies "a profound unity of inspiration." [30] St. Thomas considers what is natural to man "*de iure*," while the Cistercians begin with the actual, "*de facto*" consideration of man's fallen nature. Both, however, hold that a love of God above self is natural to man, once the meaning of the term "natural" in both cases is clarified.[31] In both schools, also, one finds God as the source of the creature's love for Him,[32] and furthermore, the "problem of love" is really the same for both, "or rather they come to the same thing." [33] Gilson feels that a too clear-cut distinction can be made between the two theories, and he finds a fundamental agreement on the solution of the problem.[34]

In discussing the actual position of St. Thomas Gilson rightly sees that the real question is why man is naturally inclined to love God more than self. He notes that "what has made it easy to go astray here is the common contemporary abuse of what, originally, was a mere metaphor, the first step in a *manuductio*, too often taken in a distressingly literal way." [35] He is referring here to the understanding of the principle of the part and whole, of which Rousselot had made so much.

The Thomistic argumentation is exposed as follows: Man naturally loves his own good, and thus must love that on which the good depends; man, as an intellectual creature, realizes this dependence on God. This is why the part naturally exposes

[29] Pp. 289 ff. [31] Pp. 291-294. [33] P. 282. [35] *Ibid.*
[30] P. 281. [32] Pp. 273-276. [34] P. 283.

itself to danger for the whole. From this comes the doctrine of "physical" love, "in which the relation of the divine to the human good is represented as the relation of a whole to its part." [36] God, as being the very condition of man's existence, is loved more than self. The truth in this, however, is easily falsified, especially if the doctrine is carried beyond the biological; "the relation of dependence in which man stands to God is no longer that of a part to its whole. God is not a whole of which man is a part. . . ." [37] A literal interpretation of this principle would, according to Gilson, be patently false and absurd.

The true solution, he says, lies in ascertaining "in what sense itis true to say that God is the 'universal' good of which man is but a particular case." [38] This solution is ready at hand in the doctrine of analogy: every particular good is a resemblance of the sovereign good, and "it is impossible to love the image without at the same time loving the original, and if we know, as we do know, that the image is only an image, it is impossible to love it without preferring the original." [39] Man, bearing a greater likeness to God than lower creatures, in striving to perfect self, is perfecting the image of God, and is thus, in reality, loving God more than self. In arriving at this conclusion, Gilson again notes the harmony with the solution presented by the Cistercian school.[40]

The key, then, to the Thomistic position is not the part-whole principle, but that of analogy and similitude. It is easy to see how different is this view from that of Rousselot. The principle which for Rousselot was central is for Gilson a mere metaphor capable of leading to false conclusions if taken at face value, and, nevertheless, both authors claim that theirs is the true interpretation of St. Thomas.

In all the Thomistic texts dealing specifically with this problem, except the earliest one, the Angelic Doctor seems to make the part-whole principle the basis of his solution. One must be

[36] P. 284.
[37] P. 285.
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] P. 286.
[40] P. 287.

careful not to consider it lightly without sufficient examination. Gilson's main objection is that man cannot be considered as part of God, seen as the whole. To this, first of all, we may remark that, in virtue of this principle, it is by no means necessary to consider God Himself as the whole. As we shall hope to show later on, the universe of creatures is, in some texts, considered as the whole, to the good of which man is more strongly oriented than to his own isolated good. There is no reason for denying that man is a part of this whole, and St. Thomas speaks of the " universe of creatures to which man is compared as part to whole." [41] Gilson would probably remark, as he did in the case of the citizen exposing himself to death for the good of the state, that man is not a " natural " part of the universe. It is certainly true that the universe is not a " natural " whole, in the technical sense of the term, but it is a relative whole of which man is truly a part, and as such he is ordered to the good of that whole. In any case, Gilson has not considered this aspect of the Thomistic position.

If this view is neglected, the other opinion in which God Himself is the whole is dismissed. It is obviously true that a material and literal interpretation of this principle leads only to pantheism, but it is somewhat strange that the author who bases his whole interpretation of St. Thomas on the doctrine of analogy did not interpret this principle in an analogical sense. When St. Thomas states explicitly that the " inferior " is compared to the " superior " as part to whole, he is evidently interpreting the principle in an analogical manner.[42] Just as a literal view of this principle leads to error, so a too restricted view of it precludes the possibility of understanding the principle as St. Thomas used it. He gave to it a metaphysical value, and man, if not a natural or physical part of God, is truly a participation of God.

With regard to analogy, and the " image theory," one may say that similitude as the cause of love must be seen in its

[41] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 2, a. 8, ad 2.
[42] *De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 9.

relation to the good as a cause of love, i.e., the notion of entitative similarity must be related to that of finality, which is the proper order of love, in order to obtain a complete understanding of the Thomistic solution. Finality must be considered so as to understand the nature and direction of love.

In addition, there is a practical difficulty with Gilson's "image theory." The notion of man as an "image" of God is a fairly difficult metaphysical consideration, and if this is to be grasped intellectually as the basis of an explicit love of God above self, one may doubt that it offers the best solution to the problem. In fact, Father D'Arcy was led to ask if then, in Gilson's theory, one is to love God more by striving for personal perfection, or to "go out of self" and seek God, and as a result, perfect self.[43] The "image theory," while clarifying the problem, does not seem to offer a definitive solution. Finally, it is difficult to see how, in not considering finality, a purely eudemonistic view on the whole question is avoided. As was stated above, in the actual Thomistic texts dealing with this problem it is the part-whole principle which provides the key to the solution of the difficulty.

C. Vincent Héris, O.P.

In an article "L'Amour Naturel de Dieu," in the *Mélanges Thomistes*,[44] Père V. Héris, O.P., has given an outline of the general Thomistic teaching on the creature's natural love for God. The background for his discussion is the order of the universe for which God could propose no other end than Himself. In this framework the author treats of the part-whole principle, for, he says, St. Thomas bases himself on the unity and order of creation to show that the individual creature is inclined naturally to love God above self, since it tends more to the good of the whole than to the exclusive good of self.[45] The natural mode of action of the individual creature is to tend to the perfection of the whole, to prefer the good of the

[43] M. C. D'Arcy, S.J., *The Mind and the Heart of Love* (New York, 1947), p. 98.
[44] *Mélanges Thomistes* (Kain, 1923).
[45] Pp. 293-294.

whole to its own limited good.[46] The good of the whole is not only the intrinsic good of order, but also the extrinsic good to which the whole is ordered, viz. God. Love of self is derived from this primary love.

With regard to unity as a basis for love, Héris is in fundamental agreement with Rousselot, and he states that the part, as such, does not have a true and perfect unity except in and by the whole, and is thus, in some way, more closely united to the whole than to self.[47]

In a special section the author discusses this natural love as found in intellectual creatures. Here there is the added difficulty of free will, but also, and more important, there is the fact that such beings constitute an end in themselves, and are not mere parts, but enter into the " principal intention of nature." [48] In this case, Héris states that the order to God only (and not to the universe) must be considered, for we must recognize the intellectual creature " by no means as a part, but (rather as) a participation of the *infinite whole* from which the world depends." [49]

By way of comment, we may note that Héris has not considered at all the " image theory " of Gilson, and has not discussed the question of similitude as a cause of love. The principal cause of love, however, he correctly sees to be the end, the good to which a being is ordered. On one point may some criticism be offered: the author in treating of the part-whole principle interprets the " whole " as the universe only when not dealing with intellectual creatures. In this latter case, he notes that the intellectual creature cannot be sacrificed to the good of the universe, and, as constituting an end in itself, cannot be considered a part of the universe in the strict sense. However, man, though having a direct ordination to God which is lacking in lower creatures, is not thus exempted from the whole. St. Thomas remarks that intellectual creatures were necessary for the perfection of the universe, and not that the

[46] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 3.
[47] P. 296.
[48] P. 302; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 98, a. 1.
[49] P. 303.

universe is subordinated to the intellectual creature.[50] One may also recall that man's condemnation to hell in some way is for the good of the universe. The point to be made is that the universe is a relative, not a strictly natural, whole—man is not a part of the universe as the hand is a part of the body. But in a relative whole the part and the whole have the same end. Therefore, the part-whole principle, when applied to the intellectual creature, does not have to be seen only in the light of participation.[51]

D. Th. de Régnon, S. J., Pedro Descoqs, S. J., and Martin C. D'Arcy, S. J.

We may come now to consider several authors who, seeing defects in the Thomistic solution to the problem of love, have proposed several modifications of their own. De Régnon and Descoqs will be considered together.

Père Descoqs, defining love as an appetite for or a complaisance in the good, divides it into an imperfect form directed to some good (*in aliquo bono*) and a complete or perfect form directed to a person (*velle bonum alicui*). This latter form is further divided into an interested, *natural* love "of concupiscence," in which the person to whom the good is willed is the lover himself, and a disinterested love "of friendship," or "benevolence," which is a *personal* love directed to another.[52]

[50] Cf. *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 46, and Joseph LeGrand, S. J., *L'Univers et l'Homme dans la Philosophie de Saint Thomas* (Brussels, 1946), I, 230-249.

[51] R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P. has also devoted his attention to this problem (*L'Amour de Dieu et la Croix de Jésus* (Juvisy, 1929), I, 61-162; "De Amore Puro secundum sancti Thomae Principia," *Angelicum*, VII (1930), 3-16). There is a lengthy discussion of various false positions, both philosophical and theological, and it is pointed out that St. Thomas has avoided all of these. Regarding the part-whole principle as the basis of the Thomistic doctrine, the author interprets it in the light of participation, much as Rousselot did, and he states there is absolutely no danger of pantheism here. In dealing with man's natural union with God as the basis of love for God, he mentions only that God is man's "*tota ratio existendi*," but does not explain further. When God is loved as the source of human happiness, He is loved "*nobis*," but not in any way "*propter nos*."

[52] *Institutiones Metaphysicae Generales* (Paris, 1925), pp. 398-391. This division is certainly not Thomistic. For St. Thomas, the "*amor concupiscentiae*" was not

Both forms presuppose a union or unity between, and a proportion or connaturality of lover and loved. Excepting a reference to de Régnon, Descoqs offers no defense of this division.[53]

Descoqs then considers the problem of pure love, in the framework proposed by Rousselot. The author finds the work of his confrère rather unsatisfactory and calls for a new historical study, as well as for a doctrinal synthesis of which he himself proposes the main lines.

The first point in the Thomistic doctrine to be considered is the necessity for a relation of "*convenientia*," or proportion, between the lover and the loved object; the object of love must be a good for the lover. Thus, at the very outset, according to Descoqs, the possibility in Thomism for a perfectly pure love is denied. However, in virtue of creation, an act of God's love, the creature is directed back to God in a movement of love, and thus the human capacity for love is by no means limited to the self, but stretches out to the Supreme Good. It is thus the Dionysian notion of the "*circulatio amoris*" which Descoqs sees as the basis of the thought of St. Thomas.[54]

The part-whole principle is illustrative of this general teaching, and the author makes several criticisms of it. If the whole of which man is a part is seen to be the universe, a distinction must be made between the merely physical and the moral orders. Man, as a moral being, could never be considered as unrestrictedly subordinated to the physical universe. Rather one should see the membership of man in the universe as the remote material element of love, while sympathy (not further

a selfish love, but a love directed to an accidental, non-subsisting good (or one considered as such), and to which the subject, or better, the end of love, stands in the relation of potency to act. Thus the definition, "*velle bonum alicui*," is explained so that the "*bonum*" is loved with the "*amor concupiscentiae*," and the "aliquis"—be it the subject himself or another—is loved with the "*amor amicitiae*." Descoqs claims that his division is Thomistic, which is rather strange, considering that he has quoted from the article (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 26, a. 3) in which St. Thomas discussed the matter.

[53] Reference to Th. de Régnon, S. J., *Etudes sur la Sainte Trinité* (Paris, 1892), II, 292.

[54] Pp. 396-397.

described than as a "rather close community of nature") is the proximate material disposition.[55] He adds by way of remark that a complete self-forgetting in devotion to another is the formal element of love, while the necessary relation of love's object to the good of the lover is a mere material condition of love.[56] When the universe is taken as the "whole," the part-whole principle is not capable of giving any solution to the problem.

Even the doctrine of participation, which Descoqs does not explicitly connect with the part-whole principle, is not sufficient for it does not explain the formal, ecstatic element of love. It is the *moral*, as opposed to the ontological, character of love that must be stressed, and disinterested love is found only as a result of a "moral intention to forget self in the one loved."[57] The distinction of personal and natural love, of moral intention and natural tendency, is not the result of the imperfect condition of the creature, for the intentional lack of egoism is essential to love, as is seen by considering the mutual love of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity.[58]

This division was taken by Descoqs from de Régnon. The latter had distinguished a natural love-willing, "*vouloir*," and true or personal love, "*aimer*."[59] In another context, de Régnon, in discussing the doctrine of Richard of St. Victor, distinguished a love of concupiscence, a love of self, from that of friendship, or the love of another: the former, natural, the latter, personal; the one, centripetal, the other, centrifugal.[60] The difference between the "physical" and the "ecstatic" schools, and the controversy of Bossuet and Fénelon would be solved, according to de Régnon, by noting "that nature and

[55] P. 400, n. 2.

[56] P. 401, with a reference to *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 13, a. 3; cf. Rousselot, *op. cit.*, p. 18, n. 2.

[57] *Ibid.*, cf. D'Arcy, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-96.

[58] Pp. 402-404.

[59] *Op. cit.*, II, 224; cf. pp. 228-229

[60] Pp. 294-303.

person are identical things (choses), though formally distinct from each other." [61] Descoqs made this theory his own.[62]

For both of these authors, the Thomistic doctrine may give some notion of the ontological background of the problem of love, but it can offer no full solution, as it does not take into consideration the moral character, the explicit intention, of the act of love.

Father Martin D'Arcy, in one of the better known of modern works on this problem, gives a treatment of much broader scope than that of this article.[63] He has touched on the fields of art, literature and psychology as well as on philosophy and theology. We shall confine ourselves to a consideration of his exposition and criticism of the Thomistic doctrine.

The " image theory " of Gilson, he says, gives an idea of the direction to be followed (but which he himself does not seem to follow), but it is not wholly satisfactory.[64] He is sympathetic with the views of P. Descoqs,[65] and is favorably impressed with the distinction of natural and personal love.[66] It is, however, the distinction of the existential and essential selves, as proposed by the American Jesuit, Fr. Hunter Guthrie, that he finds most appropriate.[67]

For D'Arcy, the essential self, largely expressing itself in the intellect, which is, par excellence, " the instrument of self-realization " [68] and is seen as the faculty of the nature,[69] is self-respecting, the " *animus,*" the origin of Eros,[70] and its

[61] P. 304. Note that this is the personal opinion of de Régnon, not that of Richard of St. Victor; cf. p. 292 and pp. 305 ff.

[62] Pp. 398-399.

[63] *Vide* note 43 above.

[64] P. 98.

[65] In the last three chapters, especially pp. 319 ff.

[66] *Vide* chap. 13.

[67] In D'Arcy, *vide* chap. 2, and pp. 319-321, etc. Hunter Guthrie, S. J. proposed this distinction in his work, *Introduction au Problème de l'Histoire de la Philosophie; la Métaphysique de l'Individualité de la Pensée* (Paris, 1937); *vide* especially pp. 59-66.

[68] Pp. 317 ff.

[69] Pp. 297-303.

[70] On the " *Animus,*" *vide* chap. 7; on Eros, especially pp. 311-313.

movement is inward, directed to the perfection of self.[71] It is opposed to, or distinguished from the existential self, whose "motive-force . . . is away from itself to that Self-Subsisting Being from whom its existence is derived," [72] which expresses itself in the operation of the will,[73] and is seen as the "*anima*," [74] the origin of Agape [75] and of a self-sacrificing ecstatic love [76] which is essentially a relation of persons.[77] The two loves, Agape and Eros, are "not enemies but friends," [78] and though distinct, are both necessary to the human being, and are mutually complementary.

D'Arcy does not consider the metaphysical solution offerred by St. Thomas as giving a complete answer to the problem. He is at one with Descoqs and de Régnon in invoking another order to establish a more complete view; the latter saw this other order as the moral order, while for D'Arcy it is the order of the existential self. In fact, since, for D'Arcy, existence, as opposed to essence, is the foundation of personality, we see that his existential order is close to the moral, personal order of Descoqs. St. Thomas failed to provide a complete solution, for he remained on the metaphysical plane, the order of essence (or of nature, as the case may be), in which, according to these authors, one cannot hope to find a true love of God above self.

Another modern Jesuit, Fr. de Guibert suggested the general line of criticism of these authors, when he said that Descoqs had not given sufficient attention to the metaphysical aspects of love without which no valid solution is possible.[79] One of the fundamental misconceptions of these authors seems to be a misunderstanding of the will's striving for the perfection of the person, so that the natural love of man would tend almost exclusively to that goal, tainting all love of God with the desire

[71] Pp. 317 ff.
[72] Pp. 268 ff; cf. pp. 257 ff.
[73] P. 268.
[74] Pp. 313 and 317.
[75] Pp. 311 ff.
[76] Chap. 14; cf. chaps. 2 and 3.
[77] Especially pp. 318 and 321 ff.
[78] P. 304.
[79] In "Charité Parfaite et Désir de Dieu," *Révue d'Ascetique et Mystique,* VII (1926), 234-235.

for happiness, with the result that God would appear as little more than a means for happiness to be acquired. This view is thought to be that of St. Thomas, who in reality, considered man's natural love for God as a true love " more than self." [80] To consider the nature as turned in upon self is certainly not Thomistic, any more than to see the will as a primarily self-seeking faculty.[81] It is only in the order of material causality that God can be loved " *propter aliud* " in the proper natural order (*rectus ordo*) of the will.[82] According to the Thomistic theory, the individual good is " not the formal, but the material cause (*ratio*) of acting and willing." [83]

It seems also that one may justly question whether the distinctions invoked by these authors lead to a real solution of the problem. To say that only formally personal love is not self-seeking is not only to restrict arbitrarily the nature, but also to leave in doubt how the person can have a direction fundamentally different from its own nature. A dichotomy is set up between person and nature which is not admissible on Thomistic principles. Similarly, it is difficult to see how the will, having a natural tendency to beatitude, as these authors admit, can eliminate this tendency in the " moral " order. For St. Thomas, the " moral " love for God, as an explicit, free act, is rendered possible precisely because such a love is connatural to the human will. In fact, the will's natural tendencies are at the root of its free choices.[84]

An analogous criticism may be offered of the distinction between the essential and existential selves, advanced by Guthrie, and adopted by D'Arcy. The fundamental misconception is an unduly restricted view of the essence. With the background of Thomistic thought, it is hard to understand how

[80] *Vide Summa Theol.*, I, q. 60, a. 5; I-II, q. 109, a. 3, etc.

[81] For St. Thomas' rejection of the " *natura curva*," *vide* M. R. Gagnebet, O. P., " L'Amour Naturel de Dieu chez Saint Thomas et ses Contemporains," *Révue Thomiste* (1948), p. 414, n. 2, with references.

[82] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 27, a. 3.

[83] A. Horvath, O. P., *De Voluntate* (Rome, 1930), p. 11.

[84] *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 5 and Cajetan in *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 2, n. V.

the real distinction of essence and existence could give rise to such fundamentally opposed tendencies. It is also somewhat misleading to see the existence alone as giving " contact " with God, for man's essence is a participation, a likeness of the Divine Nature. It may be noted, with Fr. Dallaire, S. J., that human love emanates from the human supposit, from the " existential self," and that, thus, the two characters of love, egocentricity and theocentricity, derive also from that self.[85] In this sense, love of self can be as well attributed to the " existential " self as to the " essential " self.

By way of conclusion, we may remark that no valid solution to the problem of love can be attained without a solid metaphysical foundation. Distinctions which are not firmly established in the principles of being, in the order of reality, cannot give a true and safe basis for the order of love.

II. The Love of God in Itself

Having considered various authors who treat of the general principles of a solution to the problem of love, we may now give attention to others who are concerned with the exact nature of this love for God, asking if, in the natural order, such a love can be a free, moral act or whether it is limited to the plane of a merely physical tendency. This question involves the relations of the natural and supernatural orders, and it asks if nature, not fallen, but yet without supernatural grace, can love God above self in a free, explicit act. Precisely the question has been whether or not St. Thomas taught the possibility of such an act in the state of integral nature, for it is clear that he denies such a possibility to unaided fallen nature,[86] and clearly maintains such a possibility in the order of grace.[87] Once granted that such a love is possible in integral nature, there arises the further question of the relations of this natural love with the supernatural love of charity.

[85] " La Dualité de notre Amour," *Sciences Ecclésiastiques* (Montréal, 1950), III, 191.

[86] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 3.

[87] *Ibid.*, cf. II-II, q. 26, a. 3.

A. Canon Jean Mouroux and Fr. Henri de Lubac, S. J.

In the chapter on "Love" in his volume *The Meaning of Man*,[88] Canon Jean Mouroux begins by considering the love of God, the cause of the universe and its ultimate end. This love is the great "cosmic force" binding all creatures together in their common return to the Principle of their being.[89] This love "is necessitated and ineradicable because involved in the very structure of the created being," and it is seen as the principle of all acts of the creature, but not itself an act.[90] In man this love is present as the "radical dynamism" linking him to his Principle and End, and it is "involved in the very structure of the will (so that) there is neither liberty nor moral quality in it, but only a happy and constitutive necessity."[91] This love for God "is concealed in the will's conscious tendency to its own Good," but it is "beyond consciousness."[92] It is directed only implicitly to God, but is a natural preparation for grace by which this natural tendency is perfected and enabled to become explicit.

Fr. Henri de Lubac, S. J., considering this an "excellent analysis" of the position of St. Thomas, has incorporated it into his volume *Surnaturel*.[93] The love of God on the natural plane is a "natural movement" which is not free but necessary, and it is distinguished from a love "surpassing nature, a gratuitous love, alone meritorious," which is the love of charity; the first has as its object God, the Creator, source and principle of all being, while the second is directed to God, the end of supernatural beatitude.[94] According to de Lubac, St. Thomas considered only two forms of the love of God—a natural, physical tendency, and a supernatural, explicit act of love; the former not explicit, though "wholly permeated by reason,"[95] while the latter is beyond the power of unaided nature.[96] The

[88] Trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York, 1948).
[89] P. 196. [90] Pp. 196-197. [91] Pp. 197-198. [92] P. 200.
[93] No. 8 in series "Théologie" (Paris, 1946).
[94] P. 250, with references to *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 60, a. 5, and *Comp. Theol.*, c. 174, 2.
[95] P. 247. [96] P. 248.

first belongs to the nature considered absolutely, statically; the latter to the nature as elevated and oriented to its supernatural beatitude; the one pertains to the "*voluntas ut natura*," the other to the "*voluntas ut ratio*."[97] The distinction of a natural and a supernatural beatitude is due not at all to St. Thomas, but was "forged" by later scholastics.[98] De Lubac rejects the natural, explicit act of love for God that would follow upon the acceptance of this distinction.

It would be vain, indeed, in these few pages to attempt a complete criticism of this position. The reader may be referred to the careful and accurate articles of M.-R. Gagnebet, O. P.,[99] written in refutation of de Lubac, and on the basis of which we may make a few remarks. First of all, however, it may be noted, in regard to Mouroux, that his own argument seems to be based on only one Thomistic text, which is badly misinterpreted: "love is said to be that which is the principle of a movement tending to the loved end."[100] To infer, as Mouroux does, from the word "principle" (*principium*) that this love itself is not an act is to misunderstand not only the text but the whole of the Thomistic theory of love.[101] Also, in reference to de Lubac, one sees that this author has relied heavily on Question Sixty of the *Prima Pars*, the Fifth Article of which is devoted to the love of God in the angels, and in which St. Thomas makes no explicit mention of an elicited act. However, in the Prologue to that Question, it is stated: "We are now to consider the *act* of the will, which is love. . . ." As Sylvester of Ferrara remarks with his usual clarity, even if the act of love for God is necessary (as to specification), it is still an elicited act, and not a mere physical tendency.[102]

Fr. Gagnebet remarks that the very fact that St. Thomas

[97] P. 250; *vide* especially, p. 251, and n. 3.

[98] P. 254; cf. pp. 253-256.

[99] *Vide* note 81 above; the articles appeared in *Révue Thomiste*, XLVIII (1948), 394-446; XLIX (1949), 31-102.

[100] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 26, a. 1.

[101] This will be discussed at greater length in the following article.

[102] *In III Cont. Gent.*, c. 51, n. II; cf. *de Verit.*, q. 22, a. 5, ad 6.

could propose to himself the question as to the necessity of charity, granted the existence of a natural act of love for God, shows that he considered such an act naturally possible.[103] Having made this point, he proceeds to show in detail how carefully St. Thomas distinguished between the two forms of love in all the modes of causality.[104] The one form of love is based on a natural likeness of creature and Creator, the other on the supernatural similitude of grace.[105] Natural love is directed to God the Author of nature; supernatural love to God, the Author of grace,[106] so that it is shown St. Thomas himself held the distinction of a natural and a supernatural beatitude.[107] The presence or absence of grace and charity allows for a distinction of the two loves in regard to their elicitive principles, while God, known naturally, and God, object of supernatural faith, is the distinction serving to contrast these two forms of love on the basis of the knowledge which directs them.[108]

On the basis of such a careful study of the many distinctions drawn by St. Thomas himself between these two forms of love for God, there is little basis for the opinion that the Angelic Doctor considered the natural love of God as a mere physical tendency, and restricted the possibility of an explicit act of love for God to the supernatural order.

[103] *Vide* Gagnebet's first article, *Révue Thomiste* (1948), pp. 397-412, 424-425, and especially p. 413, n. 4, with reference to *III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, obj. 4: "ad illud ad quod natura sufficit, non oportet quod per virtutem elevetur. Sed diligere Deum, quod est actus charitatis, potest etiam homo per naturalia. . . . Ergo, non oportet superaddi aliquam virtutem charitatis." Cf. *de Caritate*, q. 2, a. 2, obj. 16; *de Spe*, q. 1, obj. 9.

[104] In the first article, pp. 426-432.

[105] *III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4; cf. *ibid.*, d. 22, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 3, ad 1; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 60, a. 5, ad 4. In the article, *vide* p. 432.

[106] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 62, a. 1, ad 3; and other texts mentioned in n. 2, p. 434 of the article.

[107] Pp. 432-434, 436-439; cf. second article, *Révue Thomiste* (1949), pp. 39 ff.

[108] Pp. 439-441, with regard to knowledge; pp. 442 ff. with regard to the elicitive principle.

B. Anders Nygren.

Having mentioned the Thomistic doctrine on the possibility of a natural, free act of love for God, the question of the relation of that act to the supernatural love of charity may be treated with reference to what is undoubtedly one of the most important of all modern works on love, the three-volume study, *Agape and Eros*, by the distinguished Swedish Lutheran theologian, Anders Nygren.[109] The work considers, theologically and historically, these two conceptions of love, seen as fundamentally different dynamic forces in religion and morality from Christ to Luther, and includes a survey of the theories of love found in the Greek philosophers.[110] The author believes that Agape and Eros are two diametrically opposed notions of love for God, the former of which was revealed and taught by Christ, further explained by Sts. Paul and John, but which, throughout history, has been mingled with the impurity of Eros. In its purity it was expressed through the ages only by Marcion, to some extent by St. Augustine, and finally by Luther.[111] Eros is egocentric, seeking the happiness of the lover and the attainment of God; it is a love of the good and the beautiful, a desire for the perfect. Agape is the exact opposite, being wholly theocentric and disinterested.[112] The author admits that the absolute spontaneity essential to Agape made St. Paul avoid the use of that term in reference to man's love for God, for man could not be wholly independent, and on an equal footing with God.[113] Yet, true Christian love for God must strive for this purity and spontaneity, and cannot be contaminated by a desire for personal happiness, but must be a total surrender to the love of God and Christ for the human person.[114]

[109] Published originally in Swedish under the title, *Den Kristna Karlekstanken*, I (1930), II (1936). For the first volume we have had to use the French translation of Pierre Jundt, *Erôs et Agapè* (Paris, 1943); for the second the English of Philip S. Watson, *Agape and Eros* (New York, 1939).

[110] Pp. 22, 25, 32-33, 39. (French translation, unless otherwise noted).

[111] Pp. 156, 202.

[112] *Passim; vide* especially pp. 75 ff., 80-92, 169, 194 ff.

[113] Pp. 130-134, 136, 156.

[114] Pp. 239, 242-243.

It is not possible to consider here Nygren's Scriptural exegesis, nor his discussion of the patristic developments, fascinating as they may be, but enough has been said to indicate that this author believes the medieval notion of charity to be a fusion, or attempted harmony of Agape and Eros.[115] He feels that such a joining of the two different conceptions of love can only be detrimental to the true nature of Agape. For this reason he would hardly subscribe to the Thomistic teaching that man's natural love (Eros, for Nygren) could in any way prepare for, or be a foundation of true Christian love, or Agape.

About St. Thomas himself, Nygren says that " all love (for St. Thomas) is fundamentally acquisitive love (I-II, q. 26, a. 1, *ad appetitum pertinens*); love corresponds to the acquisitive will, and this latter to the natural quest for happiness. . . . Self-love properly understood must drive us to love God, who, as the highest good, includes all that concerns our happiness (I-II, q. 5, a. 8). The reason why we love God is that we need Him as our *bonum*." [116] In fact, Nygren sums up the whole Thomistic teaching in two propositions: " (1) Everything in Christianity can be turned back to love, and (2) everything in love can be turned back to self-love." [117] According to this author St. Thomas perceived the difficulty of harmonizing such a view of love with that charity " which does not seek its own." The matter was handled by introducing the Aristotelian notion of friendship, but of this Nygren says that any " external correction is unable to neutralize the egocentricity that is bound up with the very first premises of the Thomistic doctrine of love." [118]

For Nygren, the love of Agape is something entirely new,

[115] Pp. 49-51.

[116] Vol. II, Part II of English translation, p. 429.

[117] Eng. trans., pp. 425-426.

[118] Eng trans., p. 427. It may be noted that there seems to be some confusion in Nygren's mind between "*amicitia*" and the "*amor amicitiae*," as well as on the basis for distinguishing the latter from the "*amor concupiscentiae*." Cf. note 52 above.

and is the exclusive property of what we would call the essentially supernatural order. All other love is but a form of self-seeking, even, as in the case of the "celestial Eros," directed to God. He would not hold, with St. Thomas, that a natural love of God above self is possible, nor would he concede that man's natural love for God could in any way prepare for or lead to supernatural charity.

Needless to say, a complete criticism of this important work is far beyond the scope of these pages, though the hope may be expressed that Nygren's study will some day receive the critical attention it deserves. On the specific question of man's love for God, one may find in Nygren a clarity of presentation and general soundness of doctrine on many points. He does not realize, however, his proximity to the Thomistic position on several matters. This is certainly true with regard to the love of God for man,[119] but also of man's love for God. Nygren, in dealing with St. Paul, as was mentioned above, realized the difficulty for man to love God in the same way as he is loved by Him, since man cannot be considered as in any way independent of God. It is for this reason that we cannot abstract from man's imperfection, i. e., his condition as a creature, and thus, we cannot forget his necessary striving for self-perfection, a goal set for man by Christ Himself. What Nygren fails to notice, or would not agree with, is that God is not hereby rendered a mere means to human happiness. Thus, he does not see that, according to St. Thomas, God is loved for Himself (*in se, et propter se*) with a formally "disinterested" love. Furthermore, while conceding without hesitation the new and revolutionary character of Christian Agape, this love for God is not to be seen as diametrically opposed, in its fundamental orientation, to man's natural love for God, as found, if not in

[119] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 6, a. 4; q. 19, aa. 2-4; q. 20. For the reader interested in consulting what few discussions of Nygren there are by Catholic authors, *vide* L. Bouyer, "L'Ecole de Lund," *Irénikon* (Chevtogne, 1940), XVII, 24-49; on St. Augustine, G. Hultgren, *Le Commandement d'Amour chez Augustin* (Paris, 1939); for shorter discussions and reviews, *vide Bulletin de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* (Mont César), IV, nn. 41-42, 10-11.

fallen nature, at least in integral nature. When Nygren advocates the explicit intention to love God to the complete forgetting of self, he is liable to the same criticism made of Descoqs, viz. that such an intention cannot change the fact that man's happiness is found in God, and that, materially, the seeking of happiness cannot be absent from human love. We may note that when Nygren states that St. Thomas reduced all love to self-love, he is neglecting the essential point of the Thomistic doctrine of love, that the good, under the aspect of " end " (*bonum sub ratione finis*) is truly loved in itself. Failing to appreciate this, Nygren failed to realize that the purity of Agape is not really tainted by the seeking for happiness, and that there can be a natural preparation for the love of Agape.

III. Conclusion.

We have sought to give a variety of points of view on different aspects of the Thomistic teaching on the natural love of man for God. First of all, the basic principles of St. Thomas' solution to the problem of love were examined: P. Rousselot found this principle of solution in the theory on the relations of part to whole, interpreted in the light of participation, so that man was the part, and God the whole. Gilson denied the validity of this theory, and found the essence of the Thomistic position in the " image theory ": that, every good, including the self, in virtue of analogy, is loved because of a primary and supreme love for God, the " model " or exemplar of every created good.

The criticisms of the Thomistic doctrine offered by de Régnon, Descoqs, and D'Arcy were then discussed, and the solutions of these authors were seen to rest on a distinction of natural or essential, from personal or existential forms of love. The latter forms allowed for a truly disinterested love for God. The principal failings of these suggestions seemed to be a lack of solid metaphysical foundation for the proposed distinctions, which, themselves, did not really provide a satisfactory solution to the problem.

In treating the nature of the love of God in itself, it was seen that Mouroux and de Lubac denied that, without grace, there could be any natural, moral, elicited act of love for God, and held that this love was a merely physical tendency. This, however, is not the doctrine of St. Thomas, as these writers claimed. Finally, the work of Nygren was mentioned in order to show that for St. Thomas the natural love for God was, in a real sense, "disinterested," and, as such, could serve as a preparation for the supernatural love of Charity. There remains to be considered the actual position of St. Thomas himself, in its principles and consequences.

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(To be continued)

ACTUAL GRACE ACCORDING TO SAINT THOMAS

WHEN in the opening years of a post-atomic age our descendants assess our times, it is not inconceivable that they will entitle their dissertations "The Age of Motion." We wage our global wars at super-sonic speed; we live our hectic lives to the rhythmic throb of wheels; we build and we destroy—with the restless, straining effort of men who move, relentlessly, they know not whence nor whither. But if in the quiet of an age remote from ours some scholar ponders this aspect of our days, he may perhaps marvel that a people so pre-occupied with movement should have been so neglectful of the Mover, so loathe to own themselves as moved.

It would not be wholly unreasonable if this conclusion should be reached. Is there an article of Catholic teaching which so suffers from a conspiracy of silence as that grace, called actual, whose very name connotes the motion most worth our pondering? It is true that volumes have been written on the subject—but written largely for the learned. The average Catholic has but the haziest of notions concerning the grace without which he can do nothing availing unto salvation. And he must do much, against great odds. "The gates of heaven are lightly locked"—but the latch must still be lifted, and that is a task beyond all human doing.

Perhaps it is just this last concept which twentieth century independence refuses to accept. We have been taught so thoroughly that we are captains of our souls and masters of our fates, that even the crash of nineteenth century hopes for human progress and the cataclysmic events of our own lives have not fully dispelled our self-security. The error is pernicious; at times it may be tragic.

The boy or girl who moves through life serene in the unfounded belief that his own strong will and high ideals will

lead him ever onward and upward, may go on for years with his false faith untested. But sooner or later the battle must be joined—for " The Kingdom of Heaven suffereth violence "—and in that day, only the man will stand who knows where to turn for instant aid.

It is precisely because he teaches the height to which men are called, the depths from which they must be raised and the ineffable mystery of grace by which God leads them to their high estate, that Saint Thomas Aquinas is " *Doctor Gratiae.*" His is no facile over-simplification of eternal truth. But with the clarity and profundity of thought which he drew abundantly from the Source of all wisdom, the Angelic Doctor has expounded the teaching of our Holy Mother the Church, that by a fuller understanding of God, moving men " *fortiter suaviterque* " towards their end, we may the more surely attain the prize.

An ordered study of Thomistic teaching on actual grace should, therefore, prove as fruitful in the supernatural order as has the endless investigation of the mechanics of motion. Before the first jet pilot was moved with the speed of sound towards his goal, men had analysed their needs, discarded inadequate modes of propulsion, experimented with new and untried engines, and only after grueling years of labor found the potent source of motion which has brought the antipodes to our doors. In the supernatural order, God, in His mercy waits not upon our knowledge. But surely the realization of our needs, the fuller appreciation of His ever-ready assistance, cannot but lead us to a more profound humility, more fervent prayer, more filial gratitude and trust in the Divine help whereby " God moves us to will and act."

Necessity of Grace

He who " stirs a stone and starts a wing " may well give us a point of departure for a study of the necessity of actual grace. For no stone stirs from its place, no acorn yields an oak and no bird soars unless each is moved from the potentiality

of its first state to the actuality of its second by some already actual power outside itself.[1] This intimate, unfailing movement of all things to their connatural end is the divine concursus by which the omnipotent goodness of God, having constituted all things in their being, moves them to their natural ends, each according to its nature.[2] Without this "*auxilium generale*" there would be no movement in all nature, from the swift flight of the falling star to the flash of the intellect grasping truth.[3] For all change and multiformity must, in the last analysis, flow as from its principle from the unmoved, the unique.[4]

Actual grace, in the supernatural order, is comparable to this natural movement. It is the transient, supernatural gift of God, by which He moves human faculties, in a human way, but to an end beyond their scope.[5] In the integrity in which Adam was constituted at his creation, the perfect harmony and ordered subjection of body to soul,[6] of sensitive to rational

[1] *Compendium Theologiae*, cap. 4: "Omne quod movetur, inquantum hujusmodi, (est) in potentia; quod autem movet (est) in actu"; cap. 7: "nihil enim se ipsum educit de potentia in actum." Cf. *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 94, a. 3.

[2] *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 7: "Deus est causa actionis cujuslibet inquantum dat virtutem agendi et inquantum conservebat eam, et inquantum applicet actioni, et inquantum ejus virtute omnis alia virtus agit."

Cf. *de Malo*, q. 6, art. un.: "id quod primo movet voluntatem et intellectum, scil. Deus; qui cum omnia moveat secundum rationem mobilium . . . etiam voluntatem movet secundum ejus conditionem, non ex necessitate, sed ut indeterminate se habentem ad multa."

Cf. *ibid.*, ad 3: "a causis contingentibus proveniunt effectus contingenter inquantum Deus omnia movet proportionaliter unumquodque secundum suum modum."

[3] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, q. 89: "Omne enim operans est aliquo modo causa essendi, vel secundum esse substantiale vel accidentale. Nihil autem est causa essendi, nisi inquantum agit in virtute divina."

Cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *De Gratia*, p. 31; *Reality*, pp. 55, 131.

[4] *Comp. Theol.*, c. 129: "omne mutabile et multiforme, in aliquod primum immobile et unum reducetur sicut in causam."

[5] J. van der Meersch, "Grâce," *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, VI, 2ième, col. 1558, no. 5: "La grâce actuelle est un secours transitif par lequel l'homme est mû par Dieu à une opération salutaire."

[6] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 49, a. 1: "Deus fecit hominem rectum, et haec rectitudo consistit in perfecta subjectione corporis ad animam."

appetites,[7] of reason to God,[8] was as yet undisturbed by sin. The knowledge of natural truth,[9] the accomplishment of natural good, even the effective love of God above all things as the Author of nature—all this presented no problem to unfallen man.[10] He required actual grace for the performance of supernatural acts, but his natural powers, actuated always by the divine concursus, were competent for the attainment of their own ends.[11]

It is otherwise with fallen man.[12] And it is fallen man who must grasp the extent of his dependence upon God's grace. In the ten articles which comprise his treatment of the necessity of grace, Saint Thomas leaves no room for doubt—or for self-complacency. With inexorable logic it is borne in upon the most reluctant mind that the doing of good, the avoidance of evil, and the right use of the very gifts of God depend wholly upon the divine motion moving the human faculties to act. Without the special help of God, fallen man cannot even know all natural truths. The brevity of human life, its infirmities and its cares, make it impossible for a single mind to investigate all the mysteries of the universe. That twenty centuries of our era had passed before man had learnt to split the atom, gives some indication of the limitations of the human intellect left to its own devices.

[7] *Ibid.*, q. 95, a. 2: "in statu vero innocentiae inferior appetitus erat rationi totaliter subjectus."

[8] *Ibid.*, a. 3: "talis erat rectitudo primi status, quod ratio erat Deo subjecta, inferiores autem vires rationi."

[9] *De Veritate*, q. 18, a. 3: "Quicquid unquam homo aliquis de cognitione eorum naturali ingenio assequi potuit, hoc totum Adam naturali cognitione habitualiter scivit. Scivit etiam multa quae sunt in creaturis quae naturali cognitione cognosci non possunt."

[10] *Ibid.*, ad 2: "Adam debuit habere omnia perfecte quod natura humana requirit."

[11] *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 1, ad 9: "secundum statum naturae conditae homo nihil habebat impellans ad malum, licet bonum naturae non sufficeret ad gloriae consecutionem; et ideo indigebat auxilio gratiae ad merendum, non autem indigebat ad peccata vitandum."

[12] *Ibid.*: "sed in statu naturae corruptae habet impellens ad malum, et ideo indiget auxilio gratiae ne cadat."

Nor is the human will better equipped. It cannot in its fallen state comply even with the whole natural law, since the corruption of sin has affected the will, even more than the intellect, through the inordinate tendency of the appetites to seek sensible goods in opposition to the dictates of reason.[13] As though this were not enough, Saint Thomas, in the third article, becomes still more precise. Not only is man now incapable of obeying the natural law in its entirety, he cannot even efficaciously obey its first principle. His will, perverted indirectly by sin, even from its ultimate natural end—God, as the Author of nature—has been deflected to himself, the criterion of his own private good.[14]

All that has been said thus far of the necessity of grace has concerned the attainment of natural knowledge and the performance of naturally good acts under the dominion of reason. We have seen that only a very limited knowledge of natural phenomena and a very imperfect fulfilment of the natural law is possible to fallen man without the aid of actual grace. That he should, unaided, be capable of supernatural acts is utterly impossible. There must always be a proportion between an agent and its effect—and the human agent of himself is incapable of producing a supernatural effect.[15]

Fundamentally, this proportion is established by man's pos-

[13] *Summa Theol., I-II*, q. 109, a. 2, ad 3: "magis est natura humana corrupta per peccatum quantum ad appetitum boni, quam quantum ad cognitionem veri."

Cf. *de Malo*, q. 4, a. 6, ad 8: "Quia ergo peccatum est in sensualitate, secundum quod potest obedire rationi; primus motus sensualitatis, qui est ex dispositione corporali, non est peccatum . . . secundus autem motus, qui excitatur ex aliqua apprehensione, est peccatum. Primum enim ratio nullo modo vitare potest; secundum autem vitare potest quantum ad singulos, non autem quantum ad omnes; quia dum avertit cogitationem suam ab uno, incurrit in aliud, ex quo potest insurgere motus illicitus."

[14] *Ibid.*, a. 3: "in statu naturae corruptae, homo ad hoc (amorem Dei super omnia ex solis naturalibus) deficit secundum appetitum voluntatis rationalis, quae propter corruptionem naturae sequitur bonum privatum, nisi sanetur per gratiam Dei."

[15] *Ibid.*, I, q. 25, a. 3: "cum unumquodque agens agat sibi simile." Cf. *ibid.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 6: "cum secundum ordinem agentium sive moventium sit ordo finium, necesse est quod ad ultimum finem convertatur homo per motionem primi moventis."

session of habitual grace, inhering in the essence of the soul. In the natural order, human faculties capable of performing human acts are rooted in the essence of the soul. So in the supernatural order, the virtues and the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, from which proceed supernatural acts, though proximately rooted in the soul's potencies, have as their remote subject the essence of the soul, but an essence itself divinely qualified by habitual grace. In any order action, follows being, and action ordained to a supernatural goal must follow supernatural being.

Beginning, therefore, with the first advance of man towards the supernatural end, in which alone he can hope for happiness,[16] we find that he is as powerless as a fuelless jet plane. Without habitual grace, that created participation in the Divine Nature which raises him to a totally new level of life, man cannot perform a single meritorious act. He cannot so much as turn towards his goal and prepare himself for the reception of this habitual grace, except by God's help moving him inwardly.[17] And once the mercy of God has endowed him with this new life and its concomitant theological and moral virtues, he is still powerless to reduce his new habits to act, nor can he so much as freely consent to the movement of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, unless he is moved thereto by actual grace. He cannot even wait in a state of suspended animation and possess his treasure in security until death, for he cannot without a very special help avoid all venial sin,[18] nor rise from sin,[19] nor persevere in grace to the end of life.[20]

[16] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 2, a. 8: "Solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere potest. . . . In solo igitur Deo beatitudo hominis consistit."

[17] *Ibid.*, q. 109, a. 6: "Unde patet quod homo non potest se praeparare ad lumen gratiae suscipiendum nisi per auxilium gratuitum Dei interius moventis." Cf. *de Verit.* q. 24, a. 15: "Liberum arbitrium non potest se ad gratiam praeparare nisi ad hoc divinitus dirigatur."

[18] *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 12: "Et ideo in hoc statu miseriae, post reparationem gratiae, homo non potest omnia peccata venialia vitare."

[19] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 7: "homo nullo modo potest resurgere a peccato per seipsum sine auxilio gratiae."

[20] *Ibid.*, a. 10: "postquam aliquis est justificatus per gratiam, necesse habet a

The parallel between the orders of nature and of grace may, perhaps, be clarified by the accompanying table. Everything acts for an end, and the ends of the natural and of the supernatural man are not identical. In both orders the essence of the soul is the principle of the faculties, which in turn are perfected by habits which ensure facility of operation. In both orders also, these powers and their habits are in potency to their objects, and must be reduced to act by an extrinsic motion. In the supernatural order this motion is actual grace.

Thus man, dowered as he is by God, with the glorious complexus of natural faculties, and raised to still more wonderful newness of life, is yet incapable of eliciting a single meritorious act without the gratuitous help of God. Without Him, we can, quite literally, do nothing.[21] Faced with this truth, a man might well despair, were it not for that other word of Truth itself, " ask and you shall receive, seek and you shall find, knock and it shall be opened unto you." (Matthew 7:7) It is actual grace which is to be the reward of the search, and, by a divine paradox, it is this same actual grace which makes the seeking possible.

Deo petere praedictum perseverantiae donum, ut scilicet custodiatur a malo usque ad finem vitae."

Cf. *de Veritate*, q. 24, a. 13: "homo causa perseverantiae sibi esse non potest, sed necesse habet perseverantiam a Deo petere."

Cf. *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 155: "omne quod de se est variabile ad hoc quod figatur in uno indiget auxilio alicujus moventis immobilis."

[21] *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 150: "quod enim in aliquem finem dirigatur quod habeat continuum ordinem in ipsum; nam movens continue mutat quousque mobile per motum finem sortiatur. Cum igitur auxilio divinae gratiae homo dirigatur in ultimem finem, oportet quod continue homo isto auxilio potiatur quousque ad finem pervenit."

THE NECESSITY OF GRACE [22]

In the Order of Nature	*In the Order of Supernature*
End: God, as Author of Nature, known through His works	End: God, as He is in Himself, known through the light of glory [23]
Means: The soul, operating through its faculties	Means: The soul, perfected in its essence by habitual grace, operating through the faculties perfected by the virtues and Gifts of the Holy Spirit

	In potency to their objects Actualized by *auxilium generale* Require actual grace for perfect operation	In potency to their objects Actualized by actual grace
Intellect:	Understanding Wisdom Science Prudence Art	Faith Prudence Understanding Counsel
Will:	Justice	Hope Charity Justice Knowledge Wisdom Piety
Irascible Appetites:	Fortitude	Fortitude Fortitude
Concupiscible Appetites:	Temperance	Temperance Fear

[22] *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 11: "Ad consecutionem alicujus finis in rebus naturalibus tria preexiguntur: scil: natura proportionata ad finem illud, . . . inclinatio ad finem illud, . . . et motus in finem. . . . Homo autem secundum naturam suam proportionatus est ad quemdam finem, cujus habet appetitum naturalem; et secundum naturales vires operari potest ad consecutionem illius finis, qui finis est aliqua contemplatio divinorum. Sed est aliquis finis ad quem homo a Deo praeparatur, naturae humanae proportionem excedens; scil. vita aeterna quae consistit in visione Dei per essentiam, quae excedit proportionem cujuslibet naturae creatae, soli Deo connaturalis existens: unde oportet quod homini detur aliquid. non solum per quod operetur ad finem, vel per quod inclinetur ejus appetitus in finem illum; sed per quod ipsa natura hominis elevatur ad quemdam dignitatem secundum quam talis finis sit ei competens et ad hoc datur gratia; ad inclinandum autem affectum in hunc finem datur caritas; ad exsequendam autem opera quibus praedictis finis acquiritur, dantur aliae virtutes."

[23] *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 53: "Illa dispositio qua intellectus creatus ad intellectualem divinae substantiae visionem extollitur congrue lux gloriae dicitur."

Nature of Actual Grace

Having explained the absolute necessity of actual grace for the performance of every salutary act, Saint Thomas next proceeds to a consideration of the nature and divisions of this divine motion.[24] As motion, it must touch the immediate principle of act, the faculties, moving them to their act. For example, upon the potency of the will informed by charity, but unable to reduce itself to act, there falls actual grace. This created reality, which is neither the Mover, nor the power, nor the operation of the power, but the motion of the Mover, enables the power freely to elicit its proper operation—in this case an act of supernatural charity. Analogies always limp, but perhaps the nature of this motion may be clarified somewhat by an example.

The tree has a potency for swaying, but it is unable to reduce that potency to act until the motion of the air so acts upon the tree that it can, as it were, elicit its act of swaying. In the case of the tree, of course, the act follows necessarily, since all things that are moved are moved in accordance with their natures, and it is the nature of trees to be moved necessarily. In the case of human acts, grace moves the will freely, for freedom is of the very nature of the human will,[25] as we shall see more fully later on in this paper.

Divisions of Actual Grace

We may look at this divine motion from the point of view of its immediate effect, or of its position in a series of graces, or we

[24] R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *Predestination*, pp. 240-242.

[25] *I Cont. Gent.*, c. 68: "Dominium autem quod habet voluntas supra suos actus, per quod in ejus est potestate velle vel non velle, excludit determinationem virtutis ad unum et violentiam causae exterius agentis; non autem excludit influentiam superioris causae, a qua est ei esse et operari. Et sic remanet causalitas in causa prima, quae Deus est, respectu motuum voluntatis."

Cf. *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 148: "Est autem proprium homini et omni rationali creaturae quod voluntarie agat et suis actibus dominetur, huic autem coactio contrariatur. Non igitur Deus suo auxilio hominem cogit ad recte agendum." Cf. *ibid.*, c. 113. Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Reality*, pp. 131-132.

may consider how well it attains the end for which it was given. It is upon these three bases that Saint Thomas divides actual grace. According to its immediate effect then, grace is either operating or cooperating.[26] To understand the distinction something must be said about how the human will operates. The object of the will is the good as an end. This end is presented to the will by the intellect, and in this sense the will is moved by the intellect[27] to the exercise of its proper act. The will then through its volition of the end moves itself to choose the means.[28] In the supernatural order, cooperating grace enters into this last act enabling the will, in virtue of its prior act of choosing the end, to determine itself now to the use of the means by the exercise of one of the infused virtues. This last determination is attributed not only to God, but also to the will itself, and hence the grace is called co-operating.[29]

But there must always be a first interior act by which the will, hitherto directed to a selfish or to an evil end, begins to will good. There is no prior choice of the end here in virtue of which the will can move itself. In this case, therefore, God is the Mover, helping man to will the good through operating grace.[30] The sequence could perhaps be illustrated by the following diagram:

[26] *De Verit.* q. 27, a. 5, ad 1: "ex parte vero gratuitae Dei voluntatis gratia operans dicetur ipsa justificatio impii, quae fit ipsius doni gratuiti infusione. Hoc enim donum sola gratuita divina voluntas causat in nobis, nec aliquo modo ejus causa est liberum arbitrium, nisi per modum dispositionis sufficientis. Ex parte vero ejusdem gratia cooperans dicitur secundum quod in libero arbitrio operatur, motum ejus causando, et exterioris actus executionem expediendo et perseverantiam praebendo, in quibus omnibus aliquid agit liberum arbitrium."

Cf. Van der Meersch, *Grâce*, col. 1653, no. 1.

[27] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 9, a. 1: "et isto modo motionis intellectus movet voluntatem, sicut praesentans ei objectum suum."

[28] *Ibid.*, q. 15, a. 3: "unde cum consilium non sit nisi de his quae sunt ad finem, consensus, proprie loquendo, non est nisi de his quae sunt ad finem."

[29] *Ibid.*, q. 111, a. 2: "In illo autem effectu quo mens nostra et movet et movetur, operatio non solum attribuitur Deo, sed etiam animae; et secundum hoc dicitur gratia cooperans."

[30] *Ibid.*: "In illo ergo effectu in quo mens nostra est mota et non movens, solus autem Deus movens, operatio Deo attribuitur."

Cf. *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 149: "Non igitur potest se anima praeparare ad susci-



In each case there is a potency to be actualized on a supernatural plane. The will has two potencies—to choose the end, and having chosen it, to determine the means—but only under the influence of the grace which can reduce both potencies of the will to act.

It is evident, then, that the sinner is first turned to God by operating grace, while the soul already in possession of habitual grace and the infused virtues, and thus already determined to God as end, is moved by cooperating grace to the use, here and now, of these infused gifts.

The second division of actual grace according to Saint Thomas is into prevenient and subsequent, depending upon the position in a series of graces of a given actual grace.[31] This actual grace is ordained to produce five consecutive effects in the soul. In the first place it heals the soul that has been corrupted by sin. Following upon this first grace, and under the impulse of a second, the soul begins to desire the good, then to determine to carry out the good proposed, to persevere in good, and finally to attain to glory.[32] Our Lord Himself in the story of the Prodigal Son has given us an illustration of this sequence of actual graces. (Luke 15:11-32)

piendum effectum divini auxilii, nisi secundum quod agit ex virtute divina. Praevenitur igitur divino auxilio ad bene operandum magis quam divinum auxilium praeveniat quasi merendo illud vel se praeparando ad illud."

[31] Van der Meersch, *Grâce*, col. 1654: "Cette distinction ne considère que l'ordre de priorité ou de postérité qui s'établit entre les divers effets attribués à la grâce."

[32] *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 5, ad 6: "Gratia praeveniens et subsequens dicitur secundum ordinem eorum quae in esse gratuito inveniuntur. . . . Distinguitur igitur uno modo gratia praeveniens et subsequens, ut gratia praeveniens dicatur qua justificatur impius, subsequens vero secundum quam justificatus operatur." Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 111, a. 3.

Cf. S. Augustinus, *De Natura et Gratia*, *ML*, XLIV, col. 264: "Praevenit autem ut sanemur, quia et subsequetur ut etiam sanati vegetemur; praevenit ut vocemur, subsequetur ut glorificemur."

The first healing movement of grace turned the Prodigal from the husks of the swine to the thought of his Father's house. A second grace impelled him to desire the good of confessing his unworthiness and becoming as one of the hired servants in his Father's house. Following upon this came the grace to put this resolution into effect, and "rising up he came to his Father." Here his resolution was put to the test and under the impulse of grace he persevered in his determination to ask forgiveness and to become a servant where he had once been heir. At length his perseverance was rewarded by the last grace of a welcome home, and a new life for the son that was dead.

The first in this chain of graces is prevenient absolutely.[33] The second grace is subsequent to the first and prevenient in relation to the third, and so on until the last grace which is absolutely subsequent. The terms, therefore, refer to the order of operation of a series of graces, whose multiplicity reveals something of the unutterable mercy of God, pursuing His creatures, until at length He brings them to Himself.[34]

The last division of actual grace, on the basis of the efficacy of its action, does not appear, as such, in Saint Thomas' treatment of grace in the *Summa Theologiae*, though the distinction is referred to specifically in his other works.[35] It was the so-called Reformers who brought the question to the fore and contributed all unwittingly to the clarification of the truth. The Protestant preoccupation with the problems of justification and free will obliged Catholic theologians to defend and, as far as possible harmonize, the apparently contradictory truths that God wills all men to be saved and yet allows some to be lost;

[33] *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 2, ad 2: "fides dicitur esse gratia praeveniens, in quantum in motu fidei primo apparet gratiae praevenientis effectus."

[34] S. Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia*, *ML*, col. 922: "Nonne apertissime ostendit (Judas Apostolus) donum Dei esse in bono perseverare usque in finem? Quid enim aliud donat, qui conservat sine offensione, ut constituat ante conspectum gloriae suae immaculatos in laetitia, nisi perseverantiam bonam?"

[35] *I ad Tim.*, c. 2, lect. 5: "Pro aliquibus efficaciter; (sed) pro omnibus sufficienter, quia pretium sanguinis ejus est sufficiens ad salutem omnium; sed non habet efficaciam nisi in electis propter impedimentum."

Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, "Predestination," *DTC*, col. 2941-2947.

that His grace is efficacious and yet man remains free. Of these truths, which all Catholics admit, various and somewhat contradictory explanations have been offered. The chief positions may perhaps be summarized in three syllogisms. Protestants in general might state their position:

> If grace is intrinsically efficacious, there can be no freedom of the will.
> But grace is intrinsically efficacious.
> Therefore there can be no freedom of the will.[36]

Some Catholic theologians counter this Protestant heresy with arguments reducible to the following:

> If grace is intrinsically efficacious, there can be no freedom of the will.
> But grace is not intrinsically efficacious, but is made so in virtue of human consent and cooperation.
> Therefore the will remains free.

To Thomists this position is untenable, because, in the last analysis, it would place in the soul a good—cooperation with grace—independent of the will of God, from Whom alone good exists in any being.[37] Thus, of two men equally loved and aided by God, one would be saved and the other lost, in contradiction of the principle that inequalities exist in beings only because God loves one more than another, and by this fact confers upon him the greater good.[38] When we are dealing with a sovereignly effective Cause, we cannot have unequal effects except from unequal causes.

A Thomist might therefore summarize his teaching thus:

> If grace is intrinsically efficacious, the will can still be free.
> Grace is intrinsically efficacious.
> And the will is still free.

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[36] Garrigou-Lagrange, *Predestination*, p. 146.

[37] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 22, a. 2: "et sic oportet quod in tantum habeat aliquid esse, aut quodcumque bonum, in quantum est volitum a Deo."

[38] *Ibid.*, a. 4: "Deum diligere magis aliquid nihil aliud est quam ei majus bonum velle . . . et sic ex hoc sunt aliqua meliora quod Deus eis majus bonum vult."

The exposition of this doctrine is by no means simple. Although each principle upon which a solution rests is crystal clear, we are dealing with a supernatural mystery—the intimate reconciliation, in the white light of Divinity, of the attributes which our finite minds can only perceive refracted as distinct, and apparently contradictory, glories.[39] But then, a God who could be contained within the narrow confines of a human mind would be no God at all. And we should be faced, not with mystery, but with contradiction; we should be filled, not with wonder, but with despair.

Into this mystery Saint Thomas gives us some insight when, in treating of the Divine Will, he distinguishes between the antecedent and consequent will of God.[40] We have all had very human experiences which may help to clarify this distinction. There are many things which, viewed in themselves, are so good that a man might well give much of the substance of his house to possess them. And yet, looking at these things in relation to all their circumstances, a sane man might freely and deliberately choose not to attain them. Saint Thomas himself uses the example of a merchant.[41] And whether we think, as he may have done, of a stately Venetian galley, laden with the spoils of far Cathay, flying before the Barbary pirates, or of a TWA giant trying to gain altitude in a storm, the human element is unchanged. A cargo may be priceless, but when weighed against walking the plank or crashing into a mountain—the treasure is thrown overboard. By his antecedent will a man cleaves to his possessions; by his consequent will he, here and

[39] *Comp. Theol.*, c. 24: "si autem essentia ejus in seipsa videremus, non requireretur nominum multitudo, sed esset simplex notitia ejus, sicut est simplex essentia ejus."

[40] *De Verit.* q. 23, a. 2: "Voluntas divina per antecedentem et consequentem convenienter distinguitur . . . Illud ergo ad quod Deus creaturam ordinavit quantum est de se, dicitur esse volitum ab eo quasi prima intentione, sive voluntate antecedente; sed quando creatura impeditur propter sui defectum ab hoc fine, nihilominus tamen Deus implet in ea id bonitas cujus est capax, et hoc est quasi de secunda intentione ejus, et dicitur voluntas consequens."

Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Gratia*, p. 347, and *Reality* pp. 304-308.

[41] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 6, a. 6: "sicut projectio mercium in mare fit voluntarium tempore tempestatis propter timorem periculi."

now, freely determines to abandon them. In the same way God antecedently wills that all men should be saved, but inasmuch as some creature by his own deficiencies hinders the attainment of this end, God, as His justice demands, consequently wills his damnation.[42] And just as in the merchant there are not two wills, but rather two modes of regarding a single object, so in God the distinction is not in the will itself, but rather in the thing willed.[43]

Now this distinction is basic to an understanding of sufficient and efficacious grace. From God's antecedent will that all men should be saved, and from the divine justice which does not command the impossible,[44] there proceeds to every man truly, but merely, sufficient grace, which confers upon the will a real potency to attain salvation. Efficacious grace, which reduces this potency to act, flows into the souls of men from God's consequent will to save this man, here and now. The relation between them has been described by saying that with sufficient grace there is offered efficacious grace, just as with the blossom there is offered also the fruit. But as the hail may fall upon the delicate blossom of the peach tree, blasting its rich promise of fruit, so too upon the divine gift of sufficient grace there may fall the blight of willed resistance, so that the fruit of efficacious grace is never produced.[45]

In order to illustrate the difference between sufficient and efficacious grace, as well as their relationship to operating and cooperating grace, we might consider two possible situations. A man in the state of sin possesses his natural faculties of

[42] *Ibid.*, I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1: "Similiter Deus antecedenter vult omnem hominem salvari sed consequenter vult quosdam damnari secundum exigentiam suae justitiae.

Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Gratia* p. 348, *Predestination*, pp. 80-84.

[43] *De Verit*, q. 23, a. 2, ad 1: "In voluntate divina nec ordo nec distinctio est ex parte voluntatis, sed solum modo ex parte volitarum."

[44] S. Augustinus, *De Natura et Gratia*, *ML*, col. 271: "Non igitur Deus impossibilia jubet: sed iubendo admonet, et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis."

Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Predestination*, p. 75.

[45] Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Gratia*, p. 178.

intellect and will and sense appetites, but is incapable of eliciting a meritorious act, as we have seen. If such a man is to turn to God it can only be because the divine mercy offers him a sufficient operating grace, which confers on him a real potency to choose God as end, and to reject his sin. He may refuse the proffered grace, and if he does, the fault is solely his own.[46] If, on the contrary, the sinner places no impediment to the sufficient grace, God's further mercy offers him an efficacious grace, which infallibly and freely [47] reduces to act the real potency already conferred, so that de facto, here and now, he is converted. And if he is, he owes it entirely to the grace of God which has moved him to act.[48]

In the case of the man already possessed of habitual grace, the infused virtues and the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are supernatural faculties for the performance of salutary acts.[49] But as we have seen, these powers must be reduced to act by a sufficient cooperating grace which gives a real power to elicit, here and now, an act, for example, of supernatural justice. A man may reject this divine motion, and if he does, it is his own fault. If, on the contrary, he places no impediment to the sufficient grace, God's continued mercy offers him the efficacious grace which infallibly and freely moves his will so that, here and now, he freely elicits the act of justice. He could resist even in the face of this further grace, but de facto he does not, and that he does not, he owes entirely to the intrinsic efficacy of the grace which moves him.

[46] *III Cont. Gent.*, q. 159: "Illi soli gratia privantur qui in seipsis gratiae impedimentum praestant; sicut sole mundum illuminante, in culpam imputatur ei qui oculos claudit si ex hoc aliquod malum sequatur, licet videre non possit nisi lumine solis praeveniatur."

[47] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 113, a. 3: "in eo qui habet usum liberi arbitrii non fit motio a Deo ad justitiam absque motu liberi arbitrii, sed ita infundit donum gratiae justificantis quod etiam simul cum hoc movet liberum arbitrium ad donum gratiae acceptandum."

[48] *Ibid.*, q. 11, a. 2: "Operatio enim alicujus effectus non attribuitur mobili, sed moventi."

Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection and Contemplation*, pp. 87, 90-91.

[49] *Ibid.*, q. 110, a. 4, ad 1: "sicut ab essentia animae effluunt ejus potentiae quae sunt operum principia, ita etiam ab ipsa gratia effluunt virtutes in potentias animae, per quas potentiae moventur ad actus." Cf. *ibid.*, q. 68, a. 2.

In a word, sufficient grace, which is always given to man in virtue of God's antecedent will to save all, removes from man every excuse for sin or for the failure to advance in holiness. While efficacious grace, given in virtue of God's consequent will, to those who place no obstacles in its way, removes from man every reason for self-complacency. That he remains in sin or in mediocrity is his own fault; that he is converted or advances in sanctity is due solely to the gratuitous gift of God.

This Thomistic teaching on intrinsically efficacious grace, gratuitously given to some men, raises two questions of vital import: "Why the inequality of its distribution?" How can we hold simultaneously that the will is free and grace intrinsically efficacious?" Both questions merit consideration.

Doctrinal Presuppositions

"Equality" did not cease to be a battle-cry with the fall of Robespierre—and rarely has battle-cry been more abused. Somehow in the struggle for the recognition of human and civil rights, for social justice and democratic freedoms, man has lost sight, among other things, of two basic facts—that we have no right where God is concerned, and that order, and hence perfection, of necessity implies inequalities.

The concept of man's creaturehood has become obscured by the emphasis on his dignity; but however obscured, the fact remains, immutable, incontrovertible. We are not dependent upon our Creator in the same way that Michelangelo's "Moses" depends upon the great Florentine.[50] We are not a complexus of intricately organized matter, quite capable of "getting on in the world" once we have done it the honor of entering it. The sculptor "creates" statues because he wants to win renown, or to express himself, or to earn a living. So he buys a block of Carrara marble, a chisel and a hammer, and sets to work. Then he gets a copyright which lasts for fifty-six years.

[50] Garrigou-Lagrange, *Reality*, pp. 125-126: "St. Thomas shows that the distance is infinite between creation from nothing and production, however masterly, of something from pre-existing matter."

But God had nothing to gain from His universe. From all eternity He had uttered His ineffable Word, from all eternity His Triune Life is. He creates not for His profit, but solely for His infinite goodness,[51] infinitely diffusive of itself. Nor had God anything with which to work.[52] Perhaps part of the difficulty of grasping the notion of our own creaturedom lies in our imaginations. We picture a chaotic mass, unpromising it is true, but somehow malleable. We cannot imagine nothingness. So we miss the implications of the fact that God did not only make us to be thus and so, but He made us to be. From the utter void which was nothing, He drew us into being. From falling again into that nothingness He must eternally sustain us.[53] There can be no question of rights where there is no equality nor even proportion of goods to be exchanged.[54] There can be no such equality between God and His creature.[55] There can be only infinite mercy.

It is the part of this very mercy to cause the unequal distribution of gifts without which there could be no ordered universe, since order of necessity implies gradation. We have seen that the will of God is the cause of all things, that His love for His creatures confers on them whatever good they may possess. It is the very lavishness of this divine goodness which has decreed that there should be diversity among creatures.[56] It is not for any merit of their own,[57] but because only

[51] *Ibid.*, I, q. 44, a. 4, ad 1: "ideo ipse solus est maxime liberalis, quia non agit propter suam utilitatem, sed solum propter suam bonitatem." Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Reality*, p. 127.

[52] *Ibid.*, q. 45, a. 1: "ita creatio, quae est emanatio totius esse, est ex non ente, quod est nihil."

[53] *Ibid.*, q. 104, a. 1: "Dependet enim esse cujuslibet creaturae a Deo, ita quod nec ad momentum subsistere posset, sed in nihil redigerentur, nisi operatione divinae virtutis conservarentur in esse."

[54] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 85, a. 11: "materia justitiae est operatio exterior secundum quod ipse, vel res qua per eam utimur proportionaliter alteri personae, ad quam per justitiam ordinamur."

[55] *Ibid.*, q. 81, a. 5, ad 3: "Dico autem aequalitatem non absolute, quia Deo non potest tantum exhiberi, quantum ei debetur, sed secundum quamdam considerationem humanae facultatis, et divinae acceptionis."

[56] *Comp. Theol.*, c. 73: "Hoc enim ad abundantiam divinae bonitatis pertinet,

by such diversity can the finite mirror the infinite. Even the evil of natural defect or of punishment is permitted only for the sake of the greater good.[58] Saint Thomas reminds us that there would be no patience in the martyr were there not first tyranny in his persecutor.[59] And Our Lord Himself has warned us that the grain of wheat must die, or itself remaineth alone.

But it is not so much the diversity in the material universe which troubles the human mind. It is rather the question: "If Saul of Tarsus was thrown from his horse upon the Damascus road and converted by one blinding, efficacious stroke of grace —why not everyone, and, especially, why not I?" To this question Saint Thomas reiterates the warning of Saint Augustine that we may not ask. The dispensing of God's grace depends upon His simple will, just as it depends upon the potter to determine that this clay shall become the priceless urn, and that the kitchen crock.[60] In Saul of Tarsus, it is the mercy of God which is revealed, for His glory and for our hope and encouragement. In the sinner who is not saved, there is revealed God's infinite justice, for His glory and for our instruction and conversion.[61] For only those are deprived of

ut suae bonitatis similitudinem rebus causatis communicet . . . ut igitur perfectior esset rerum creatarum similitudo ad Deum, necessarium fuit ut quaedam res aliis constituerentur meliores."

Cf. *ibid.*, c. 72: "Necesse fuit diversitatem esse in rebus a Deo productis, ut divinam perfectionem rerum diversitas secundum suum modum imitaretur."

[57] *II Cont. Gent.*, q. 45: "Est diversitas et inequalitas in rebus creatis . . . non propter interventum aliquarum causarum vel meritorum sed ex propria Dei intentione."

[58] *I Cont. Gent.*, q. 94: "Deus vult aliquod majus bonum esse non potest sine privatione minoris boni." Cf. S. Augustinus, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, ML*, col. 907: "Ecce quomodo probatur Deum uti cordibus etiam malorum ad laudem atque adjumentum bonorum."

[59] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 19, a. 9, ad 1: "praeter intentionem tyrannorum fuit quod ex eorum persecutionibus clarescceret patientia martyrum."

Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, "Predestination," *DTC*, col. 3007, no. 3.

[60] *III Cont. Gent.*, q. 159: "Et cum hoc sit in potestate liberi arbitrii impedire divinae gratiae receptionem, vel non impedire, non inmerito in culpam imputatur, ei qui impedimentum praestet gratiae receptioni."

[61] *III Cont. Gent.*, q. 159: "hoc enim ex simplici ejus voluntate dependet sicut ex simplici ejus voluntate processit quod, cum omnia fierent ex nihilo quaedam facta

grace who freely and deliberately place obstacles to its path.[62] Since, then, it is due only to man's negligence or ill-will that he lacks grace, very justly is he punished.[63]

The second question which arises in view of the intrinsic efficacy of actual grace concerns, as we have said, the reconciliation of freedom with the divine movement which infallibly attains its end. In his treatment of the will and its action in the natural order, Saint Thomas lays down the principles upon which his solution of the present problem rests.[64]

The object of the will is the good. It can no more choose evil, as such, than the eye can perceive sound.[65] But the will, left to itself, is a blind faculty, dependent for its illumination upon the intellect.[66] The relation of the two is obvious when one analyses any act of choice.[67] My intellect, for example, may indicate to me that a trip to Florida is a highly desirable good, as a relief from New England's icy blasts. My will responds at once by accepting this good as an end. The intellect then takes counsel as to the means. I could travel by boat, train, car or plane—and my will accepts any or all of these as suitable means to the end in view. Then the intellect weighs the relative merits of these modes of transportation, and decides

sunt aliis digniora, et sicut ex simplici voluntate procedit artificis ut ex eadem materia similter disposita quaedam vasa format ad nobiles usus et quaedam ad ignobiles." Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Predestination*, pp. 75-79.

[62] S. Augustinus, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, ML*, col. 910-911: "in eo quem seduci permittit vel obdurari, mala ejus merita credite; in eo vero cujus miseretur, gratiam Dei non reddentis mala pro malis agnoscite."

Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Reality*, p. 121.

[63] *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 14, ad 2: "recte homo corripitur qui praecepta non implet; quia ex ejus negligentia est quod gratiam non habet, per quam potest servare mandata quantum ad modum, cum possit nihilominus per liberum arbitrium ea servare quantum ad substantiam."

[64] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, qq. 8, 9, 10, *in toto*.

[65] *Ibid.*, q. 8, a. 1: "Ad hoc igitur quod voluntas in aliquid tendat, non requiritur quod sit bonum in rei veritate, sed quod apprehendatur in ratione boni."

[66] *Ibid.*, q. 9, a. 1, ad 3: "quantum ad determinationem actus quae est ex parte objecti, intellectus movet voluntatem."

Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Reality*, pp. 278-279.

[67] *Comp. Theol.*, c. 76: "intellectus et finem cognoscit, et id quod est ad finem, et habitudinem unius ad alterum."

that in view of the weather, my bank account and every other conceivable factor " Pullman is best." So the will accepts the verdict and settles for train travel. Once more the intellect goes into action and commands the purchase of tickets, packing of bags and the thousand and one tasks that must be accomplished if the end is to be reached. And once again the will follows suit and drives hands, feet—and family—to do its bidding until at long last the good of the Florida sun is grasped and the will rests in the attainment of its end—a good.

The will could have accepted the verdict " Pullman is best " and yet have determined to risk flying, because trains are slow. In other words, as long as the good presented has a flaw, the will is free to reject the imperfect good and choose the contrary good, even though this, too, falls short of perfection. In this freedom of specification lies one aspect of the will's freedom.[68]

But there is another sort of freedom even more important for an understanding of the relation between grace and freedom, than is the liberty to specify between contraries or disparities. At no point in the whole process of choice could the will have acted without the concomitant action of the intellect—because that is the way the human will acts by its very nature. But at any point it pleased, the will could have arrested action altogether.[69] And it is this freedom of exercise that is essential to the free will.[70]

There are then in this life two possibilities. In most human

[68] *Summa. Theol.*, I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2: " ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones boni."

Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Reality*, p. 189; Van der Meersch, " Grâce," *DTC*, col. 1649, a): " La motion qui procède de l'objet concerne la spécification de l'acte, la motion qui procède de la cause efficiente concerne l'exercice de l'acte."

[69] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 8, a. 3: " manifestum est quod voluntas potest ferri in finem inquantum hujusmodi sine hoc quod feratur in ea quae sunt ad finem."

Cf. *ibid.*, ad 3: " Voluntas aliquando vult finem, et tamen non procedit ad volendum id quod est ad finem."

[70] Garrigou-Lagrange, *Reality*, pp. 225-226: " Liberty of exercise suffices to safeguard the essence of liberty. Man is master of his act when he can either place the act or not place it. Such an act is free, even when there is no choice between contrary acts . . . or between two disparate ways of attaining it."

Cf. *ibid.*, *Our Savior and His Love for Us*, pp. 177-180.

situations man has both freedom of specification and freedom of exercise, and in the use of either efficacious grace may be involved. He may choose between alternative partial goods, or he may decide that as none of the alternatives is really satisfactory, he will have none of them. In some situations, however, a man, practically speaking, retains only freedom of exercise. The reasonable choice is so clear, that no other alternative enters into practical consideration, though he may refuse to act at all. This is precisely a case when efficacious grace moves the will. The very efficacy of the grace so clarifies the issue that if a choice occurs, it will occur thus. A man may still refuse to act at all, but under the influence of this grace, he does not wish to refuse.[71]

When a man, suffering from a deadly disease, weighs the alternatives of a palliative and of surgery as means of recovering the good—health—we do not say that his intellect deprived him of freedom because it presented the second alternative as so obviously the better, that the first attracted him not at all. We say that he is a sensible man, who acts according to the dictates of reason. In other words, we say that his intellect moved him to act according to his nature—deliberately, unwaveringly, freely. In much the same way does the divine motion of efficacious grace move the will. The Author of human nature acts upon His creature in accordance with the very nature which He has conferred.[72] He does not impede its freedom.[73] Rather does He actualize that freedom, here and

[71] Garrigou-Lagrange, "Prédestination," *DTC*, col. 2970: "Selon St. Thomas sous la grâce efficace, la liberté ne veut jamais de fait résister et poser l'acte contraire (la grâce ne serait plus efficace), mais elle conserve le pouvoir de poser cet acte contraire."

[72] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 9, a. 6 ad 3: "Deus movet voluntatem hominis sicut universalis motor, ad universale objectum voluntatis quod est bonum; et sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle; sed homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere bonum, vel apparens bonum. Sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum, sicut in his quos movet per gratiam."

[73] *III Cont. Gent.*, q. 73: "quod perfectionis est magis conservandum est per providentiam quam quod est imperfectionis et defectus . . . igitur pertinet ad providentiam divinam conservare libertatem voluntatis."

now, bringing it to perform its proper act of choice—deliberately, unwaveringly, freely.[74] God and the human will act together, not as two partial but concurrent causes, but as two total, subordinated causes.[75] The whole human act, of justice for example, comes from God's grace as Primary, Principal Cause; the whole human act comes from the free will as secondary cause.[76]

This intrinsically efficacious grace, then, which by God's mercy moves a man freely and infallibly, here and now, to perform a supernatural act, does not destroy his freedom.[77] It is metaphysically impossible that it should.[78] The will is

[74] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 19, a. 8: "Cum enim aliqua causa efficax fuerit ad agendum, effectus consequitur causam, non tantum secundum id quod fit, sed etiam secundum modum fiendi vel essendi. . . . Cum igitur voluntas divina sit efficacissima non solum sequitur quod fiant ea quae Deus vult fieri, sed et quod eo modo fiant quo Deus ea fieri vult."

Cf. *ibid.*, q. 83, a. 1, ad 1: "Non tamen hoc est de necessitate libertatis quod sit prima causa sui id quod liberum est . . . Deus igitur est prima causa movens et naturales causas, et voluntarias. Et sicut naturalibus causis movendo eas, non aufert quin actus earum sint naturales, ita movendo causas voluntarias, non aufert quin actiones earum sint voluntaria, sed potius hoc in eis facit operatur enim in unoquoque secundum ejus proprietatem."

[75] *De Malo*, q. 131, ad 3: "Motus voluntatis directe precedit a voluntate, et a Deo, qui est voluntatis causa, qui solus in voluntate operatur, et voluntatem inclinare potest in quodcunque voluerit."

Cf. *de Verit.*, q. 22, a. 8: "Cum igitur Deus voluntatem immutat, facit ut praecedenti inclinationi succedat alia inclinatio et ita quod prima auferatur, et secunda manet, unde illud ad quod inducit voluntatem non est contrarium inclinationi jam existenti, sed inclinationi quae prius inerat: unde non est violentia nec coactio . . . Potest autem Deus voluntatem immutare ex hoc quod ipse in voluntate operatur sicut in natura: unde sicut omnis actio naturalis est a Deo, ita omnis actio voluntatis, inquantum est actio non solum est a voluntate ut immediate agente, sed a Deo ut a primo agente."

[76] St. Augustinus, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, *ML*, col. 900: "certum est nos facere ut faciamus, praebendo vires efficacissimas voluntati; col. 886; Quibus enim non est datum, aut nolunt, aut non implent quod volunt: quibus autem datum est, sic volunt ut impleant quod volunt."

[77] St. Augustinus, *De Natura .et Gratia*, *ML*, col. 263: "Non enim cum ista commemoramus, arbitrium voluntatis tollimus, sed Dei gratia praedicamus. Cui enim prosunt ista nisi volenti, sed humiliter volenti, non se de voluntatis viribus, tamquam ad perfectionem justitiae sola sufficiat extollenti."

[78] Garrigou-Lagrange, *Reality*, pp. 189-190: "it is self-contradictory that the will should necessarily will an object which reason says is in some way not good, and

essentially a capacity for Total Goodness, and then only will it be necessitated when it is in possession of that Totality to which alone it can say "Thou art THE GOOD." This it can never say in this life. While the adequate object of the intellect is being as such, its proper object in this life is material essences—and about these it does not err. But in this life the essence of God escapes the grasp of every intellect. No matter how profound a man's knowledge of God, seen only indirectly and imperfectly through His creatures, it can never compel assent. Only the essence of God, seen in the light of glory, will reveal Him as the Total Goodness in which the human will must, at last, rest fulfilled. Until that day a man may range the universe in quest of goodness, weighing the imperfect, choosing now this, now that, never wholly satisfied, always free to reject the partial good in favor of any object which at the moment seems more adequate to his desire.[79]

But without efficacious grace no human will, however free, would seek a good beyond the narrow horizon of his finite natural powers. With it, a man may soar to heights undreamed of and have within his grasp a whole new treasury of supernatural goods, imperfect still, but all of them foreshadowings of the Perfect Good, in which alone he can be wholly at rest. It is this that the Thomist means when he holds that efficacious grace, far from limiting a man's freedom, actualizes it,[80] bringing it ultimately to its highest perfection—"the simultaneously whole and perfect possession of interminable life."[81]

which therefore is absolutely disproportioned to the only object which can necessitate the will."

[79] Hyacinthe Woroniecki, O. P., "Pour une bonne définition de la liberté humaine," *Angelicum*, XV (1937), 150: "Evidémment l'objet ne peut atteindre la volonté autrement qu'en passant par le filtre de la connaissance, filtre bien imparfait quamdiu peregrinamur a Domino. C'est à cette imperfection que nous devons que le seul bien capable de nous rassasier de tout point ne peut pas nous être présenté ici-bas comme tel d'une manière parfaite et que par là il est exposé à être librement rejeté par notre volonté."

[80] S. Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia*, *ML*, col. 926: "voluntas quippe humana non libertate consequitur gratiam, sed gratia potius libertatem, et ut perseveret delectabilem perpetuitatem, et insuperabilem fortitudinem."

[81] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 10, a. 1: "Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio."

Practical Consequences

The jet pilot who climbs into his seat for his first mission may well be torn between hope and despair. His target, whatever its grim reality, he has been schooled to regard as a splendid goal for his achieving. He knows the power of the throbbing engine whose throttle waits but the flick of his finger. Towards every dial on the control panel his hand moves with the automatic precision of long practice. And yet . . . ?

With something of the same mixed feelings a man might contemplate the supernatural movement towards eternal life. The goal, however hidden in light inaccessible, is unquestionably glorious. The infinite largess of God, who has so wonderfully constituted him in his nature, has still more wonderfully dowered him in his supernature. The graced human being is magnificently and divinely equipped for flight towards the most splendid of goals. And yet . . . ?

It is precisely this shackling hesitancy that a proper understanding of Saint Thomas' teaching on actual grace should help to overcome. If anything is abundantly clear about this doctrine, it is the absolute dependence of man on the goodness of God for the divine motion which moment by moment must actuate his supernatural potencies. One can no longer rely upon his own strength. Still less can one expect as of right the grace without which one must surely fail. At long last perhaps, one must face the starkest of all realities—one's own nothingness. But in this is humility rooted, and it is only to the humble that He who resisteth the proud gives grace.[82]

If this were the only fruit of the doctrine it would be much. But just as the shadows enhance the beauty of the light, so does the realization of human dependence reveal the omnipotent mercy of the Creator. For God's love is the cause of all human goodness, with which, even in its darkest days our world is brightened. The glory of human heroism, the strength of

[82] Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Gratia*, p. 216: "Haec doctrina ducit ad profundam humilitatem, quia juxta eam homo non habet de suo exclusive nisi peccatum"; also *Three Ages of the Interior Life*, II, 119.

human love, the tenderness of human compassion—are but the palest reflections of the Goodness which gives them being. Even the evil which results from the refusal of His proffered gifts, Omnipotence turns to good. Man is dependent utterly, not upon the whims of a tyrant nor the fragility of a broken reed, but upon the omnipotent goodness of God. In such dependence a man might well rejoice.

But he must also pray. The more profound his realization of his need, the more intimate will be his prayer, and the closer his contact with God from whom alone "virtue goes out."[83] The liturgy, that infallible guide to the mind of the Church, shows us for what actual graces we must pray. We are to entreat God's mercy to overcome and rouse our rebellious wills,[84] cure our wicked propensities,[85] and then change our hearts that we may be led into the right ways.[86] We are to ask His grace that we may serve Him well, since He is the very Author of our piety and the Cause of our sanctification,[87] directing us that we may please Him by cleaving to His commandments.[88] To a soul habituated thus to plead humbly and urgently before the throne of God, grace will never be

[83] Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Gratia*, p. 216: "Haec doctrina ducit ad intimam et continuam orationem, ad magnam gratitudinem et vere ad orationem contemplationis."

[84] *Missale Romanum*, Dom. XXIV post Pent.: "Excita, quaesumus, Domine, tuorum fidelium voluntates," Dom. IV post Pent.: "ad te nostras etiam rebelles compelle propitius voluntates." Cf. S. Augustinus, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, *ML*, col. 88: "Nisi donum Dei esset etiam ipsa ad Deum nostra conversio, non ei diceretur 'Deus virtutum, converte nos.'"

[85] Dom. XVII post Pent: "et vitia nostra curentur, et remedia nobis aeterna proveniant."

Cf. S. Augustinus, *De Gratia*, *ML*, col. 887: "Ergo et victoria qua peccatum vincitur nihil aliud est quam donum Dei, in isto certamine adjuvantis liberum arbitrium."

[86] Dom. VII post Pent.: "et ad ea quae sunt recta, perducat."

Cf. S. Augustinus, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, *ML*, col. 898: "Nisi posset Deus etiam duritiam cordis auferre, non diceret per prophetam: auferam ab eis cor lapideum, et dabo eis cor carneum."

[87] Dom. XXII post Pent.: "Adesto piis Ecclesiae tuae precibus, auctor ipse pietatis."

[88] Dom. XX post Pent.: "fac nos, quaesumus, tuis semper obedire mandatis."

wanting. It will go before and after his every action, removing from his path all that is harmful, teaching him to despise all earthly things and to serve God with a quiet mind, certain that by His mercy he shall never be confounded.

Thus from the realization of our radical indigence, which has been in the past so divinely relieved, man reaps a twofold fruit. Humility is engendered by the knowledge that not upon his own feeble will, but upon God's efficacious grace does salvation depend. And from this truth there results a second benefit—a " mind-set " in virtue of which a man turns spontaneously and confidently to Him in whom alone is our hope. In such a soul there develops, by little and little, an inner tranquility and freedom,[89] based not upon a chimerical self-security, but upon the omnipotent goodness of God. Wars and rumors of wars, and the surging waves of present-day panic roar in vain around men who know how completely " our times are in His hands," and how surely He moves His own towards that day when " all things shall be subdued unto Him . . . that God may be all in all." [90]

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[89] S. Augustinus, *De Dono Perseverantiae, ML,* col. 1000: " tutiores igitur vivimus, si totum Deo damus; non autem nos illi ex parte, et nobis ex parte committimus."

[90] I Cor. 15 :28.

NATURAL APPETITE *

IN AN article entitled *Natural Necessitation of the Human Will*, which appeared in two numbers of THE THOMIST,[1] the author, Father Robert P. Sullivan, O. P., takes issue with the present writer over the correct understanding of St. Thomas' teaching on natural desire. The main points of disagreement are two. The first concerns the nature of natural desire in general: is it movement in the proper sense of the term, or is it relation and not movement, the transcendental relation every nature and power of nature has to its end? The second main point of disagreement concerns the natural appetite of the will and of the sensitive appetite. Has the will, for example, only one natural appetite, which always follows intellectual cognition in its subject, or are there two natural appetites of the will; the one innate, which is a relation that does not depend upon prior cognition in its subject, and the other the elicited appetite described by the Commentators, which depends upon prior intellectual cognition?

The first part of Father Sullivan's article [2] contains a clear and able treatment of the problem of the number of objects willed by natural necessity in the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas. In the second. concluding, portion Father Sullivan defends the views of the great Commentators that innate natural appetite means only relation without prior cognition as a necessary prerequisite in its subject, even in the case of the will; while the elicited natural appetite of the will or of

* In presenting the reply of Fr. O'Connor to the criticism of Fr. Sullivan, the Editors merely wish to present the considered opinions on both sides of the question, without expressing judgment on the conclusions of either author.—ED.

[1] THE THOMIST, XIV (1951), 351-399; 490-528. This study subsequently appeared under the title "Man's Thirst for Good," *Thomistic Studies*, n. 4 (Newman Press, 1952).

[2] *Loc. cit.*, 364-399.

the sensitive appetite is an activity that follows cognition. The opposite view he regards as erroneous.[3]

Besides the great Commentators Father Sullivan has on his side many authors who see in the innate natural appetite only the ordination of one thing to another, or a proportion between one and another.[4] Dom Laporta in an article that dealt with this question [5] divided natural appetite into ontologic and elicited; ontologic natural appetite is not an act but only a transcendental relation or ordination of finality. Maquart, however, disagrees with this understanding of St. Thomas' teaching on natural appetite. He cites against it the statement in *De Veritate*, q. 25, a. 1, that natural appetite is " a certain inclination and order to something suitable to itself." He grants that it is a relation or order but there is more to it than this. It is something dynamic: an active inclination to a proportioned end and a principle of movement in the order of execution.[6]

A recent study of this question by Enrico di S. Teresa, O. C. D., while presenting peculiar features of its own, agrees with this dynamic conception of natural appetite. It sees in the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas a single natural appetite that is always a non-cognitional, innate inclination impressed upon all things by God, the author of nature. This one natural appetite is more than a mere order or transcendental relation of a potency to its act. It adds to this the note of a really existing inclination towards a natural end or operation. It never requires prior cognition in its subject, not even in the case of the will. Only the elicited appetite has this requirement.[7]

[3] *Loc. cit.*, 527.

[4] Cf. L. De Raeymaeker, *Metaphysica Generalis*, I (2nd ed.; Louvain, 1935), p. 72: " Quo latissimo sensu appetitus vocatur *appetitus naturalis* atque comprehensio ejus simplicissima est: tantummodo significat *ordinationem* unius ad aliud, *proportionem* unius cum alio, *convenientiam* inter plura."

[5] A. Laporta, O.S.B., " Les notions d'appétit naturel et de puissance obédientielle chez saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, 5 (1928), 42.

[6] F. X. Maquart, *Elementa Philosophiae, II, Philosophia Naturalis* (Paris, 1937), p. 42.

[7] Enrico di S. Teresa, O.C.D., " Il desiderio naturale della visione di Dio e il suo

Here, then, are two extreme positions. The first sees in St. Thomas' teaching two natural appetites, one of which is an innate, non-cognitional relation in every nature and power of nature, while the other is an elicited act that follows cognition in its subject. The second extreme position sees in St. Thomas' teaching only one natural appetite, which is always an inclination or tendency that is more than a mere transcendental relation and yet it never follows cognition in its subject, not even in the case of the will.

Both these views regard the innate appetite univocally, so far as its presence in the various powers of the soul is concerned. Whether it is regarded as purely a relation or more dynamically as an inclination and tendency, it is always independent of cognition in its subject. The conclusion I have come to from reading St. Thomas maintains the analogy of natural appetite not only, as Father Sullivan grants, " as now in the body, now in the soul, now a substantial nature, now an accidental one,"[8] but also, as he is not willing to concede, in the various powers of the soul themselves. In my opinion natural appetite for St. Thomas Aquinas is more than a mere relation; it is always an inclination or tendency that flows from the natural form, either substantial or accidental. He never speaks of two natural appetites, one innate and the other elicited. The one natural appetite that he knows includes necessarily relation, the so-called transcendental relation of finality of later writers, but it is not only this: as inclination or tendency it is a genuine movement. Its analogical character lies in the fact that where a nature or power does not involve cognition (except of course the knowledge of God, the author of nature), its natural appetite will be a non-cognitional tendency, as in a stone. Where, however, a natural power such as the will depends by its nature upon prior cognition in its subject, its natural desire will require the same dependence.

valore apologetico secondo S. Tommaso," *Ephemerides Carmeliticae,* 1 (1947), 55-102. Cf. especially pp. 88-89.

[8] *Art. cit.,* 509.

Since the correctness of this interpretation has been challenged and difficulty found especially with the notion of natural appetite as movement in the proper sense of the term, I am grateful to the editors of THE THOMIST for giving me the opportunity to defend my views and to answer the difficulties that have been found in them by Father Sullivan. It should be kept in mind that this article, as well as anything else I may have written upon the points under discussion, is written in a spirit of inquiry. The inquiry concerns mainly what St. Thomas himself thought and said about natural appetite. I can only present the evidence upon which my conclusions are based, leaving open the possibility of different conclusions upon the discovery of further evidence or of a more correct interpretation of texts already seen.

1. Natural Appetite in General

We shall first examine what St. Thomas has to say about natural appetite in general in order to discover, if possible, whether he regarded it as just relation or as movement as well as relation. We shall leave for further consideration the question whether natural appetite in the will and in the sensitive appetite depends upon prior cognition in the subject. We readily grant that St. Thomas often speaks of natural appetite in terms of aptitude, order, proportion, or relation, without mentioning inclination, tendency, or movement. This is especially the case when he is speaking of the natural appetite of matter for form, as in *De Pot.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 2 *in contr.*: "The appetite for form is not any action of the matter, but a certain relationship (*habitudo*) of the matter to the form, according as it is in potency to it." A more general statement occurs in *II Phys.* lect. 13: "This is what 'nature seeks an end' is: to have a natural aptitude for the end."[9] From these and similar statements there is no doubt about the fact that St. Thomas conceived of natural appetite in terms of aptitude, order, and

[9] Cf. *I Phys.*, lect. 15: "'Matter seeks form' is nothing else than the fact that it is ordained to form as potency to act."

relation. The question is, does this mean that there is nothing more to natural appetite than relation, or is it primarily a movement that essentially involves what St. Thomas calls a relation *secundum dici?* [10] In other words, is it possible to eliminate movement in explaining what natural appetite meant for St. Thomas and express his meaning solely in terms of relation? The only way to reach a satisfactory answer to this question is to see what St. Thomas actually said.

One of the most detailed explanations of natural appetite occurs in *De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 1. In this article St. Thomas explains how all things seek the good. All natural things are ordained, disposed, or directed towards their end. They are not directed towards their end violently, since violent direction either goes against the inclination of a natural form, or it is an impulse imparted to a thing without the presence of a form in the thing to make this impulse its own. St. Thomas then says:

> Sometimes that which is directed or inclined towards an end obtains from the one who directs or *moves* it a form through which this inclination belongs to it; hence an inclination of this kind will be natural, as if having a natural principle; just as He who gave heaviness to a stone inclined it to be carried downward naturally. This is the way in which the generator is the *mover* in heavy and light things . . . and in this way all natural objects are inclined towards the things that are suitable to them. They have within themselves a principle of inclination, by reason of which their inclination is natural, so that in a certain way they move (*vadant*) towards their due ends instead of being merely led (*ducantur*) to them. Things which suffer violence are only led, because they contribute nothing to the agency moving them. Natural objects move (*vadunt*) towards their end inasmuch as they cooperate with the one who inclines and directs them through an innate (*inditum*) principle within them. Whenever a thing is directed or inclined towards something by someone, it is inclined towards that

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[10] Terms that are relative *secundum esse* signify relations themselves, as the terms *father* and *son*. Terms that are relative *secundum dici* directly and principally signify things of another category, as *mover* and thing *moved*, from which a relation flows. Cf. *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 10, ad 11; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 13, a. 7, ad 1.

which is intended by him who inclines or directs, as the arrow is directed to the mark by the archer.

Hence, since all natural objects are inclined towards their ends by a certain natural inclination from the first mover, who is God, it is necessary that the end to which each one is naturally inclined be that which is willed or intended by God. The will of God, however, has no other end than Himself, and He is the essence of goodness; hence, it is necessary that all other things be naturally inclined towards the good. To desire (*appetere*), however, is nothing else than to seek (*petere*) something, as if to tend towards something ordained to itself.

Since, then, all things are ordained and directed towards the good by God, and in such a way that in each thing is a principle through which it tends towards the good, as if seeking its good, we must say that all things naturally seek (*appetant*) the good. If all things were inclined towards the good without having in themselves a principle of inclination, they could be said to be directed towards the good, but not to be seeking the good. Because of this innate (*inditi*) principle all things are said to seek the good, as if spontaneously tending towards the good. This is why in Wisdom, 8, it is said that divine wisdom disposes all things sweetly, because each and every thing by its own movement tends (*ex suo motu tendit*) towards that to which it is divinely ordained.

The importance of this passage justifies the length of the quotation. For St. Thomas there is in every natural object a tendency or inclination, coming from God through the natural form, whereby these natural things are not only directed constantly towards their natural end but they are spontaneously moving in that direction. The article comes to a climax in the statement that every *ens naturae* in virtue of this innate principle is tending by its own movement (*motu*) towards its divinely appointed end.

In the reply to the second objection this inclination or movement is expressly called natural appetite. It is in all things and it can be present even where there is no knowledge, although it always requires knowledge in the one who ordained these things to their end.[11] St. Thomas bases his notion of natural

[11] See also *ibid.*, ad 4, and article 2 of the same Question, where we are told that the natural appetite for the good, which is in all things, implicitly contains a natural desire for God. Italics in all quotations from St. Thomas are mine.

desire upon the fact that God is not only the creator but also the prime mover whose movement is not just an initial impulse that has ceased; on the contrary, it is an impulse that is kept up constantly and by it God is, as it were, heading all things towards their natural end. This doctrine lies within the framework of Aristotle's teaching on natural movement as St. Thomas understands it. In his commentary on *II Physics*, 14, he tells us:

> Things are said to be 'according to nature' whenever they are moved continuously by an intrinsic principle until they reach . . . a determined end. . . . Nature is nothing else than a kind of art, a divine art, impressed upon things, whereby they themselves *are moved* towards a determined end; just as if a builder of a ship could give to the planks and boards the ability to be moved by themselves to assume the form of a ship.

The same idea of nature as movement occurs in *IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1:

> In every order of mobile things and of movers, the second movers must be ordained to the end of the first mover by a disposition *impressed* upon them by the first mover. . . . There is this difference, however, between natural movements and violent, that in violent movements the impression left by the first mover on second movers is outside (*praeter*) their nature; and therefore the *operation* following such an impression is difficult and laborious for them. In natural movements, on the other hand, the impression left by the first mover on second movers is for them a natural cause; and therefore the *operation following this impression* is suitable and agreeable; and therefore it is said in Wisdom, chap. 8, that God disposes all things sweetly, because each and every thing by the nature divinely implanted in it *tends* towards that to which it is ordained by divine providence according to the exigency of the *impression* it has received. Because all things proceed from God inasmuch as He is good, . . . therefore all created things, according to the impression received from the creator, are *inclined* towards seeking the good according to their mode. Thus a certain circulation is discovered in things, while, proceeding from the good, they tend towards the good. This circulation is perfect in some creatures [i. e., in rational creatures, which are ordained to reach God by knowledge and love]; in others it remains imperfect [i. e.,

in irrational creatures, which are ordained to reach only a likeness of the first good from which they proceeded]. . . . Therefore, as every other thing naturally seeks its good, so every rational creature naturally seeks its beatitude.

We use this text not so much for the light it throws on the natural desire for beatitude but simply for the sake of what it tells us about the natural tendency in all things towards the good. It is difficult to interpret the " circulation " it speaks of in terms of relation alone, apart from genuine movement. The impression or inclination it describes is prior to operation, and the subsequent operation is suitable and agreeable when it is in harmony with the natural inclination. The analogous character of natural appetite is suggested in the statement that the impression coming from the creator inclines all things to seek the good *according to their mode.*

In *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 24, again we find natural inclination explained in terms of movement:

> It is not difficult to see how natural bodies which lack cognition are moved and act because of an end. They tend towards the end as directed towards it by an intelligent substance, in the way that an arrow tends towards the mark directed by the archer. As the arrow requires an inclination towards the mark, or determined end, from the impulse of the archer, so natural bodies obtain an inclination towards their natural ends from *natural movers,* from which they acquire their forms, and powers, and movements. It is clear, then, that every work of nature is the work of an intelligent substance, for the effect is principally attributed to the first *mover* directing it to its end rather than to the instruments directed by him. This is why natural operations are discovered to proceed in an orderly way towards their end, as do the operations of a wise man. It becomes plain, then, that even things which lack cognition can operate because of an end, and can seek good by *natural appetite.* . . .

In *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 60, a. 5, St. Thomas, arguing against the contention that an angel, absolutely speaking, loves himself with natural love more than he loves God, indirectly throws light upon the nature of natural appetite in general: " The falsity of this opinion is apparent, if one will consider in natural

objects to what a thing is naturally *moved*; for natural inclination in things that are without reason demonstrates a natural inclination in the will of an intellectual nature." In natural objects that lack knowledge altogether, as a stone, there is no room for a twofold natural appetite, innate and elicited. Consequently the *movement* that is natural inclination or appetite belongs to natural appetite in general; it is what may be called the basic or innate natural appetite.

This natural appetite is again described in terms of movement in *I Ethics*, lect. 1:

> The philosopers have well said that the good is that which all things seek. . . . This is not to be understood only of things that have knowledge which apprehend the good, but also of things that lack knowledge, which tend towards the good by *natural appetite;* not as if they know the good, but because they are *moved towards the good* by some intelligent being; that is, from an ordination of the divine intellect, in the way that an arrow tends towards the mark from the direction of the archer. To tend towards the good is to seek the good. So it is that all things seek the good inasmuch as they tend towards the good.

The same thought occurs in *I Ethics*, lect. 2: "Natural desire is nothing else than an inclination inhering in things from the ordination of the first *mover* (*moventis*) which cannot be frustrated." We find it again in *IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 1: "A thing is *moved* towards its perfection in two ways. In one way, by natural inclination, as a stone is moved downwards; and this movement does not require cognition in that which is moved but in another which is the principle causing this inclination; and this is natural movement." It appears also in *III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 2: "In two ways a thing tends towards an end. One, when it is directed to the end by itself, which occurs only in the case of one who knows the end. In another way, when it is *directed* by another, and in this way all things according to their nature *tend* towards their proper and natural ends, *directed* by the wisdom that instituted nature. Thus we find two appetites; namely, natural appetite, which is nothing else than the inclination of a thing towards its

natural end, which is from the *direction* of the author of nature. . . ." The other is animal appetite, either intellectual or sensitive.

Another term is used to describe natural appetite: *impetus*. We find this in *V Metaphy.*, lect. 6: "In natural things is an *impetus*, or inclination to some end, to which the will corresponds in a rational nature; hence, the natural inclination itself is called appetite. It is possible, however, . . . for the *impetus* of natural inclination . . . to be impeded in the prosecution of a movement already begun." *Impetus* translates Aristotle's ὁρμή, a term that signifies in Liddel and Scott's lexicon a violent movement onwards, an assault, a first stir or start, an impulse; the Latin *impetus*.

The same doctrine is taught in *De Verit.*, q. 25, a. 1: "Natural appetite tends towards the appetible thing itself, without any apprehension of the reason of the appetibility; for natural appetite is nothing else than a certain inclination of a thing, and an order to something suitable to itself, as for a stone to be borne (*ferri*) to a lower place. . . . This apprehension is required in the author of nature, who gave to each and every nature its own *inclination* suitable to itself." Every natural power as well as substantial nature has this natural appetite, as we see in *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 1, ad 3: "Natural appetite is the inclination of each and every thing towards something from its nature; hence, by natural appetite every power desires (*desiderat*) that which is convenient to it."

The term of movement is rest. If natural appetite is a true kind of movement, we can understand why it can be said to come to rest, as in *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 19, a. 1: "Everything has this relationship (*habitudinem*) to its natural form, that when it does not have it, it *tends* towards it; and when it has it, it *rests* in it. The same is the case with every natural perfection, which is a good of nature. This relationship (*habitudo*) to good in things that lack cognition is called natural appetite." If natural appetite were just relation without movement, rest would have no meaning; but if it is what

St. Thomas calls a relation *secundum dici,* then rest has a meaning in reference to it, since it is primarily movement with a relation that necessarily flows from it.

The term "proportion" is also used in the same way to describe natural appetite, as in *Comp. Theol.,* c. 107: "In natural movement first is considered some property through which the mobile thing is *proportioned* or *inclined* to such an end, as heaviness in the earth to this that it be borne downwards; for nothing would be naturally moved to a certain end unless it had a proportion to it." The *inclination* that is natural appetite is also a proportion and a relation, but it is primarily movement. It is precisely because this natural inclination is a genuine movement that St. Thomas can say in *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 18, a. 1, ad 2: "Heavy and light bodies are *moved* by an extrinsic mover, either the generator of them who gives the form, or the one who removes an impediment." In the same sense of movement do we understand the statement of *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 6, a. 1, ad 2: "Some things have a natural appetite without cognition, inasmuch as they are *inclined* to their ends by some superior intelligent being."

Further texts that assert the movement-nature of natural appetite are these:

Summa Theol., I, q. 103, a. 8: "Every inclination either natural or voluntary of anything is nothing else than a certain impression from the first *mover,* as the inclination of the arrow towards a determined mark is nothing else than a certain impression from the archer."

Ibid., I-II, q. 1, a. 2: "This determination to produce an effect, as it takes place in a rational nature by rational appetite, which is called will, so in others takes place by natural inclination, which is called natural appetite. Yet it must be considered that a thing by its action or *movement* tends towards an end in two ways. One, as moved by another towards the end, as the arrow tends towards a determined end from the fact that it is moved by the archer, who directs his action towards an end. Things therefore that have reason move themselves towards an end. . . . Those, however, that lack reason tend towards their end by *natural inclination,* as if *moved* by another, not however by themselves, since

they do not know the notion of end, and therefore . . . they are only ordained to the end by another."

Ibid., q. 26, a. 2: "A natural agent induces a twofold effect in a patient; for first it gives a form; secondly, it gives a *movement* following the form, as the generator gives to a body heaviness and a movement following it. Even heaviness itself, which is the principle [*or* beginning; *principium*] of movement to a connatural place because of heaviness, can in some way be called natural love."

II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2: "Natural things, although they have not a will, still intend something through natural appetite, inasmuch as they are directed towards their end by the divine intellect which gives to nature an inclination towards its end; and this inclination is called natural appetite."

Summa Theol., I-II, q. 23, a. 4: "Every mover [St. Thomas is speaking of natural agents] draws in some way the recipient of movement to itself, or repels it from itself. In drawing it to itself it does three things in it. First, it gives it an *inclination* or aptitude to tend towards itself. . . . Second, if a generated body is outside its proper place, it gives it a motion (*moveri*) towards the place. Third, it gives it rest when it arrives at its place. . . ."

The identification of natural appetite with movement is made by St. Thomas in a place that leaves no room for doubt. He is speaking of the question whether the will moves the intellect and, if so, how we can avoid an infinite regress in the reciprocal acts of intellect and will. He replies in *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 12, ad 2: "We need not proceed to infinity, for we must make a stand in *natural appetite* whereby the intellect is inclined towards its act."

After writing this, St. Thomas came upon the *Liber de bona fortuna*, in Italy, some time between 1259 and 1260. This work forms part of the *Eudemian Ethics*, formerly attributed to Aristotle but now assigned to Eudemus of Rhodes, one of his pupils.[12] In this work God appears as the first instigator of intellectual operation. From this time onward God takes the place of natural appetite as the first mover of intellect and will especially in the *Summa Theologiae* and in the *Contra*

[12] Cf. Th. Deman, O.P., "Le *Liber de bona fortuna* dans la théologie de S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 17 (1928), 38-58; cf. p. 39.

Gentiles.[13] No amount of control that the mind of man has over its act can dispense with the fact that it needs to be moved by God.[14] To be inclined by natural appetite and to be moved by God are equivalent expressions for St. Thomas Aquinas.

When St. Thomas speaks of the government of the world by God he clearly asserts the movement of nature towards its end. In *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 103, a. 1, he teaches that "natural things are being *directed* by providence towards the end of the good, which is government"; and that divine goodness not only "produced things in being, but is also *leading* them to their end. This is government." In answering the first objection, which made the point that natural things do not move or operate because of an end since they do not know the end, St. Thomas points out that they are *moved* and operate towards an end in the sense that they are driven or directed towards it as an arrow is moved towards the mark as directed towards it by the archer, who possesses the requisite knowledge of the end.

Even when St. Thomas speaks of the natural appetite of matter for form, he retains the notion of movement. In *II Sent.*, d. 12, *exposit. text.*, he tells us: "Form is the end to which the appetite of matter *tends*." In *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 1, ad 3, we learn: "As a thing has in itself the form of the end and of the good in potency, it *tends* towards the good or towards the end, and desires it. In this way matter is said to seek form, inasmuch as the form is in it in potency. Therefore,

[13] See *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 4, ad 3; I-II, q. 9, a. 4; *ibid.*, q. 80, a. 1, and ad 3; *ibid.*, q. 109, a. 2, ad 1. *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 89, *Item: Arguit.* . . .

[14] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 1: "Unde mens hominis etiam sani non ita habet dominium sui actus quin indigeat moveri a Deo." Cf. Deman, *art. cit.*, p. 42: ". . . une appréhension intellectuelle précède nécessairement tout mouvement de la volonté au lieu que le contraire ne se vérifie pas. Mais qui donnera le branle à l'intelligence? Son appétit naturel, disait laconiquement le *de Veritate.*" On p. 44 Father Deman speaks of this need of God as first mover as one of St. Thomas' "plus importantes doctrines métaphysiques, selon laquelle le mouvement de la volonté ne s'explique pas si l'on ne pose, au principe du premier acte de la volonté . . . un premier moteur, qui est Dieu."

the more that potency is perfect and nearer to act, so much the more *vehement inclination* it causes; from which it happens that every natural movement is intended in the end." In *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 1, a. 2, we have this: ". . . matter does not attain form unless as it is *moved* by an agent, for nothing reduces itself from potency to act." In *II Sent.*, d. 18, q. 1, a. 2, St. Thomas clearly associates the natural appetite of matter with movement, while recognizing that not all natural movements are the same: " Nor does it follow, if in matter is only passive power, that there is not natural generation; because matter cooperates (*coadjuvat*) towards generation not by acting but inasmuch as it is able to receive such an action; and this ability (*habilitas*) is called the appetite of matter, and the beginning of form. *Not in the same way are all movements said to be natural. . . .*" We must never lose sight of the fact that matter never exists apart from form, so that what is said of natural appetite as a tendency that flows from the natural form only by reduction and analogously can be applied to matter alone.

The reason why St. Thomas can speak of matter desiring form is because Aristotle, whose *Physics* he is following, placed in every *ens naturae* an impulse (ὁρμή) which is its natural tendency or desire, a desire that he finds even in matter: " The truth is that what desires the form is matter." [15] The fundamental role of movement in nature is clearly shown in this statement: " Those things are natural which, by a continuous movement originated from an internal principle, arrive at some completion; . . . the tendency in each is always towards the same end, if there is no impediment." [16] It is easier for us to see how things are moving by natural desire towards their natural ends when we know that they are not just placed in existence statically by the Creator, who merely gave to each a relation to its end. The Creator is also the prime mover and as such He has launched creatures into being, setting them in motion towards their natural ends. This primordial movement

[15] *Physics*, 192a 22.

[16] *Physics*, 199b 15-19.

in the natures of things is, so far as I can see, what St. Thomas means by their natural desire.

2. Movement in the Proper Sense

It is impossible in my opinion to escape the conclusion that natural appetite is for St. Thomas a movement, not to the exclusion of relation but including it as a relation *secundum dici*. By natural appetite all creatures from the beginning of their existence are moving towards their proper good and at least implicitly towards God. This movement involves a relation towards their end and towards God. A remarkable statement occurs in *I Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1, in which St. Thomas asserts that all the relations between creatures and God are founded upon movement: ". . . sometimes it happens that relation is really in one and not in the other; because in one it has a certain movement (*motum*) upon which it is founded, which it does not have in the other; as is the case in all those relations by which God is referred to the creature, which are indeed really in the creature but not in God."

What is the alternative to identifying natural appetite in the basic sense with movement? It must be borne in mind that natural appetite follows every natural form and as such it is in every *ens naturae* and in every natural power: "Since every inclination follows some form, natural appetite follows a form existing in nature";[17] "Each and every power of the soul is a certain form or nature, and it has a natural inclination to something. Hence, each one desires an object suitable to it by natural appetite."[18] The innate natural appetite is for Father Sullivan, following the Commentators, not movement but a transcendental relation of nature, or power of nature, to its end. *This relation is identified with the nature that has it*, and it must not be confused with the predicamental relation which is a really distinct accident added to the nature.[19] In

[17] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 8, a. 1.
[18] *Ibid.*, I, q. 80, a. 1, ad 3.
[19] *Art. cit.*, 525. Italics mine.

the case of the will, the transcendental relation which is its innate natural appetite is identified with the will as a power, and for this reason Father Sullivan calls it potential natural appetite.[20] Then, in explaining the statement of St. Thomas that " in natural things the nature itself is something else from the inclination of nature, and its movement or operation," [21] Father Sullivan says that nature here means substantial nature, while the inclination of nature means the power of the will which is really distinct from the natural or substantial form.[22]

Here is something to ponder over. Innate natural appetite is a transcendental relation in every case for Father Sullivan. As such it is identified with the nature that has it, for it is not a predicamental relation which is a really distinct accident added to the nature of man.[23] Father Sullivan even cites St. Thomas to support his contention that natural inclination is a transcendental relation identified with nature, when the nature is evidently a substantial nature: " Moreover, we have his clear identification of the natural appetite with the nature: 'The very nature of each thing *is* a certain inclination implanted in it by the First Mover and ordering it to its due end.' " [24] In spite of the fact that we are dealing with an inclination implanted by the first *mover,* this natural inclination or appetite is not movement but relation, in Father Sullivan's view.

Yet this transcendental relation which is natural inclination or appetite is also really distinct from the substantial nature: " Whether natural appetite be an act of will or the power itself which is the will, it is really distinct from the *substantial* nature." [25] When, therefore, St. Thomas says that " just as

[20] This identification is asserted on pp. 503, 511, 516, 524, 525; potential natural appetite occurs on pp. 491, 494, 495, 496, 517, 526.

[21] *De Verit.,* q. 27, a. 2, Father Sullivan mistranslates *motus vel operatio* by " movement and operation."

[22] *Art. cit.,* 502.

[23] *Art. cit.,* 525.

[24] *Art. cit.,* 525-526. The quotation is from *In XII Metaphys.,* 2, n. 2634. Italics are Father Sullivan's.

[25] *Art. cit.,* 502. Italics are Father Sullivan's.

in natural things the nature itself is something else from the inclination of nature," [26] he means that natural appetite, which is a transcendental relation, is really distinct from the substantial nature; while in the statement that "the very nature of each thing is a certain inclination implanted in it by the First Mover," [27] St. Thomas identifies the same natural appetite with the nature. Father Sullivan seems to contradict himself in these two statements. How can the same natural inclination be distinct from and identified with the substantial nature?

Father Sullivan identifies the innate natural appetite with nature in the sense of a natural power; it is the transcendental relation of a power to its natural end. The will in his explanation is a natural appetite of man's substantial nature; yet it is a power really distinct from the substantial nature. As a transcendental relation of a substantial nature this natural appetite which is the will should be identified with the nature of which it is a relation. Yet it is an accidental power, really distinct from this nature. At the same time the will has its own transcendental relation or natural appetite which is identified with it.

St. Thomas nowhere gives any indication that natural appetite is really distinct from a substantial nature but really identified with the natural powers. It is always an inclination that flows from each and every natural form, whether substantial or accidental, and it is represented as really distinct from the form from which it flows. In *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 2, he points out the distinction between nature and its proportion on the one hand, and natural appetite on the other: "For the attainment of some end in the sphere of nature (*in rebus naturalibus*) three things are required; namely, a *nature proportioned* to that end; and an *inclination* towards that end, which is the *natural appetite* of the end; and a *movement* towards the end." The movement (*motus*) which St. Thomas sometimes places after natural inclination may be either move-

[26] *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 2, *Art. cit.*, 502.
[27] *XII Metaphys.*, lect. 2. *Art. cit.*, 526.

ment in the sense of imperfect act midway between pure potency and the completed act, which is what movement really is; or it can be movement in the wide sense, which is the perfect act of operation. In the passage before us St. Thomas illustrates both these meanings.

He tells us first: "It is clear that in the earth is a certain *nature* to which it belongs to be in the center (*medio*); and an *inclination* towards the central place follows this nature, according to which [inclination] it *naturally desires* such a place when it is detained outside it by violence; and, therefore, if there is no impediment, it always *moves* (*movetur*) downward." This movement follows natural inclination, and they are both movement in the sense of imperfect act. That there can be an inclination or impulse to movement in the imperfect sense of act as well as in the perfect sense is clear from *Quodl.* I, a. 8, ad 3: "The inclination of a natural thing is twofold: to be moved, and to act." We must not be surprised if we hear St. Thomas at times call even local movement an operation, as in *II De Anima*, lect. 5:

> From each and every *form* follows some *inclination*, and from the inclination an *operation*; as from the *natural form* of fire follows an *inclination* to a place that is upward, according to which [inclination] fire is called light; and from this inclination *operation* follows; namely the movement which is upward. . . . the inclination following the natural form is called natural appetite. From appetite follows operation, which is local movement.

Another term that alternates with operation is action, as in *De Malo*, q. 6: "In natural things is found form, which is the principle of action, and an *inclination* following the form, which is called natural appetite, from which *action* follows." Father Sullivan argues that natural inclination cannot be movement because St. Thomas distinguishes movement from natural inclination and identifies it with operation.[28] This, however, does not warrant the conclusion that inclination cannot be move-

[28] *Art. cit.*, 502-503. The two texts studied in these pages are from *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 2, and *II de Anima*, lect. 5.

ment also. We must keep in mind the two senses of movement, the imperfect act and the perfect act. Besides, for St. Thomas there is nothing strange about a movement before a movement even when both are the imperfect act of transition from potency to act. He teaches this in *VIII Phys.*, lect. 4: "In inanimate things, although movement appears to begin anew in something, nevertheless movement appears preexisting in something exterior by which the thing is moved." The exterior thing that moves inanimate things is either that which generated them, or that which removes the impediment, or that which induces violence. Even animals, which move themselves, still have an exterior mover which naturally moves them, and which for Aristotle was either the air or a heavenly body. Hence, St. Thomas concludes: "So, to one who diligently considers the matter, it is apparent that never does any movement appear in us anew, unless some other movement precedes it." This is merely another way of saying what we are told in *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 15: "Nature tends towards its end as *moved* and directed by another who is endowed with intelligence and will."

The second sense of movement as operation, which is movement in the wide sense because it is a perfect or completed act, is illustrated in the same *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 2: "Man according to his *nature* is *proportioned* to a certain end, of which he has a *natural appetite*; and according to his natural powers he is able to *operate* for the attainment of that end which consists in some contemplation of divine things, such as is possible to man according to the faculty of his nature. . . ." In both the examples used in this article to illustrate the midway position of natural appetite between nature on the one hand and movement on the other, proportion is on the side of nature, while natural appetite is clearly marked off from this proportioned nature. St. Thomas could not have written this article as it appears if in his mind natural appetite was identified with nature and meant no more than proportion.[29]

[29] That movement as natural tendency can precede another movement in the same sense of imperfect act is expressed in *De Pot.*, q. 5, a. 5: "Nature never

If natural tendency is movement, is it movement in the proper sense of the term? Father Sullivan cites *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 1, ad 14, in which St. Thomas restricts movement in the proper sense (the act of a being existing in potency as such) to bodies. No problem arises here when natural tendency is considered as it exists in inanimate objects such as stones. Since, however, natural tendency is found in spiritual beings as well as in material, how can it in the latter case be movement in the proper sense, if this is identified with bodily movement?

It is true, and I was aware of it, that St. Thomas restricts movement in the proper sense *at times* to bodies. Besides the passage from *De Veritate* just cited we find this restriction in *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 73, a. 2: "Although movement *properly speaking* is of bodies, still the name movement is also applied to spiritual beings in two ways. One way, inasmuch as every operation is called movement. In another way, desire tending towards something is called a certain movement." It is significant that *in spiritual beings* there can be another movement besides the one we call operation. Tendency in them is movement as operation is movement. These two kinds of movement in a spiritual being differ in this respect: operation is the perfect act, while desire as tendency is the imperfect act of movement towards the perfect act called operation. Calling desire a certain movement (*quidam motus*) does not deny its reality as movement in the sense of imperfect act as opposed to movement in the sense of perfect act. The same meaning is attached to the statement in *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1: "Appetite is as it were a certain movement towards a thing." St. Thomas is not denying that the natural appetite for the

inclines towards movement for the sake of movement, but because of something determined which follows from movement; as the nature of a heavy thing inclines it towards rest in the center, and consequently it inclines it towards downward movement, inasmuch as by such movement it can arrrive at such a place. . . . Movement is tending towards something else; hence it has not the character of an end but rather of a means to an end. The fact that it is an imperfect act testifies to this." If natural appetite is natural tendency, as it is, it is movement in the sense of imperfect act.

good is movement, but he is emphasizing that it is a certain kind of movement.

St. Thomas, however, does not always restrict himself to bodily movement when he speaks of movement in the proper sense of the term. Movement in the proper sense can mean simply the imperfect act of existing in potency as such, as opposed to the perfect act of operation, even in the case of spiritual beings. In *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 18, a. 1, St. Thomas, speaking of the life of things in nature, makes this statement: "Those things are properly said to be living which move themselves according to some species of movement; whether movement be taken *properly*, as the act of a being in potency (that is, of one existing in potency) is called movement, or movement be taken *commonly*, as the act of a perfect being is called movement, as understanding and sensing are called movement."

To the objection that St. Thomas at least has in mind here the movements of bodily things in nature and not of spiritual beings, we may cite a passage where he is considering the movement of the purely spiritual power of the intellect. In *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3, St. Thomas shows in what sense the human intellect of Christ could ascend to God in prayer: "Ascension is nothing else than a movement upward. Movement, however, is spoken of in two ways. In one way, *properly*, inasmuch as it implies an exit from potency to act, as it is the act of an imperfect being. . . . In another way, movement is called the act of a perfect being; that is, of one existing in act, as understanding and sensing are called certain movements." St. Thomas denies that the human intellect of Christ could move up to God in the proper sense of movement. The reason he gives is interesting. It is not because the intellect is a spirit and as such cannot move in the proper sense of the term. The reason is simply that the intellect of Christ was always united to God through the hypostatic union and the beatific vision. As a result, it could move up to God only in the second sense, by the operation of contemplative prayer.

II Sent., d. 24, q. 3, a. 1, gives us a further restriction:

movement in the proper sense of the imperfect act of tendency belongs to appetite and the appetitive powers of the soul:

> Movement, as Aristotle says, is a way to being. Hence, in the parts of the soul movement is *properly* called an inclination to something [*or,* an inclination to something is properly called movement]. *Properly,* therefore, movement is not attributed to the powers to which an inclination does not belong. Inclination, however, is in the appetite, which moves to something; therefore, the acts of the appetitive powers are called movements; but not properly the acts of the apprehensive powers. There is, however, in us a threefold appetite: natural, sensitive, and rational. Natural appetite; for example, for food, is that which the imagination does not engender but the very disposition of natural qualities, whereby the natural powers exercise their actions. This movement in no one is subject to reason, nor does it obey it. . . ."

In the first objection in this article St. Thomas makes the point that Peter Lombard did not sufficiently account for the movements of the soul when he mentioned the movements of sensuality and of the superior and inferior reason. St. Thomas remarks: " Every power is *naturally moved* towards its object. The generative and nutritive power is a certain natural power. It, therefore, has a natural *movement* towards the *act* of generating and of eating; so that besides the movement of sensuality and of reason, we must place a natural *movement.*"

It is to be noted once more how St. Thomas carefully distinguishes the natural movement from the act or operation that follows it. In giving his reply to this difficulty St. Thomas grants the existence of a natural movement which is evidently natural appetite or inclination. The only reason he gives to explain why it was passed over by Peter Lombard is the fact that sin cannot exist in it. The main point for us that emerges from this article is the notion that natural appetite is movement in the proper sense, whereby the appetitive powers naturally tend towards their operations and activities.

The virtue of hope considered merely as a tendency is also movement in the sense of the imperfect act. We find this in *III Sent.,* d. 31, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 2:

There is a twofold act; namely, the act that is the act of an imperfect being as such, such as *movement;* and the act which is of a perfect being as such, such as *operation* following a form. . . . Movement, which is the act of an imperfect being, when it arrives at its termination does not remain so far as the substance of the act is concerned, but only in its root, according to which movement was present; which root was a certain proportion and order of the imperfect being to its perfection. . . . Hope, inasmuch as it *tends* towards the arduous which is not yet attained, and towards something expected in the future, is as the act of an imperfect being, since it is as it were a certain *movement;* and therefore when it arrives at its perfection it no longer remains so far as expectation or hope is concerned, but only in that in which this expectation was rooted; namely, order and proportion of the man himself to the things which are now possessed, of which, when they were not possessed, there was hope."

In this passage St. Thomas makes a clear distinction between the imperfect act of movement and the order and proportion that are involved in it. The fact that the two are not the same for St. Thomas is evident from the assertion that when movement reaches its term, the movement ceases, while the order and proportion remain.

In *III Phys.*, lect. 2, St. Thomas enumerates four species of movement: alteration in quality, increase and diminution in quantity, generation and corruption in substance, and local motion in place. He then adds: "He [Aristotle] here takes movement *commonly* for change, but not *strictly*, according as it is divided against generation and corruption." In other words, movement in substance, which is generation and corruption, is not movement strictly so-called because it is instantaneous and not continuous. This leaves the other three species of movement in the strict sense, to which the definition of movement as the imperfect act of existing in potency as such properly belongs. Local motion, while it is the first of all movements, as St. Thomas tells us in *V Phys.*, lect. 2, is not the only kind of movement in the proper sense of the term; movement in quality is just as properly movement as movement in place.[30]

[30] In *I Sent.*, d. 37, q. 4, a. 1, St. Thomas speaks of movement in reference to

In *V Phys.*, lect. 4, the heading in the Parma edition tells us that "movement *properly* is said to be only in three *genera*." In the text St. Thomas, explaining Aristotle, says that "movement is only in these three *genera*, quality, quantity, and place, because in each of these there happens to be contrariety which movement requires."

Because movement is caused by an agent and received by a patient, St. Thomas with Aristotle teaches in *III Phys.*, lect. 5, that "as it is from the agent it is called action, but as it is in the patient it is called passion." The explanation makes clear that one and the same movement is called both action and *passio*, depending upon whether it is considered as the act of the agent or as the act of the patient. St. Thomas continues: "Movement in the realm of nature is nothing else than an imperfect act, which is a certain beginning of a perfect act in one that is moved; as in one that is being made white there begins to be something of whiteness." If we ask in what *genus* natural movement is to be placed, St. Thomas replies in the same lesson: "So far as movement in nature is concerned, it

the angels. After stating that the succession of infused species in the intellect of an angel is movement in the wide sense (*largo modo*), he says: "It differs from movement properly so-called in at least two respects. First, because it is not from potency to act but from act to act. Second, because it is not continuous." There is succession between two species, but not continuity. Then, in answer to the first objection, St. Thomas says: "Movement taken *properly* is always of one existing in potency; but at times the operation of a thing is *improperly* called its movement." Movement in the proper sense is the imperfect act; movement in the improper or wide sense is the perfect act of operation. Finally, in answering the fifth objection, St. Thomas says this: "Local movement, as it is of bodies, does not belong to an angel except metaphorically; but speaking equivocally of movement it belongs to an angel properly." Equivocally here means analogously, as in *I Sent.*, d. 31, a. 2, a. 1, ad 2: "In equivocal terms which occur by chance and fortune, as the term dog [applied to an animal and to a heavenly body], no likeness is attended to at all; but in equivocal terms which are used in reference to one principle, we attend to some likeness of analogy or proportion." From the whole article it is clear that movement taken equivocally or analogously here means operation, whereby an angel is said to be and to move in place. While St. Thomas rules out local movement from an angel, except metaphorically, he does not tell us in this article whether any of the other species of movement in the proper sense can belong to a spiritual being.

is placed by reduction in that *genus* which terminates the movement, as the imperfect is reduced to the perfect. . . . To the extent that it is a certain midway entity between two terms, it involves the notions of cause and effect; since to reduce something from potency to act takes place only by an efficient cause. In this respect movement belongs to the predicament of action and passion, for these two predicaments are related as cause and effect." [31]

The *passio* is the disposition, impulse, or impression, which as disposition belongs to the first species of quality. St. Thomas, as we have seen, makes use of these terms when he describes the effect upon natural beings of God as the prime mover, moving them towards their natural end through natural desire. This movement called natural appetite is found in every *ens naturae*, corporeal and spiritual, as we learn from *De Sortibus*, c. 4: "The supreme intellect is God, who, as He produced all things in being by His wisdom, so also by the same wisdom conserves and *moves* them, directing all things to their due end. . . . *By a divine disposition not only are bodies moved but also the minds of men towards their proper actions.*" Likewise in *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 2: "God is the first mover in respect to all movements *both spiritual and corporal*, as a heavenly body is the principle of all the movements of inferior bodies."

Natural appetite is then movement in the sense of the imperfect act of tendency as opposed to the perfect act of operation, which latter is movement in the wide or improper sense. The definition of movement in the strict sense (the act

[31] For the part played by quality in movement, we have this statement from *De natura materiae* (*Opusculum* 28; Parma, 16), 1: "Each and every mobile thing is moved by its own movement through a quality inhering in it, which is the passive principle of its own movement, as heaviness and lightness in local motion; for in these qualities is the power (*virtus*) of the generator for local movement in these inferior things. Hence it is that at times these qualities are called active principles of movement, inasmuch as they are the instruments of the generator that is the principal mover of heavy and light things; at times, however, they are called passive principles, inasmuch as they are the effects of the generator. . . ."

of existing in potency as such) is verified in natural inclination, since all created natures are really moving towards their end under the influence of the prime mover, who is God.

It is difficult even for Father Sullivan, for whom the innate and potential natural appetite is just a transcendental relation, to avoid speaking of this appetite in terms of movement. On p. 378 of his article he speaks of the will "in motion by its very nature towards good and happiness in general." Is this motion in the sense of the imperfect act or in the sense of the perfect act? Or is motion here just a figure of speech for relation? On p. 517 Father Sullivan leaves us in no doubt that he is speaking about the innate and not the elicited natural appetite when he applies to it the concept of motion.

He tells us that the "existence of this potential and innate natural appetite is implied in the very fact of the actual natural appetite which we have been discussing." The freely elicited act of natural appetite implies "that the will is already determined as to the end and good in general by potential natural appetite. Here is where *imperfect* or *first* act comes in" (italics mine). The power of the will is as act in relation to the supposit or the substantial nature, while it is still in potency in regard to its own act and its object. Then Father Sullivan continues: "Thus we can say that by the very fact a man has the power which is the will, determined of its very nature to the end in general, he is in motion (using the term in the broad sense) to the end, and can thus freely elicit the act of natural appetite as a means or particular good." Father Sullivan adds immediately: "This potential natural appetite does not follow human cognition." I quote this last sentence merely to show that we are dealing with the basic, innate natural appetite, and not with the so-called elicited natural appetite.

In these quotations I have underlined *imperfect* or *first* act because they seem to be used equivalently by Father Sullivan, while they are not equivalent terms for St. Thomas Aquinas, whose doctrine, after all, we are seeking. *Imperfect* act for St.

Thomas is balanced by *perfect* act, and they differ as tendency or inclination towards an operation differs from the operation itself. *First* act, on the other hand, is balanced by *second* act, and they differ as "the form and integrity of a thing" differs from its "operation," as we are told in *Summa Theol.*, I. q. 48, a. 5. Can it be that this confusion between first act and imperfect act has led Father Sullivan to identify the natural tendency of a form with the form itself? For St. Thomas the tendency (imperfect act) flows from the form (first act) and therefore differs from it.[32]

What follows in Father Sullivan's explanation I cannot understand. The potential and innate natural appetite of the will means that a man is in *motion* to the end, but in motion only in the broad sense. If this is so, then innate and potential appetite is not just relation but motion, which has been my contention all along. Yet, for Father Sullivan, it is motion in the broad sense. For St. Thomas, motion in the broad sense means *operation*, as we see in *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 1, ad 14; *De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 1; *I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2. Does Father Sullivan really mean that the innate and potential natural appetite of the will is an *operation* of the will? Operation in Thomistic terminology is *perfect* act as opposed to *imperfect* act; it is also *second* act as opposed to *first* act. How then can the innate and potential natural appetite as an operation (motion in the broad sense) be referred to in terms of *imperfect* or *first* act, as occurs on p. 517 of Father Sullivan's article? [33]

[32] The innate natural inclination is also called first act as opposed to second act by Cajetan, *In I Summ. Theol.*, q. 78, a. 1, n. 5; it is likewise called first act by Ferrariensis, *In I Cont. Gent.*, c. 4, n. II, and by John of St. Thomas (cf. *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus*, ed. Reiser, II, 78 a 36). In my opinion this is not an exact reflection of the teaching of St. Thomas, for whom *first* act is the form; the inclination or tendency following from the form is the *imperfect* act, and the operation that follows both of these is the *perfect* act, as well as *second* act.

[33] To add to the inconsistency, Father Sullivan himself correctly gives us on p. 500 of his article St. Thomas' examples of understanding and sensing as perfect acts or operations, which are *motus* only in the broad sense; and on p. 507 he uses movement in the broad sense to characterize the act or operation of the will that follows apprehension.

It would be simpler to recognize, with St. Thomas, that all natural beings and powers are genuinely and constantly in movement towards their ends, a movement that is caused by God as prime mover and which, as the imperfect act of tendency, is their natural desire.

Father Sullivan objects to my statement that for St. Thomas there is in the will an imperfect act of movement or inclination towards the perfect act of choice. On p. 499 of his article he questions whether choice is a more perfect act than the willing of the end which is its source. On p. 500 he makes the categorical statement: "Hence neither does St. Thomas cite the freely elicited act of choice as an example of perfect act." On p. 501: "Nor is it clear why choice should be regarded as perfect act or operation. How, too, is natural appetite in the will an inclination towards the *operation of choice*? It is an inclination towards the end, not towards choice."

Again it must be borne in mind that the main question at issue is the doctrine and terminology of St. Thomas Aquinas. Does St. Thomas ever speak of choice as a perfect act or operation of the will, which Father Sullivan denies? Here are two texts in which he does:

IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 5, sol. 3, ad 1: "Movement is taken in a twofold sense. There is a certain movement which is the act of an imperfect being, which is the exit from potency to act; and this act must be successive, because it always expects something in the future for the perfection of its species. . . . Another movement is the act of a perfect being, which is rather called *operation*, which does not expect anything in the future for the completion of its species, as the act of sensing; and such movement is not successive but sudden; . . . and such a movement is the movement of free choice (*et talis motus est motus liberi arbitrii*) of which we are speaking."

De Verit., q. 28, a. 9, ad 11: "Movement is not taken here [in the case of the justification of the sinner] according as it is an exit from potency to act, for thus it is measured by time; but the movement of free choice (*liberi arbitrii*) is taken for its *operation*, which is the act of a perfect being; and so it can be in an instant, as the perfect is in an instant."

In many other places St. Thomas calls *velle* the perfect act or operation of the will, corresponding with *intelligere* and *sentire*. Among such places are *I Eth.*, lect. 1; *De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 1; *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 1; *III De Anima*, lect. 12. The main point is, however, that St. Thomas does cite the freely elicited act of choice (*motus liberi arbitrii*) as an example of perfect act or operation of the will.

3. Natural Appetite and the Will

The main difference between Father Sullivan and myself concerning the innate natural appetite of the will bears upon the presence of intellectual cognition as its necessary prerequisite. Father Sullivan, with the Commentators, denies this presence and the need for it. If innate natural appetite is univocally present in all the powers of the soul as the relation each one has to its end, and if this relation is identified with each of the powers, the need for prior cognition is not so apparent in the case of the will and of the sensitive appetite.

In an article on " The Natural Desire for Happiness," which appeared in *The Modern Schoolman* for January, 1949, many texts are assembled from St. Thomas which in my opinion assert the presence and the need of intellectual cognition before the innate natural desire of the will.[34] Father Sullivan believes that these texts prove the necessity of intellectual cognition for any *actual* tendency of the will, natural or free; but not the innate natural appetite that is identified with the will itself as a power.[35] He makes the unqualified statement that " every reference in St. Thomas to the effect that the *movement* of the natural appetite of the will follows the cognition of the intellect is a reference to actual or elicited appetite only." [36]

Father Sullivan and the Commentators see in the teaching of St. Thomas on the will two natural appetites; one the innate natural appetite that does not follow cognition, while the other

[34] *The Modern Schoolman*, 26 (1949), 91-120.
[35] *Art. cit.*, 507. [36] *Ibid.*, 504.

is the elicited natural appetite which does. At the same time Father Sullivan makes this admission: "It is true that we have no passage in which St. Thomas explicitly distinguishes the two kinds of natural appetite of the human will." [37] He believes, however, that *de facto* we find him "teaching and using an innate natural appetite which is prior to human cognition and is identified with the power itself which is the will." [38] It is difficult to see how St. Thomas could have avoided speaking about these two natural appetites if he recognized their existence and used them in his teaching. If he has not made the distinction which we find so clear-cut and explicit in his Commentators, and if he regularly speaks of the natural appetite of the will in the singular, is there not just a chance that he knew of only one natural appetite of this appetitive power?

Father Sullivan grants my contention that when St. Thomas discusses the origin of the will, he roots it by nature in the intellect or intelligence.[39] This is indeed a large concession to make. Father Sullivan believes, however, that St. Thomas refers to a priority of nature, not of time, of intellect over will.[40] Intellect and will are in the same parts of the soul, the reason; but the intellect is prior to the will only in the sense that it presents to the will its object.[41] The two, I take it, are for Father Sullivan parallel powers in the sense that the will does not owe its origin as a particular nature or power to the intellect but only the origination of any actual tendency, natural or free. He tells us: "Moreover, the purpose of having the will itself is so that men can desire the objects presented by the intellect, so that it would be idle, therefore, for God to put a will in a creature who lacked an intellect." [42] God presumably could do it, but it would be idle to do so; hence we never see the strange phenomenon of a creature lacking an intellect but possessing a will. Only in the way of final causality do we understand that "the intellect is, as it were, a cause and

[37] *Ibid.*, 516-517.
[38] *Ibid.*, 517.
[39] *Ibid.*, 506.
[40] *Ibid.*, 506.
[41] *Ibid.*, 506-507.
[42] *Ibid.*, 506.

principle of the will and is prior to it by nature. Hence the will naturally tends towards the understood good as to an end." [43]

The issue, I agree, concerns the priority in nature of intellect over will, and not to any priority in time, which I never held. For St. Thomas the intellect is prior to the will fundamentally because the will by its nature owes its origin to the intellect. In *IV Cont. Gent.*, c. 19, he tells us:

> In every intellectual nature a will must be found. . . . A natural thing through the *form* by which it is perfected in its species has an *inclination* towards its proper *operations* and its proper *end*, which it obtains through its operations, . . . and it tends towards things that are agreeable to itself. Hence it is also necessary that *from an intelligible form* an inclination follows in an intelligent being towards his proper operations and proper end. *This inclination, however, in an intellectual nature is the will*, which is the principle of operations which are in us, by which an intelligent being operates for the sake of an end; for *end* and *good* is the object of the will.

The will is the rational or intellectual appetite. What does this mean? For St. Thomas it means that the will as an appetite is proper to an intellectual nature only to the extent that it depends upon the intellect, as we are taught in *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 26:

> Appetite is not the peculiar possession (*proprium*) of an intellectual nature but it is present in all things, although differently in different things. This diversity proceeds from the fact that things are differently related to cognition. Those things which altogether lack cognition have only a natural appetite. Things that have sensitive cognition have also a sensitive appetite. . . . Things which have intellective cognition have also an appetite in proportion to their cognition; namely, the will. The will, therefore, as it is an appetite, is not the peculiar possession (*proprium*) of an intellectual nature, *but only as it depends upon the intellect.*

Does this dependence upon the intellect mean only that the intellect ranks higher than the will and is prior to it because it

[43] *Ibid.*, 506.

supplies to the will its object, but not that the will owes its origin to the intellect? St. Thomas answers this question in *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 11, ad 6:

> The will does not directly proceed from intelligence but from the essence of the soul, *with intelligence presupposed.* Hence from this there is made manifest not an order of dignity, *but only an order of origin whereby the intellect is prior naturally to the will.*

Both intellect and will originate from the essence of the soul. The intellect has a prior origin by nature but the will originates from the soul only *praesupposita intelligentia.* This taken in conjunction with the statement in *IV Cont. Gent.*, c. 19, that the will is the inclination that follows an intelligible form seems to imply that the will is not merely juxtaposed in the part of the soul called the reason, as if it were parallel to the intellect. On the contrary, the will seems to stem out from the intellectual soul as a necessary consequence of intellectual cognition. This gives a meaning to St. Thomas' statements that " what is in the will is also in some fashion in the intellect "; [44] " the things which are of the will fall under the intellect, and those which are of the intellect can fall under the will "; [45] " *the will is in the reason inasmuch as it follows the apprehension of the reason* ; [46] " from the affinity of the will to reason it happens that the will according to its very intelligibility as a power (*secundum ipsam rationem potentiae*) corresponds to reason "; [47] " the intellect is a higher power than the will by reason of order, because it is prior and is presupposed by the will "; [48] " the will denominates the rational appetite; and therefore it cannot be in things which lack reason." [49] The will is

[44] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 87, a. 4, ad 1. While intellect and will are distinct powers, yet this does not mean that what is in the will is absent from the intellect. St. Thomas continues: " Since both are rooted in the one substance of the soul, and one is in some way the principle of the other, the consequence is that what is in the will is also in some fashion in the intellect." Cf. *The Modern Schoolman, art. cit.*, 95-97.

[45] *Ibid.*, ad 2.

[46] Q. D. *De Anima*, a. 13, ad 12.

[47] *De Virtut. in Comm.*, a. 5, ad 11.

[48] *II Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4.

[49] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 6, a. 2, ad 1.

the appetite that is "annexed to the reason";[50] it is the appetite that is "joined to the intellect."[51]

When St. Thomas says that "the will is in the reason inasmuch as it follows the apprehension of the reason,"[52] he is saying more than the simple fact that the will is in the same part of the soul as the intellect. Does this mean that there must be some apprehension, some awareness, some knowledge in the soul before it can have a will? It certainly does not mean that there must be actual knowledge, but St. Thomas never seems to have envisaged the possibility of the soul existing without any kind of knowledge whatever. From this knowledge follows a certain natural love. In an earlier work, *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 5, he tells us that *intelligere* as opposed to *cogitare* means a simple regard or intuition of the intellect on that intelligible object which is present to it. Then he adds: "As *intelligere* means nothing else than intuition, which is nothing else than the presence of something intelligible to the intellect in any way, so the soul always understands itself and God indeterminately, and there follows a certain indeterminate love."[53] In a work of his maturity, *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 8, he clarifies this teaching to the extent that he calls it habitual knowledge, not actual, and he denies that it takes place through species. The soul sees itself through its essence "from the fact that its essence is present to itself." In *ad* 11 he explains that this "knowledge is in us habitually from the fact that the essence of the mind is present to our intellect." This doctrine reappears in *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 87, a. 1, where St. Thomas repeats that for this knowledge "the presence itself of the mind suffices."

If then the soul is never without some kind of knowledge, it is not difficult to see how for St. Thomas there must always

[50] *III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1.

[51] *II Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3. See also *I Sent.*, d. 45, q. 1, a. 1.

[52] Q. D. *De Anima*, a. 13, ad 12.

[53] The adverb *indeterminate* is lacking in the Mandonnet edition, but it is found in the Parma edition. Cf. Maquart, *Elementa Philosophiae*, III, *Theologia naturalis*, 262-264; esp. 213, n. 5.

be a precedence of intellect over will and of knowledge over the first movement of the will which is its natural love or appetite. Now we can see what he means when he says that " it is not necessary to proceed to infinity, but a stand is taken in the intellect as in the first. *It is necessary that apprehension precede every movement of the will,* but a movement of the will does not precede every apprehension "; [54] " an appetitive movement follows apprehension "; [55] " the ultimate end itself must first be in the intellect before it is in the will, because the will is not borne towards anything unless it is apprehended by the intellect "; [56] " the intellect first apprehends the end, before the will; yet movement towards the end begins in the will ; [57] " man naturally desires happiness; and what is naturally desired by man, is naturally known by the same "; [58] " the movement of the will is an inclination following an understood form "; [59] " the understood good is the object of the will, and moves it as end "; [60] " natural inclination in the appetitive power follows a natural conception in cognition." [61]

It is significant that St. Thomas speaks of a " certain indeterminate love " that follows the intuition the soul always has of itself and of God. Are we not here at the origin of the will, or at least of its fundamental inclination as a particular nature in the soul? St. Thomas brought together intellect and will as powers or abilities of a common spiritual subject, the soul, much more closely than they seem to be in at least some of his interpreters. The compenetration of will by intelligence is clearly asserted in *Quodl.* VI, q. 2, a. 1: " The human soul is not totally intellect, but it participates in intellectuality. Hence, there is in it some power and action which does not belong to an intellectual nature, as is especially clear in those things which pertain to the vegetative soul. An angel, however, is totally of an intellectual nature; and therefore it is necessary

[54] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 4, ad 3.
[55] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 28, a. 1.
[56] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 4, a. 7.
[57] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 4, ad 3.
[58] *Ibid.*, I, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1.
[59] *Quodl.*, VI, q. 2, a. 1.
[60] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 4.
[61] *IV Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 9.

that every action of his be according to intellect. . . . Intellect, however, does not act except through the medium of the will, because the movement of the will is an inclination following an understood form. . . ."

If it is true that the natural appetite of the will is movement and not merely relation, the need of knowledge before this natural appetite is evident, according to the teaching of *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 4, ad 3: "It is necessary that apprehension precede *every* movement of the will." Father Sullivan himself admits that "by the very fact a man has the power which is the will, determined of its very nature to the end in general, he is in motion (using the term in the broad sense) to the end. . . ."[62] Omitting the words in parentheses, I agree that, for St. Thomas, the power that is the will is in motion through its natural appetite towards its end. St. Thomas does not make any exception: every natural power is caught up in the movement that comes from God as prime mover, including the will. We see this doctrine in *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 9, a. 6:

> The movement of the will is from within, as also natural movement. Although something can move a natural thing which is not the cause of the nature of the thing that is moved, nevertheless only that can cause natural movement which is to some extent the cause of its nature. A stone is moved upward by man, who does not cause the nature of the stone; but this movement is not natural to the stone. Its natural movement is caused only by that which causes nature. . . .
>
> The cause of the will can be nothing else than God. This is clear for two reasons. First, from the fact that the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone through creation. . . . Second, from the fact that the will has an *order* to the universal good. Hence, nothing else can be the cause of the will except God himself, who is the universal good. Everything else is called good by participation, and is a particular good; and a particular cause does not give a universal *inclination.*

In answering the third objection St. Thomas makes clear that this universal inclination of the will is a universal movement

[62] *Art. cit.*, 517.

from God: "*God moves the will of man as a universal mover towards the universal object of the will, which is the good.* Without this universal *motion* man is not able to will anything." In *ibid.*, q. 9, a. 4, ad 2, St. Thomas tells us that the will itself wills indeed, "yet *moved* by another"; and in *ad* 3 we learn that this other is the first or prime mover: "it [the will] needs to be *moved* by another as by a first mover." [63]

In *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 4, ad 5, we find this clear statement: "The will of a rational creature is determined to one, to which it is *naturally moved;* as every man naturally wills to be, and to live, and happiness. These are the things to which a creature is first *naturally moved* either to know or to will, because always a natural action is presupposed to other actions." The natural movement of the will is called an action here because, as we have seen, movement as it is in its cause is action, and St. Thomas in this reply is considering the natural movement of the will from the standpoint of the author of nature; for he continues: "Therefore, if an angel sinned in the first instant of his creation, this would seem to belong to his nature, and so to some extent it would be referred to the author of nature."

In *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 1, the question is asked whether the will is naturally *moved* towards something. St. Thomas replies that it is "the good in general towards which the will naturally tends, as every power does towards its own object." In *ad* 1 he tells us: "Because the will is founded in

[63] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3: ". . . every movement both of the will and of nature proceeds from him [God] as from the first mover. As it is not against the notion of nature that a movement of nature be from God as from the first mover, inasmuch as nature is a certain instrument of God as mover (*moventis*), so it is not against the notion of a voluntary act that it be from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God." The term will (*voluntas*) can mean the power or the act of the power, as we are told in *II Sent.*, d. 39, q. 1, a. 1: "Unde cum voluntas dupliciter dicatur, scilicet voluntas potentiae, et voluntas actus. . . ." In the quotation from the *Summa* above St. Thomas is speaking of God moving both the power and the act of the will, but it significant that for him the voluntary *act* is from God inasmuch as the *will* (evidently the power) is moved by God. The voluntary act is rooted in the natural movement given to the will by God as prime mover; God moves this voluntary act because He moves the natural power from which it proceeds.

some nature, it is necessary that the *movement* proper to nature be shared in some respect by the will." This natural inclination or movement of the will is the same as the natural appetite which St. Thomas finds in every natural power, as we see in *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 80, a. 1, ad 3: "Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Hence, each power desires by natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself." In the *corpus* he teaches: "Some inclination follows every form, as fire from its form is inclined upward, and to generate its like. . . . Natural inclination follows this natural form, which is called natural appetite."

At this point we meet again one of those disconcerting admissions made by Father Sullivan which seem to go against his whole case. He tells us on p. 523 of his article: "It is not disputed that natural appetite is an impression or inclination from God. If so, why should human knowledge have to precede it? We believe that the passages we have adduced show that there is a natural appetite in the human will prior to human cognition." Then in a footnote (n. 95) he cites four texts to show that for St. Thomas this non-cognitional natural appetite is an impression or inclination from God. Yet three of these texts or their contexts speak of this natural appetite as movement.

In the first text, from *IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2, ad 1, St. Thomas says: "The will cannot extend to the opposite of that to which it is determined by the divine impression; namely, towards the opposite of the last end." In sol. 1 of the same article St. Thomas speaks of this divine impression in terms of movement: "In every order of mobile things and of movers, second movers must be ordained to the end of the first mover by a disposition impressed upon them by the first mover. . . . In natural movements the impression left by the first mover on second movers is for them a natural cause; . . . each and every thing, from the nature divinely given to it, tends towards that to which it is ordained through divine providence, according to the exigency of the impression received."

In *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 103, a. 1, ad 3, Father Sullivan's third text, the notion of movement is used in the example employed by St. Thomas to illustrate natural appetite: "The natural necessity inherent in things which are determined to one is a certain impression of God directing to the end, just as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to tend towards a certain target is an impression of the archer and not of the arrow." The movement of the arrow illustrates how God is directing or moving all things towards their end. Throughout this article and its responses motion appears as a basic concept in explaining God's government of the world.

Then, without a word of explanation, Father Sullivan cites this passage from *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3: "God, as the universal mover, moves man's will to the universal object of the will, which is the good." Is this movement of the will by God, which for Father Sullivan is its innate natural appetite, just relation? Is it, in accordance with his explanation on p. 517, an operation of the will? Is it not obviously movement in the same sense that God is the prime mover, which is not just a figure of speech, or mover in the improper sense, or merely a relation? If God is really the prime mover of nature, all natural beings and powers, including the will, must really be in movement under this influence or impression. After this admission on p. 523 of his article, with the texts that he cites with approval, it is difficult to see why Father Sullivan has any objection to the doctrine that natural appetite in the basic sense is movement and not just relation.

To the further question asked by Father Sullivan; namely, why should human knowledge have to precede natural appetite if it is an impression or inclination from God (p. 523), the same answer can be given as to the similar question on p. 510: why must the natural appetite of the will always conform to what is proper to the will as will; which is, that it follow the cognition of the intellect? The answer is simply that it is the *nature* of will to follow in the wake of cognition, and God in moving our powers moves them according to their natures. This brings

us at once to the question of the analogy of natural desire, which Father Sullivan partly admits but rejects so far as its application to the various powers of the soul is concerned.[64]

For St. Thomas Aquinas, the movement caused by God as prime mover is not of a uniform type, the same in all respects in all created natures and powers. On the contrary, it is received in each nature according to its mode. In *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 2, he tells us, as we have already seen: "God is the first mover in respect to *all movements both spiritual and corporal*, as a heavenly body is the principle of all the movements of inferior bodies." Then follows the statement: "Yet we must observe that the movement of the first mover is not received uniformly in all mobile things, but in each one *according to its proper mode*." St. Thomas then shows how this movement is received in one way by inanimate things, in another way by plants and animals which also move themselves. Finally, he shows how it is received in the will in such a way as to leave open the possibility of the inordinate action called sin. The main point at present is that St. Thomas uses the movement of God as prime mover of the will to show how this movement is not received uniformly in all natures and powers but in each according to its mode.

In *De Malo*, q. 6, the analogy of the movement which is natural appetite is again applied to the will: "That which first *moves* the will and intellect is something above will and intellect; namely, God, who, since He *moves* all things according to the nature (*rationem*) of mobile things, as light things up and heavy things down, also *moves the will according to its condition*, so that it has not a necessary but an indeterminate relation to many things." In *ad* 1 we learn: ". . . the interior will is *moved* by some superior principle, which is God." In *ad* 3: "God *moves* the will immutably because of the efficacy of the moving power, which cannot fail; but because of the nature of the will that is *moved*, necessity is not induced, but

[64] Cf. *art. cit.*, 509.

freedom remains. . . . *God moves all things proportionately, each one according to its mode.*" This is similar to what we have seen in *IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1: "Because all things proceed from God inasmuch as He is good, . . . therefore all created things, according to the impression received from the creator, are inclined towards seeking the good *according to their mode.*"

A key text both for Father Sullivan and for myself is *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 60, a. 1:

> . . . the prior is always preserved in the posterior. Nature, however, is prior to the intellect, because the nature of anything is its essence. Hence that which is of nature must be preserved also in those beings which have an intellect. It is, however, common to every nature to have some inclination, which is natural appetite, or love. *This inclination, however, is found differently in different natures, in each according to its mode.* Hence, in an intellectual nature natural inclination is found according to will; in a sensitive nature, according to sensitive appetite; but in a nature that lacks cognition, only according to the order of nature towards something." [65]

Father Sullivan on p. 509 of his article believes that natural appetite in this text conforms to the mode of the substantial nature, and not to the mode of the will. He does not believe, as he makes clear on p. 510, that the natural appetite of the will must always conform to what is proper to the will as will, which is to follow the cognition of the intellect. What, then, does St. Thomas mean when he says that natural appetite is found in an intellectual nature according to will? What is this mode of an intellectual nature? Father Sullivan gives us a choice of two possible meanings.

[65] Father Sullivan (*art. cit.*, 510, n. 54) says that the replies to the second and third objections of this article "are noteworthy as implying that this natural love is not always actual." Besides identifying natural love with the inclination impressed upon nature by the author of nature, St. Thomas says nothing, explicitly or implicitly, to warrant the conclusion that it is not always actual. On the contrary, this natural love in the angels must be always in act since their intellects are always in the act of knowledge and God is always moving their wills towards their proper good.

First, it is proper to an intellectual nature to *have* a will, which is the *subject* of the natural appetite in question, as it is proper to a sentient nature to *have* a sense appetite. Second, it is proper to an intellectual nature precisely as intellectual to know universals, or to generalize. While nature is determined to one thing, in an intellectual nature the natural appetite of the will is determined to a general or common unity.

The second interpretation implies that the natural appetite of the will is determined to a general or common unity precisely because the intellect, whose proper function is to know universals, presents to the will its object in this general, common way. What is the reason for introducing the intellect and its mode of knowing, if it does not have some bearing upon the natural tendency of the will? The first interpretation likewise implies the dependence of natural appetite upon the intellect in an intellectual nature. In what way would natural inclination differ in an intellectual nature and in a sensitive nature, if not according to the kind of knowledge, intellectual or sensitive, that is present in these two different natures?

What St. Thomas says, however, is that in a nature that lacks cognition altogether, its natural inclination will be only an order of nature, obviously without cognition. The reason is because the prior nature must always be preserved in the subsequent inclination. On the same principle a prior intellectual nature will make the subsequent natural inclination of the will an intellectual tendency, as a prior sensitive nature will be preserved in its subsequent natural inclination by making it a tendency that follows sense knowledge.

Father Sullivan sets up an opposition between nature and will in the sense that what is innately natural in the will is without human knowledge, while that which is peculiar to will as will flows from knowledge. This opposition, I believe, is a false one, since the will both as nature and as will depends upon the intellect. There is, however, an opposition between nature and will which centers upon another element: determination or the absence of determination. In *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 5 we find this opposition clearly stated:

Nature and will are related in this way, that the will is a certain nature, because everything that is found in things is called a certain nature. Hence in the will we must find not only that which is of the will, but also that which is of nature. It belongs to every created nature that it be ordained by God to the good, naturally seeking it. Hence in the will also is a certain natural appetite for the good that is suitable to it; and besides this it has to seek something according to its own determination, not from necessity; which belongs to it inasmuch as it is will. As nature is related to will, so the things which the will naturally wills are related to the things to which it is determined by itself, and not from nature. . . . Therefore, what the will of necessity wills as if determined to it by a natural inclination is the ultimate end, as beatitude, and the things which are included in the end, as is the knowledge of truth, and other things of this kind. To other things the will is not determined by natural inclination, but by its own disposition, without necessity.

In *ad* 6 of the same article we have this resolute refusal to drive a wedge between nature and will, except where nature is found alone: "The will is divided against natural appetite taken precisively; that is, from that which is nature *alone*, as man against that which is animal alone; but it is not divided against natural appetite absolutely, but includes it, as man includes animal." In *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 1, ad 1, we have the same:

The will is divided against nature as one cause against another; for some things are done naturally and other things are done voluntarily. There is one way of causing that is proper to the will, which is master of its act, beyond the way that belongs to nature, which is determined to one. Because the will is founded in some nature, it is necessary that the *movement* proper to nature in some respect be participated in the will; just as that which is of a prior cause be participated by a subsequent cause. The being that is from nature is prior in each thing to the *velle* which is from the will. Hence, the will naturally wills something."

The opposition here is plainly between the determined and necessary character of the will as nature and its ability to determine itself as will. It is not an opposition between the lack of knowledge and its presence.

If the one natural appetite of the will that St. Thomas knows requires prior intellectual cognition as a condition *sine qua non* and flows from the natural form of the will as a power, it is to be expected that on occasions he will mark the difference between natural appetite as it is in an intellectual or sense nature, and as it exists below the level of a cognitional nature. In other words, does St. Thomas give us illustrations of the analogy of natural appetite? I believe he does.

In *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 55, he tells us that "*natural appetite is in certain beings from apprehension*, as the wolf naturally desires the killing of animals on which it feeds, and *man naturally desires happiness;* but in certain others without apprehension, from the mere inclination of natural principles, which in some things is called natural appetite, as a heavy body desires to be below. In both ways there is in things a natural desire for being; a sign of which is the fact that things which lack knowledge resist corrupting influences according to the power of their natural principles, while those which possess knowledge resist them according to the mode of their knowledge." Here we have the innate natural tendency to continuance in being functioning from knowledge in cognitional natures, and without knowledge only in a non-cognitional nature.

In *Quodl.*, I, q. 4, a. 3 [8], St. Thomas is clearly speaking about the innate natural appetite: "Natural love is a certain natural inclination inserted (*indita*) in nature by God." Then he tells us: "Natural inclination can *especially* be known in those things which are done naturally without the deliberation of reason, for thus each thing acts in nature as it is naturally apt to be done." This text is similar to *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 11, a. 2, ad 3: "The sensitive appetite follows some cognition; but not the natural appetite, *especially* as it is in those things which lack cognition." Again, in *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 1, ad 2, St. Thomas points out that there can be natural appetite even though natural knowledge in the subject is lacking: "It is *possible* to have natural appetite, but not cognition." This is the case with material beings that lack knowledge altogether. Their natural appetite follows divine knowledge alone.

In these three texts St. Thomas is speaking about the innate natural appetite that is impressed upon all natural beings by God, the author of nature. This in a cognitional nature will follow the conditions of such a nature, while in a nature that lacks cognition it will be without cognition in its subject. Yet for Father Sullivan the innate natural appetite is always a relation that does not follow cognition in its subject.

It would be an unnecessary repetition to cite all the texts that can be found in the article in *The Modern Schoolman* which in my opinion show the need of cognition for the natural appetite of the will and of the sensitive appetite. An important consideration is the fact that St. Thomas very often restricts the term natural appetite to natures and powers below the level of cognition. This quotation from *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 59, a. 1, is only one out of many that illustrate the point in question:

> Since all things proceed from the divine will, all in their own way are inclined towards the good, but diversely. Some things are inclined towards the good through only a natural relationship without knowledge, as plants and inanimate bodies; *and this inclination towards the good is called natural appetite.* Other things are inclined towards the good with some knowledge . . . such as sense. The inclination following this knowledge is called the sensitive appetite. Still other things are inclined towards the good with a knowledge whereby they know the very intelligibility (*rationem*) of good, . . . and this inclination is called the will.

This restriction of natural appetite is especially marked when St. Thomas is speaking of the various powers of the soul. Then in many places natural appetite means the natural inclination of the vegetative and other powers that do not follow cognition in their subject, as the higher powers of will and sensitive appetite do. Thus in *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 148, a. 1, ad 3, he tells us: "Appetite is twofold; one *natural*, which pertains to the powers of the vegetative soul, . . . but there is another also, the sensitive appetite." In *Quodl.*, IV, q. 11, a. 1 [21], this terminology is well illustrated: "There is in man a threefold

appetite. One *natural*, so far as the appetitive power pertains to the vegetative soul, as also the digestive and eliminatory and retentive powers. The second appetite is *sensuality*, which is moved according to the apprehension of sense. The third appetite is the *will*, which is moved according to the judgment of reason." We have a similar concept in *In II Sent.*, d. 24, q. 3, a. 1:

> There is in us a threefold appetite; namely, the natural, the sensitive, and the rational. *Natural appetite;* for example, for food, is one which the imagination does not generate, but rather the very disposition of the natural qualities by which the natural powers exercise their actions. . . . But *sensitive appetite* is one which follows from a preceding imagination or sensation. . . . While *rational appetite* is that which follows the apprehension of reason.

Yet we know, in spite of this terminology, that for St. Thomas the will and the sensitive appetite as powers of the soul have their natural appetites. Because natural appetite as such flows from the natural form and animal appetite from a cognitional form of sense or intellect, St. Thomas is prone at times to speak of natural appetite as without cognition and of animal appetite as with cognition. In *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 30, a. 1, ad 3, he tells us: "It belongs to each and every power of the soul to desire its proper good by *natural appetite, which does not follow apprehension;* but to desire good by *animal appetite, which follows apprehension,* belongs only to the appetitive power." This, however, needs to be balanced by texts like these: *IV Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 9: "*Natural inclination in the appetitive power follows natural conception in cognition*"; *De Virtut. in Comm.*, a. 5, ad 2: "The natural inclination of the will is not only towards the ultimate end, but towards that good which is shown it by reason. *For good understood is the object of will, and to it the will is naturally ordered, just as any power whatever is ordered to its object, provided that this be its proper good*"; *II Sent.*, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2: "That which is the end of man is naturally known in the

reason to be good and to be sought, *and the will following this knowledge is called will as nature.*" [66]

In my opinion it is significant that St. Thomas never, so far as I know, speaks of a natural appetite of the will that is without intellectual cognition in its subject. The case is the same, I believe, in regard to the natural inclination of the sensitive appetite. Father Sullivan cites *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 41, a. 3, as an instance in which St. Thomas shows us " the natural desire of the sensitive appetite (even actual) wholly perfected without sense apprehension." [67] Is this really the case?

This article is discussing natural fear. It begins by telling us that a movement is called natural because nature inclines to it. The inclination can be accomplished in two ways. First, when it is wholly performed by nature without any operation of the apprehensive power. Examples of this first kind of natural movement are the upward movement of fire and the growth of plants and animals. These movements are obviously below the level of cognition. The second type of natural movement follows a natural inclination but it needs apprehension to perfect it. Examples of this kind of natural

[66] Because natural appetite is found beneath the level of sense, St. Thomas frequently equates it with lack of cognition, as if it were univocal in this respect. Thus he teaches in *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 88: " Just as in an *inanimate* thing natural inclination relates to its proper end, and this is called *natural appetite,* so the will in an intellectual substance is similarly related and this is called intellectual appetite." It is clearly expressed in *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 59, a. 1: " Since all things proceed from the divine will, all in their own way incline toward the good through appetite, but in different fashions. Some things incline to the good by a natural relationship without cognition, such as *plants* and *inanimate bodies*; and such an inclination to good is called natural appetite. Other things, however, incline to the good with some kind of cognition. . . ." This inclination is either the sensitive appetite or the will, depending upon whether the cognition is that of sense or of intellect. Other texts illustrating this usage can be found in *The Modern Schoolman, art. cit.*, 101-102. Yet we know that for St. Thomas natural appetite exists also above the level of inanimate and vegetative nature, although he speaks of it at times as if it did not. The analogous character of natural appetite brings about a proper adjustment between these two views, even though St. Thomas himself did not always maintain this adjustment.

[67] *Art. cit.*, 518, n. 78.

movement are acts of intellection, of sense knowledge, of memory, and even the movements of the animal appetite (the will and the sensitive appetite).

In this second way fear can be called natural; it needs apprehension to perfect it. According to the first meaning of natural, when a movement is accomplished wholly by nature and without any operation of the apprehensive power, some of the passions of the soul are sometimes called natural; for example, love, desire, and hope; while other passions cannot be called natural in this sense. The reason is this: love and hate, desire and flight, imply a certain inclination to pursue good and avoid evil, and this inclination pertains *also* to natural appetite (*quae quidem inclinatio pertinet etiam ad appetitum naturalem*). The all-important little word *etiam* is not translated by Father Sullivan. Therefore, St. Thomas continues, there is a certain natural love; and desire or hope can in some way be said to be *also* in natural things which lack cognition. The *etiam* in this sentence is correctly rendered by *even* in Father Sullivan's translation.

In this first part of the argument St. Thomas does not teach that the passions of the soul called love, desire, and hope are called natural because they imply an inclination *in the soul* that is without cognition. In fact, he tells us nothing as to the presence or absence of cognition in these passions themselves. They are called natural simply because they are analogously found in beings that lack cognition, which by their natural tendencies are said to love or hate, to desire or to flee. The natural inclinations or movements he is thinking of are, as we see in the beginning of the article, the upward movement of fire and the growth of animals and plants. It makes sense in Aristotelian philosophical language to speak of a stone desiring to go downward and of fire to move upward. Because love, desire, and hope in this analogous way have their counterparts in the realm of nature, beneath the level of cognition, we may speak of them as natural movements, even when they occur in the soul.

The case is different, however, in regard to other passions of the soul, such as, first, delight and grief. Apprehension, either of intellect or of sense, are so required for these passions that things which lack cognition simply cannot be said to delight or to grieve. Natural inclination alone, apart from apprehension, could not bring them into being. In this sense they may be called not natural, although they are natural in the sense that they are natural movements which are perfected by apprehension. The second set of passions that are not called natural includes desperation and fear, which go against the natural tendencies to strive for good and to attack evil respectively. That is why passions of this latter kind, St. Thomas concludes, are in no way attributed to inanimate things. In this sense they are not natural, although in the soul they are just as natural as love, desire, and hope.

Father Sullivan, I fear, has missed the meaning of this article completely. When he says: "Here . . . is the natural desire of the sensitive appetite (even actual) wholly perfected without sense apprehension," does he really mean what he says? Does he mean that St. Thomas teaches that the actual natural movement of the sensitive appetite can be wholly perfected without sense apprehension? If so, this contradicts one of his chief contentions that the movement of actual natural appetite always requires prior cognition in the subject.[68] What St. Thomas is speaking about in this article is not so much innate natural appetite as the *passiones animae*, which are primarily movements or operations of the sensitive appetite. His position on these movements is clear and admits of no exception: they always require prior cognition in the soul, as we see in *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 7, a. 1: "The principle of *all* appetitive movements is *apprehended* good or evil. Hence, some apprehension must be the principle of fear and of *all* appetitive movements."

[68] Cf. *art. cit.*, 520, where, after citing texts which speak of the sensitive or the intellective appetite following apprehension, Father Sullivan says: "But this is true only of the *movement* of *actual* natural appetite, as the text he himself cites plainly states" (italics his). The text referred to, which I cited, is *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 8, a. 1.

It is, I believe, a mistake to expect to find St. Thomas always completely consistent in terminology or even in thought, as if he set out to fabricate a system that would admit of no loose ends or deviations from a pre-conceived plan. What has been said of Plato can also be said of him: over the years he expressed himself on the same subjects in terms that were different and even at times contradictory.[69] We find a verification of this in the way in which St. Thomas speaks sometimes of natural appetite as if it were confined to beings that lack cognition altogether, while at other times he makes due allowance for its presence in cognitional natures. He also at times speaks as if natural appetite were merely an aptitude or relation, but when he exposes his mind on this question more fully he leaves no doubt about the fact that his doctrine of natural desire is intimately bound up with his doctrine of God as the prime mover of all created natures. Even before they operate these natures are moved by God towards their proper operations and ends, and this primary movement is their natural appetite.

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[69] Cf. Jacques Chevalier, *La notion du nécessaire chez Aristote et chez ses prédécesseurs, particulièrement chez Platon* (Paris: Alcan, 1915), p. 198: ". . . Platon, durant la longue période de son activité philosophique, avait repris les mêmes sujets et développé des intuitions semblables en des termes sensiblement différents, parfois même contradictoires."

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BOOK REVIEWS

Theology and Education. By Thomas C. Donlan, O. P. Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Company, 1952. Pp. 134 with bibliography. $3.00.

This study of the role of Theology in education, originally a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Pontifical Faculty of Immaculate Conception College, is dedicated to the late Father Walter Farrell, O. P. Such a dedication is significant, for Father Farrell, more than any other individual, has been responsible for the inception and growth of Theology courses in colleges. This movement, despite its numerous and vigorous critics, has been so successful that the name of Theology has become fashionable in collegiate circles, indeed, so fashionable that the courses it is sometimes used to describe are only by the broadest extension of the term truly Theology. Thus, while the fury of earlier critics has somewhat abated before the accomplished fact, the debate has continued on the nature of the fact, as is evidenced by the 1952 Proceedings of the American Catholic Theological Society. It is high time, then, that the exponents of College Theology published a reasoned defence *in actu signato* of what they have been doing *in actu exercito.*

Father Donlan's little book fulfills this function in careful, scholastic fashion. This scholastic approach undoubtedly will not endear the book to those who are so accustomed to the rhetorical method of advertisement or the quantitative preoccupation of modern scholarship that they have lost the capacity to grasp a demonstration. But what this book sets out to do is precisely that, to demonstrate, to prove. And prove it does so well that its conclusion seems unavoidable: "In fact, the reasons adduced in favor of teaching theology to undergraduates are based upon propositions so fundamental that it is difficult to conceive that educators could feel free to hold a contrary opinion. The real problem does not center on the question *whether* theology should be taught to undergraduates, but rather on *how* this divine wisdom is to be communicated to them" (p. 128).

Certainly a great deal of the original opposition and how much of the confusion about the thesis of this book has resulted from certain prepossessions about what Theology really is. Most people have quite naturally identified it with their own experience with Theology, which may have been as a preparation for the care of souls, or as an Apologetic, and nearly always as a series of embalmed propositions and proofs in manuals of Theology. On this point, Father Donlan's work is especially valuable for it presents the important sapiential nature of Theology derived from the work of Father Muñiz. Even Thomists have not always been clear and definite in their use of the concept of Theology, and the material set forth

here does much to illuminate the meaning of the very first question of the *Summa*.

Having thus explained Theology itself, Father Donlan turns to the nature of Catholic education, and here he is engaged in a careful analysis of the encyclical letter of Pope Pius XI, *Divini Illius Magistri*. After a preliminary investigation, he proceeds to a detailed study of the four causes of education. In this entire discussion, one cannot help contrast the high ideal of Catholic education with the reality, which so much of even the highest human endeavor, falls far short. To say that Catholic education as it actually exists is imperfect is not to disparage the noble work of earlier builders; if we look for faults, we do so that later building will be less imperfect. If we have any reason to complain about the spiritual life and general ineffectiveness of the alumni and alumnae of Catholic colleges—and there are few so smugly sanguine as to be completely satisfied—some of the blame must be levelled at impoverished "Religion" courses. Generally speaking, when the curricula of Catholic colleges had any inner order, they were subordinated to Philosophy. Thus it became easy to speak of the "Philosophy" of Catholic education. The trouble was, and to some measure still is, that such a program is entirely too natural when the subject and aim of Catholic education is not natural, but supernatural. One of the greatest contributions St. Thomas made to Catholic thought was his magnificent and fruitful working out of the principle that grace perfects nature. Yet in practice nature has sometimes been so stressed in Catholic education that grace has been reduced to a defence of its reality in an Apologetics course and a collection of answers to random difficulties in its practical living in a Religion course. But Philosophy, like patriotism of the well-worn phrase, is not enough. No Catholic educator can rest content with the introduction of his students to the Virgil of natural reason; his work is not complete until the students are familiar with the Beatrice of Theology.

However, in the effort to *do* something about the religious instruction of the college student, some educators have confused the professor's platform with the preacher's pulpit. In his several chapters on Religious Instruction, Father Donlan quotes from these enthusiasts who have confused the ultimate with the intermediate end of Christian education. These quotations betray a fundamental anti-intellectualism which not only vitiates their claim to a place in the academic picture, but shows the incompleteness of their Catholicism. Catholicism is, and of necessity must be, a dogmatic religion. That it is a good way of life, that it is beautiful depend on its truth, and the communication of its truth is an intellectual affair. No doubt a great deal can be, and indeed, has been said against a religion which is only of the head, but one which is only of the heart is no less dangerous, for it will surely degenerate into that form of protestantism which is a vague mist of ethical platitudes.

The first problem of the Catholic educator is to teach the Truth; the doing of it, while undoubtedly assisted by persuasion, must in great measure be left to the grace of God working on the individual's good will. *Theology and Education* offers a charter for a truly Christian education. The details must now be filled in by the long, hard work of those whose sacred task it is to cooperate with Divine grace to form the image of Jesus Christ in the souls of those redeemed by Baptism.

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Intentional Logic. A Logic Based on Philosophical Realism. By Henry Babcock Veatch. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952. Pp. 440 with index. $6.00.

The introductory challenge, which Professor Veatch raises in the first chapter of his book, is "whether the achievements of the mathematical logicians, impressive as they are, are really achievements in logic proper." He makes it clear, however, that the purpose of the book is not simply to attack and criticize mathematical logic. He asserts, at the beginning of Chapter II, that "the real purpose of the book is to explain and defend a type of logic which might most aptly be termed an 'intentional logic.'" The book accordingly divides into the following main parts and chapters.

Part One is on the general issue of intentionality in logic. The first chapter raises the challenge referred to above. Chapter II explains and defends the meaning of intentional logic. Chapter III discusses mathematical logic and, in general, its disregard of intentionality.

Part Two is entitled "The Import of Intentionality with respect to the Traditional Subdivisions of Logic." Each chapter in this part is divided into two main parts, the first dealing with matter from the standpoint of intentional logic, the second from the standpoint of mathematical logic. Thus, Chapter IV is on the concept. An account of the concept in intentional logic is given first, followed by a comparative account of the concept as given by mathematical logicians.

Chapter V treats the proposition. The main points of emphasis on the proposition in intentional logic are 1) the intentional function of the proposition, 2) the composition of terms in the proposition, and 3) the property of designation, i. e., supposition. The points of emphasis on the proposition as treated in mathematical logic are 1) the theory of the relational structure of the proposition, 2) the quantification theory, and 3) discussion of two alternative theories of the proposition: a relation between classes, and the analytic or synthetic relationship between terms.

Chapter VI is on argument. The function of argument is explained with

a defense of the syllogism, followed by a treatment of inductive argument and of compound propositions. Then, from the standpoint of mathematical logic, the status of transitivity as a relation is discussed, followed by a treatment of the basic theory of proof in mathematical logic, and the role of the class and propositional calculi. The book ends with a brief "Concluding Unscientific Postscript."

This outline may give some indication of the scope of Professor Veatch's book and the extent of his treatment of both intentional and mathematical logic. The brevity of the outline hides the completeness and thoroughness with which he investigates fundamental points in both intentional and mathematical logic. I do not see, in fact, how a review could adequately estimate the book without assuming something of the proportions of a book itself.

Because of limitation of space, I shall have to restrict this review, concentrating on certain parts to the regrettable exclusion of others. The emphasis will be put on Part One, because there the main points concerning both intentional and mathematical logic are first advanced and discussed. Consequently, I shall summarize, first, Professor Veatch's exposition of intentional logic in Chapter Two, and then discuss it. I shall do the same in Chapter Three, on mathematical logic. These two chapters contain implicitly the rest of the book. Certain issues and questions in Part Two, having special interest, will be discussed at least briefly. A final concluding summary of the book as a whole, and the issue it raises, will be given.

In Chapter Two, the notion of intentional logic is developed in the following way. A cognitive relation, as distinct from other relations, is a relation of identity, a formal identity between knower and known. Cognitive instruments are therefore needed by means of which our knowledge can become formally identical with what it knows. These instruments are called "intentions." It is in and through such logical entities or instruments of concepts, propositions, and arguments that the relation of cognitive identity comes about. These logical instruments, especially concepts, are also understood as formal signs. Concepts as formal signs are the indispensable means of achieving the distinctive relation of cognitive identity. They are to be distinguished sharply from instrumental signs, such as words, which are not pure means of knowing, but which must first be known as objects before they represent something else. The failure to distinguish formal signs from instrumental signs accounts for the unnecessary epistemological difficulties found, for example, in Descartes and Locke; it may also be said to be responsible for certain confusions found in mathematical logicians.

Professor Veatch thereupon distinguishes the logical order from the real order in three ways. The first is by distinguishing the intentional from the nonintentional. Concepts, propositions, and arguments are formal

signs or intentions of other things, whereas the real things, signified by the concepts, are not themselves intentions of anything else. For example, the concept of animal necessarily intends animal; real animal does not intend anything else. The second way is by distinguishing beings of reason from real beings. A real being is dependent neither in its nature nor in its being upon the mind, whereas beings of reason have no existence independent of the mind. The third way is by distinguishing between first intentions and second intentions. An act of cognition, considered as an act of intention, is directed toward an object, but the object intended can be considered in either of two conditions. The first condition is the object considered in itself, independently of being known; the second is the object as it is in the state of being known. Hence, formalities belonging to the object as a real thing, as color belongs to animal, are first intentions; formalities belonging to the object as it is known, as universal belongs to animal, are second intentions.

Now as to what the nature or structure of logical or intentional forms is, Mr. Veatch maintains that they are nothing but relations of identity. By this he appears to mean not the relation of cognitive identity, which he regards as a real relation, but a purely logical relation of intentional identity. Just what does such a relation of identity mean? It is that relation by which a thing must first be separated from itself in order to be identified with itself, i. e., a thing's "what" is separated from itself and then held in a relation of identity to it. "For instance," Mr. Veatch illustrates, "a concept or universal (an *unum versus alia*) such as 'tree' is simply a relation of identity between a 'what' and possible individual trees, and likewise with an affirmative proposition. A universal concept being, as has just been suggested, a relation of identity to the individuals in its extension, it is for that reason predicable of these individuals. Hence actually to predicate such a universal of a subject is actually to identify it with one or more of those individuals to which it stands in a relation of identity." (p. 25).

In summary, an intentional or properly logical entity is one whose whole being consists in a representing of something else. Logic is concerned with such intentional forms, involving the peculiar cognitive relation of identity. This is the basic meaning of intentional logic. Logic thus understood cannot be purely formal because the nature and structure of which is logical must be determined on the basis of its being adapted to signify the nature and structure of the real.

It is evident, in this chapter, that by intentional logic Mr. Veatch intends more or less the same thing as traditional logic, the fundamental doctrine of logic originating in Aristotle. He is certainly acquainted with the basic doctrine on logic, not only in Aristotle, but in such commentators as John of St. Thomas as well. In this chapter and throughout the

book, however, it is clear that Mr. Veatch is thinking out the doctrine somewhat in his own terms, presenting it anew to a contemporary audience. This freshness of approach is, in many respects, admirable and commendable; it points to the vitality of the basic doctrine of logic. My impression is that Mr. Veatch's hope, however small, is to attract mathematical logicians to a consideration of what is really important in traditional logic, and it may be safely said that mathematical logicians have not always grasped what is important in traditional logic. In this respect, I think that Mr. Veatch cannot be praised too highly for his attempt to communicate with mathematical logicians.

Nevertheless, this freshness and originality of approach has drawbacks, perhaps inevitable ones. One of these is the puzzling and sometimes confusing use of technical terms in logic. He employs terms, and phrases sanctioned by long use in derived and unusual senses. In his defense, I think it should be said that he is writing more for readers not acquainted with the technical meanings of the terms with the hope of communicating with them by a flexible mode of expression.

A more serious drawback, however, is that there seems to be some confusion on the level of analysis itself. For example, throughout the exposition of this second chapter, Mr. Veatch tends to equate logical forms, concepts, second intentions, relations of identity, and formal signs. Now while one can speak of the concept as a formal sign, the concept itself cannot be identified with the second intention, as Mr. Veatch consistently seems to do. The second intention is a relation made by reason; it is not the concept itself. Nor can one say that second intentions are intentional in the sense of being formal signs of something else; it is the formal concept, and not the object represented by it, that is a formal sign.

Further, although Professor Veatch brings out properly the distinction between intentional and nonintentional, this distinction does not directly oppose the logical order to the real order. It is not a distinction that differentiates properly between logical relation and real being; it is a distinction, rather, that is made between something that knows and something that does not know. To identify intentional with the logical order is to extend the logical order so that it becomes equivalent with the order of knowledge.

Such confusions as these might have been avoided, I think, had Professor Veatch first clearly distinguished being of reason from real being, the primary distinction to make in contrasting the logical order with the real order. Thus *ens rationis* properly means, as distinct from real being, something formed by the mind such that it depends only on the mind for its existence. Then under *ens rationis* the division into negation and relation of reason can be made. Relation of reason, in turn, is divided into logical relation of reason and non-logical relation of reason (a non-logical

relation of reason being, for example, the relation of God as creator to creature). It is the logical relation of reason, finally, that is equated with second intention.

These divisions help us to see how logic is concerned only with that kind of being of reason that is a second intention. By "second intention," we mean, then, that relation formed by the mind in order to help us know an object. I do not think it is enough to say, as Mr. Veatch does, that a second intention is any object precisely as it is an object of knowledge and in its condition of being known; nor can it be said that second intentions are formal signs of something else, since second intentions are relations of reason attaching to concepts. It seems to me, to put the matter another way, that Mr. Veatch overlooks the difference between the ways in which the first and second intentions are *formed* by the intellect. Both are formed by the intellect in order to know; the first intention, however, represents the very essence of the thing known whereas the second intention represents formalities which attach to the thing as it is in the state of knowledge. To use a technical distinction, I have the impression that Mr. Veatch identified first intention with the objective concept and second intention with the formal concept.

From all this it follows that the relation of intentional identity, which Mr. Veatch makes essential to the second intention, is not really essential to the second intention; that is, the relation of identity does not illumine what is proper to second intention. It may well be that the second intention often involves a relation of identity, but this is far from making a second intention consist formally in a relation of identity. The predicables, for example, which are properties of the logical universal, are relations formed by the mind in order to know; the relation of identity follows necessarily upon the predicables.

Despite these points of confusion which I think are found in Mr. Veatch's exposition, I wish to emphasize that his presentation otherwise is both penetrating and elucidating. Throughout the book, in fact, his exposition of traditional logic is remarkable, considering that he has developed his presentation primarily in terms of his own thinking out of the basic positions in logic. His otherwise forceful account would have gained by first establishing the precise character of the second intention as a certain kind of being of reason. This being established, the other points would fall more readily into a certain order.

Having indicated, in general, the meaning of intentional logic, Professor Veatch turns in the third chapter to a general consideration of mathematical logic. He notes at once that such things as formal signs, beings of reason, relations of cognitive and logical identity, and so on, all seem "strangely foreign and alien to what the mathematical logician is inclined to discuss and talk about." Professor Veatch's main point in this chapter is that

mathematical logic seems to involve a very serious confusion of the real order and the logical order.

He puts the matter this way. "All sorts of real relations—i. e., types of order and structural patterns that are capable of an existence in *rerum natura*—are simply taken over and treated of in logic, as if they formed a proper part of the subject matter of logic. Even properly logical relations—i. e., relations such as that of subject to predicate, or that between concepts taken in extension, or that of premise to conclusion, in other words, relations which could never exist or be in the world of nature—are nevertheless treated by mathematical logicians after the manner of real relations. In short, the confusion of the real with the logical would seem to be complete and almost unmitigated." (p. 31)

Can such charges as these against mathematical logic be substantiated?

Mr. Veatch takes up first the formalism of mathematical logic. The mathematical logicians themselves are cited to show that they speak of logic as purely formal, that logic is a purely formal science. Bertrand Russell, for example, is quoted as saying that in logic we do not deal "with particular things or particular properties: we deal formally with what can be said about *any* thing or *any* property . . . It is not open to us, as pure mathematicians or logicians, to mention anything at all, because, if we do so, we introduce something irrelevant and not formal."

Both Russell and Tarski are quoted at length to show how from various relations certain pure forms of mathematical logic are supposed to be derivable by a process of abstraction or generalization. Thus, to use the Tarski example, from the proposition "this segment is congruent to that," one gets, by successive stages of abstraction, "x is congruent to that segment," "x is congruent to y," and, finally, "x R y." The pure form or abstract type of relation ("R") thus being reached, one can then proceed to construct a whole formal system of axioms and theorems upon it. Such formal systems, completely abstract, constitute "formal logic" in the modern sense.

How is this formalism related to the point that mathematical logicians confuse the real with the logical? Mr. Veatch argues that the mathematical logician takes real relations (e. g., Tarski's relation of congruence or Russell's relations of "earlier than," "greater than,") lumps them all together and treats them as somehow belonging to logic or as being proper objects of logical investigation. Mr. Veatch concludes that "all this reveals most strikingly that ingrained tendency on the part of the mathematical logicians to confuse real relations with logical relations."

The thesis that the real and the logical are confused in mathematical logic is confirmed, Mr. Veatch finds, in the following consideration. The mathematical logician never distinguishes formal signs from instrumental signs. Indeed, he seems to be totally unaware of the existence and role

of formal signs. Logical forms, he holds, are instrumental signs which, in their very structure, resemble or even mirror the structure of that which they represent. Wittgenstein's well-known passage that begins with "We make to ourselves pictures of facts" is quoted as evidence. Now if formal signs are denied, in the sense of common intentional forms serving as instruments through which all other forms and structures come to be known, and if logical forms and structures are thereby identifiable with real forms and structures, then the real is being confused with the logical.

Now it is true, Mr. Veatch admits, that the mathematical logician talks about propositions in such a way as to suggest a difference between the proposition itself and what the proposition is about. Thus the proposition "Socrates was before Aristotle" is different from the fact that Socrates existed before Aristotle. But the difference is not a logical one for the mathematical logician. For the traditional or intentional logician, the proposition has a peculiarly logical structure characterized by the relation of predicate to subject; for the mathematical logician, the proposition consists simply in having the structure of the corresponding fact. The mathematical logician, in other words, sees the proposition as having a real relational pattern indistinguishable from the pattern it is supposed to represent; indeed, the proposition is to be isomorphic with the structure of the facts it represents.

In short, Professor Veatch maintains, there is actually a double confusion in mathematical logic. The mathematical logician introduces many real or nonlogical relations into logic as though they were properly logical relations (e. g., the real relationship of Chicago's being west of New York). Yet in treating properly logical relations, he makes them over after the pattern of real relations (e. g., he construes the predication of animal of man in the manner of a real relation).

An extended consideration then follows of the relevance of the Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic proposition to modern logical theory. There have been attempts by some contemporary logicians to distinguish the logical from the empirical in terms of the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. Mr. Veatch arrives at two conclusions in this matter: 1) the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic cannot be sustained; 2) even if analytic propositions could be distinguished from synthetic ones, such analytic propositions would not be the propositions proper to logic.

There is, finally, an investigation of the notion of the purely formal and uninterpreted systems, constructed quite arbitrarily and by purely conventional determination. Such systems are thereupon given various interpretations, depending upon the practical interests of the occasion. Does not this so-called purely formal approach justify the logical character of mathematical logic? Not so, Professor Veatch argues, because the mathe-

matical logician, in dealing with these so-called formal systems, is still limited to nonintentional, and hence real forms, rather than logical forms in the sense of second intentions. Accordingly, the mathematical logician is still not properly in the domain of logic; he still treats only the nature of relational patterns or structures in their widest generality.

I should like to postpone, until a final comment, an evaluation of Professor Veatch's appraisal of mathematical logic in this chapter. I have given as much of it as I have because I think his critique, in this chapter and throughout the book, is as thorough and as serious as has been made by anyone. I think it can be said at once that he has shown, in various ways, how mathematical logic has departed from the traditional notion of logic, and that any claim of the mathematical logician that traditional logic is but a small part of mathematical logic is wholly without foundation. Indeed, even if one were to discount the cogency of Professor Veatch's arguments throughout the book, one would in all fairness have to admit that the word " logic ' is used in quite different senses when it signifies intentional logic and mathematical logic.

There are, however, several points of interest in the remainder of the book that deserve at least passing reference before a concluding summary can be given. They are points meriting much more comment and examination than can be given in this review.

Professor Veatch makes fruitful application of the doctrine of supposition, which he treats under the name of " designation." The relevance of the distinction between signification and supposition of terms in a proposition has been almost completely ignored by traditional and mathematical logicians alike. To my knowledge, the account Mr. Veatch has in his book is the most extensive treatment in any modern text. He makes effective use of the role of supposition in eliminating pseudo-difficulties arising from so-called paradoxes. Likewise, his investigation of the null class is both perceptive and apt; fundamentally, he shows that they are attempts to talk about things which do not exist—an unpromising venture. Unless one is misled by pure formalism in logic, not much attention need be given to sea serpents that do not exist or to non-existent kings of France who are bald. The extent of the attention should not go beyond seeing the difficulty as a matter of non-supposition, which is primarily Mr. Veatch's concern in the problem.

Incidentally, while Professor Veatch has no difficulty in seeing that the proposition " The present king of France is bald " is a false proposition because of a non-supposing subject, he seems disinclined to accept the contradictory, " The present king of France is not bald " as true. But in the negative proposition, we are separating the predicate from a subject; hence, if such a proposition has a non-supposing subject, then it is true to separate a predicate from such a subject. This is nothing else than the contradictory

of affirming a predicate of a non-supposing subject. Consequently, if it is false that the present king of France is bald, it is true that bald cannot be predicated of the present king of France. In other words, in the affirmative proposition we see the falsity of affirming a predicate of a non-supposing subject; in the negative proposition we see the truth of denying a predicate of a non-supposing subject.

There is considerable space devoted in the book, in various connections, to the so-called paradoxes in logic. Professor Veatch divides them into paradoxes turning on the meaning of propositions (e. g., the liar paradox) and those turning on the meaning or intention of concepts (e. g., the paradox of the "impredicable."). The book discusses these questions thoroughly and, I think, quite satisfactorily. It seems to me that the point might also have been made that, in some cases at least, there is no real logical difficulty at all. Take, for example, the paradox of the "impredicable." This apparent paradox arises by considering, first, the distinction between concepts predicable of themselves taken both in first intention and in second intention, and concepts not of this sort, or not predicable; then, considering the very concept we have of so-called "impredicable" concepts, is that concept itself one of these "impredicable" concepts? If it is thus "impredicable," then it would seem for that very reason to be "predicable." If it is not thus "impredicable," then it would seem by that very fact to be "impredicable."

After a long and somewhat involved consideration, Mr. Veatch concludes as follows. "The way to avoid (this paradox) is simply to recognize that when one makes an initial option in favor of the 'predicability' of this concept rather than of its 'impredicability,' what one means is that this concept is not 'predicable' really and in itself, but simply in terms of the mode of expression that has to be used in order to signify what it really is—viz., 'impredicable.'" (p. 149) It seems to me that this point might be made more simply by recognizing that the distinction between thought and expression of thought is ignored. We can say, or put in words, what we actually cannot think. Now we cannot think what is impredicable as if it were predicable—that would be a contradiction. But we can express "impredicable" verbally as though we were predicating it, even though mental chaos would follow if we *thought* we were predicating what is not predicable. The difficulty, then, is verbal rather than logical, and it seems to me that it is a difficulty of this kind that underlies most paradoxes in logic rather than a properly logical one. Thus, in the celebrated remark by Epimenides the Cretan that "every statement made by a Cretan is a lie," there is no difficulty in observing that Epimenides can say this, since anyone can utter a contradiction. The real feat would be for Epimenides to *think* it; rather, it would be no feat at all, but intellectual suicide.

One of the best sections of the book is the treatment of argument or

demonstration, particularly the section concerning what the proper form of demonstration is. Professor Veatch has certainly made an admirable contribution to the doctrine of logic in his exposition and defense of the syllogism, negatively in meeting objections raised by mathematical logicians against the syllogism, and positively by understanding, with a fresh approach, just what the syllogism is designed to achieve. Concerning argumentation there is, on the one hand, that extreme formalism current at the present time with little or no attention given to the content (or matter) of argument. On the other hand, there is the position that no argument is ever merely formally valid apart from the content. Avoiding either extreme, Professor Veatch emphasizes that while logical forms cannot be regarded as "mere receptacles of content," nevertheless the whole ordering of logical forms is to something other than themselves. A particularly solid point Mr. Veatch consistently makes in various ways throughout the book is that logic is for the sake of helping us to come to know reality. Hence, demonstrative argument is ordered toward making possible an understanding of things through their causes, not by confusing real relations and logical relations, but by seeing logical relations as founded on real relations, e. g., by seeing the structure of the syllogism as intending an effect through its cause or a cause through its effect. It is precisely in this way that one comes to see just how the syllogism is an instrument for demonstrating what is scientifically true, in the rigorous sense of the term. If one abstracts from the end of the syllogism, to effect scientific knowledge, the syllogism makes very little sense and is open to all sorts of objections based upon a purely formalistic conception of reasoning.

I have been primarily concerned in this review with commenting principally on points in traditional logic. I have done this because readers of this review are likely to have more interest in traditional logic. I should like to emphasize that while I have questioned some things Professor Veatch has advanced there is, on the other hand, no doubt at all that he has made an admirable and illuminating presentation of traditional logic. There is, in fact, a great deal for anyone to learn in his exposition of traditional logic. Moreover, as I have already remarked, his fresh approach to logic stimulates one to examine, with him, points too often taken for granted, or ignored, or even not sufficiently understood previously. His book deserves much more comment and discussion than can be given in a single review.

Some comment, in closing, must be made on the central issue the book raises and discusses in a rich variety of ways, the issue concerning the relation of, or contrast between, traditional logic and mathematical logic.

How may we best express the relation or contrast? Are the two so opposed that the positing of one must wholly eliminate the other? Partisan

and somewhat naive writers would seem to want us to think so. Both mathematical and traditional logicians have taken this position, in varying degrees. We are familiar with the dogmatic pronouncements of some mathematical logicians that mathematical logic is replacing traditional logic in all respects. We are even familiar with the more painful spectacle of some apparent scholastic logicians who, grasping faintly a few unimportant notions in traditional logic, seek to outdo the dogmatism of some of the mathematical logicians in proclaiming rhetorically the imminent eclipse of traditional logic by mathematical logic. We are familiar, finally, with some traditional logicians who blithely assume that anything like mathematical logic is simply non-existent or unimportant; and with others who, even worse, assume that the garbled versions of logic emanating from such sources as the Cartesian or Port Royal schools are authentic representations of traditional logic.

It is to the credit of Professor Veatch that he has examined painstakingly and carefully both traditional logic and mathematical logic. He recognizes, for example, the impressive advances mathematical logical has made in the course of its development. His original question (and, to my mind, the basic question) was whether such advances are really achievements in logic proper. I think it is clear that he does not think they are and that he has weighty reasons for so thinking.

The real issue, then, is not whether either is inadequate or erroneous or subsumed by the other. The real issue is what logic is. I think that Professor Veatch has made it evident, on solid grounds, that both cannot be logic without equivocating on the word. Whichever one is logic, the other is not.

I think it is equally clear that Professor Veatch has shown that traditional or intentional logic is logic in the original, proper meaning of the term. Obviously, then, the problem is first of all one of definition. If logic is defined, as it has been for centuries, as an art that directs the acts of the intellect, and if logic as a science is concerned with that kind of being of reason that is a second intention, and if logic aids us in coming to know something previously unknown to us and is therefore an indispensable means of obtaining knowledge in a perfect state, then traditional logic, as formulated by Aristotle, is properly and strictly logic. The case that Professor Veatch builds up is strong enough to convince anyone who knows logic as originally intended by Aristotle and who does not view it with mathematical presuppositions.

The evidence Mr. Veatch cites is impressive and extensive. Basically, it reduces to the following. Mathematical logicians do not have a logic that directs the three acts of the intellect; they do not treat properly at all the first act, nor is their distinction between the second and third acts always clear and consistent. They do not treat what is most distinctive of

logic, the being of reason that is a second intention. Mathematical logicians constantly confuse, in different respects, real relations with logical relations and logical relations with real relations.

But, the mathematical logician may interrupt with some indignation, all this is true if, and only if, logic is defined in a certain restricted way. On the other hand, if logic is defined and understood in the way we take it, just as impressive a case can be made against what is now called traditional logic.

There is something to be said for this objection as made on the part of the mathematical logician and, I suspect, the issue as it is actually raised is not likely ever to get beyond this question of definition. It is important to recognize, however, that fundamentally the question is a problem of definition, for the very posing of that question makes it evident that two different things are under discussion. But the priority of the meaning of traditional logic can be shown, I think, in a number of ways. One way, as Veatch amply illustrates, is to see that mathematical logic has no way of distinguishing between a properly logical relation and a real relation. Another way is to note that the works of Aristotle, who is admittedly the logician of logicians, can be understood in the meaning and order of traditional logic whereas mathematical logic cannot account for the order and relative importance of his works; characteristically, it makes the *Prior Analytics* rather than the *Posterior Analytics* the major work because of its preoccupation with the formalism appropriate to mathematics. Still another way is to recognize that mathematical logic does not perform the role that traditional logic performs, namely, the role of being the common method of philosophy and of knowledge generally.

But the precise excellence and importance of mathematical logic is lost when viewed from the standpoint of traditional logic. Professor Veatch refers to this excellence in his concluding "Unscientific Postscript" by asking: "Is it not true that mathematics has been the veritable lodestar of modern scientific enterprise and technological advance? And if so, would not a thoroughly mathematical logic seem to be the order of the day?" He does not directly or fully answer the question, and a review is hardly the place to discuss such a question adequately. However, a tentative remark or two might be made.

I think it can be shown that the excellence of what is called mathematical logic lies, first, in its disassociation from logic properly and from philosophy, and, second, in its intimate association with experimental science insofar as experimental science is mathematical.

For one who knows philosophy in its realistic and traditional sense, mathematical logic is simply not the organon to employ. The irrelevance of using it in metaphysics, for example, is apparent to anyone familiar with the most elementary notions in metaphysics. As far as logic in the strict

sense is concerned, mathematical logic distorts and hides the nature and role of the proper method or organon of philosophical knowledge; and, with its technical formal symbolism, simply obstructs the language of such reasoning. No important point in logic itself, or in any branch of philosophy, is illumined simply by being formulated in the symbolism of mathematical logic. And the major part of logic, logic considered on the part of matter, is necessarily a closed book to the formalism of mathematical logic. Philosophy and mathematical logic are not really made for each other; incompatibility would necessarily follow from their marriage.

But it is quite otherwise with respect to the role mathematical logic plays in experimental science. It is the appropriate tool experimental science needs for its investigation of the quantitative and relational aspects of things. It is the *calculus* needed for the dialectical exploration of the experimental scientist. It is as such a calculus that mathematical logic really works and where its fruitful application is realized. Divorced from the role it plays for experimental science, mathematical logic seems to become merely a game of arbitrarily constructed systems of purely formal rules of procedure within the web of mathematical imagination.

Such a formulation of what the excellence of mathematical logic consists in (as well as what it does not consist in) is certainly open to further investigation and consideration. In any case, it seems to me that both traditional and mathematical logicians would benefit by seeing the proper excellence of each rather than trying to have one simply obliterated by the other. Of one thing, nevertheless, I am certain: serious traditional and mathematical logicians should read Professor Veatch's book for a thorough, conscientious, and able discussion of the relation and contrast between traditional and mathematical logic. It is a necessary step in achieving a balanced judgment and evaluation of both, the indispensable prerequisite for any fruitful discussion.

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Philosophic Problems of Nuclear Science. By WERNER HEISENBERG. Translated by F. C. Hayes. New York: Pantheon Books, 1952. Pp. 126. $2.75.

This little volume contains eight lectures which were delivered at different places and times between the years 1934 and 1948. The message which it contains is noteworthy both because of the great authority of the author in the field of theoretical physics and because it is full, frank and informative statement of the historic aims of mathematical physics and a critical account of the present achievement of this science.

Although the so-called classical physics originated chiefly from the work of Galileo and Newton in the seventeenth century, the author of these lectures sees the whole development of modern physics as an effort to solve the problem first posed by the ancient Greek philosophers who asked: what are all things made of? Pythagoras was first to realize the mathematical order in musical notes, and Democritus said that all things are made of atoms. These are the terms of the historic problem and of its solution through mathematical physics.

The ancient physicists were seeking a single material principle by which everything might be explained and understood in the clear light of mathematical formulation. Modern science has accepted from antiquity the idea of a pattern in the world which is capable of mathematical description. But we must not think that pure theoretical understanding is the only goal. Such an understanding is humanly unsatisfying, and seeks an outlet in technical applications. The mathematical formulation is itself an abstract control of things, and it enables man to make nature serve his own purposes. Furthermore, it gives a real insight into the interrelations of things, and will help man to appreciate his appropriate position in nature. Here in two words, understanding and control, we have the aims of this type of science. The understanding must be crystal clear, that is, mathematical in form. It must be a universal understanding, attaining to the principle of all things and revealing the real interrelations of things and man's position in the universe. Control also must in a sense be universal, that is, sufficient to enable man to make nature serve his own purpose.

The pattern for such science as this has been set once and for all by the Newtonian mechanics. This discipline attempts to make the description of the world as independent as possible of our subjective experiences. It is based on a system of mathematically concise axioms whose physical content is fixed by the meaning of the words employed. Hence its concepts will always remain the basis for any exact and objective science whose results can be proved by measurements registered on suitable measuring apparatus.

Judged by such an ambitious goal and such a perfect model, it is freely admitted that the present achievements of mathematical physics are impressive but far from complete. A full understanding of objective reality has not been attained, and seems in principle unattainable. Not that the Newtonian mechanics is in any way defective. Rather it is solid and certain and apt to remain so: a permanent acquisition of human knowledge. But it is now known to be of limited application, and not universal. It is valid and applicable only within the range of ordinary experience, where the concepts of bodies being moved in space and time express an objective reality which is measureable by man and thus intelligible. The interiors of atoms and stars, their dimensions, distances, masses and motions

are not measureable by man according to the ordinary methods of measuring, and so they are not intelligible according to the ordinary modes of mechanical understanding. To deal with quantities which are extremely small or extremely large, new methods of thinking, measuring and understanding had to be developed, and have been developed in the relativity and quantum theories. Newtonian mechanics has not been refuted or abandoned and never will be, but it has been found wanting in universality. Hence it has been supplemented by new methods and measurements and mathematical formulations which, in their own very different way, are quite as perfect as the classical mechanics.

Through these concepts of classical and modern physics the unification of a considerable body of knowledge has been achieved. First in regard to content, mechanical concepts have been extended to thermodynamics, and optics is a branch of electro-magnetics. Modern quantum mechanics embraces atomic theory and chemistry, at least in principle, although there is little advantage in this extension of quantum physics to chemistry, because the mathematics is too complicated. For the same and even greater reason these concepts and methods are not applicable in biology. Indeed, such a complex unit as a living organism is a highly improbable structure from the point of view of atomic theory.

On the other hand, in regard to methodology a greater unity has been achieved, because to vary the methods of measuring and to modify the mathematical formulation in the direction of universality and simplicity is all part of the method. From this point of view the measurements may be considered as revealing a single reality which may be seen either as matter or as energy, and mathematical physics may be interpreted as the science of the quantitative relations of matter and energy.

This splendid theoretical advance has enabled man to gain an impressive control over the forces of nature. Thanks to researches which range from the atoms to the stars, and which both modify the theories and are modified by them, man has now at his disposal an immense physical power. He has tapped the amazing resources hidden within the atomic nucleus; he has mastered chemical and biological processes; he can control diseases, direct heredity, and mold even mental and spiritual formation or deformation.

No less astonishing is the price of this great theoretical and technical achievement. It demands, first of all, the sacrifice of immediate understanding, that is, of all familiar sense impressions and images, and of all concepts which immediately express objective reality. In particular we must give up the mechanical conception of bodies which are pushed or pulled in space and time. We must begin by facing a dark background which is lighted only by our experiments. Armed with measuring instruments we must take our man-made measures, which alone are to enter into our calculations. Neither atoms or particles are observable except by

interference. They have no properties of their own which are antecedent to our measures: no color, no shape, no position, no motion, no mass, no density. The application of our measuring apparatus to the objective reality and its reactions with the apparatus determine and limit the observable in such a way that there is left a margin of indetermination which is in principle unknowable. By confining ourselves to this man-made measure we attain an objective reality without a thing in itself. According to this method, there is no definite initial point of view, no definite cognition as a starting point, no beginning in the light of ordinary experience. There is only a flash in the dark, revealing a number on a measuring instrument; then the crystal clear light of mathematical deduction and technical application.

Knowledge of this type is admitted to be dangerous. It can lead men into relativism and nihilism, to an inability to appreciate the difference between right and wrong, good and bad. It gives men a control over the awful powers of nature which must not fall into the hands of the wicked.

Yet science is not lost. Regardless of political party or opinion, there is always a right and wrong in science, because the measuring instruments of exact science will reveal it. They show the mysterious inner core, the central reality, which the uninitiated can never appreciate through science, although they may reach it in other ways, and may even sense it in the beauty of the world.

Thus we find that the author of these lectures describes a mathematical physics which aims at being a monistic and materialistic philosophy, but which by its own proper method cannot give us a full understanding of reality. The validity of this method of mathematical formulation based on exact measurements has been clearly established. Its fruitfulness both for theoretical investigations and for technical applications is manifest and certain. But no less certain are its limitations, and these are frankly admitted. Yet the author does not seem to appreciate, as did Galileo and Newton, what a genuinely physical explanation of the world would be, and how it would differ from a mathematical description. It would have been enlightening if the problems of modern physics had been presented in view of the general principles and methods of natural science as developed by Aristotle.

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Aristotle's Metaphysics. Trans. by Richard Hope. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. Pp. 318 with index. $5.00.

This new translation has as its aim "to meet the needs of college and graduate students," and "therefore renders his (Aristotle's) text into clear English, as accurately as possible, idea by idea rather than sentence by sentence or word by word." (Preface) Professor Hope includes a glossary entitled "Analytical Index of Technical Terms," which contains selected Greek terms, nearly 300, together with their Latin (William of Moerbeke and St. Thomas Aquinas) and various English equivalents, classified under seven general headings: Being; Categories; Principles of Explanation; Nature and Change; Human Nature and Soul; Mind; The Divine. The Greek terms in each category are listed by numbers corresponding to the numbers inserted into the text itself for purposes of ready reference; and following each term is a selection of important references in the *Metaphysics* to that term. Also included is a brief index of names.

No one knows better than a Thomist the difficulty involved in finding good English equivalents for the more important words of Aristotle and St. Thomas and none knows better than one who has studied St. Thomas' commentaries on Aristotle how far from arbitrary was Aristotle's choice and use of words. Any new translation of Aristotle, consequently, merits our strongest interest; and we must, further, be grateful to Professor Hope for the freshness he gives to the *Metaphysics* through his "idea by idea" rather than "word by word" translation.

One who attempts to translate Aristotle is faced with the difficulty of having ready at hand a philosophical vocabulary derived directly from the Greek and Latin, a vocabulary which, through the course of time, has been overlaid with secondary meanings which today obscure the concreteness and commonness of the original. These words have now become almost entirely technical, "philosophical," and cannot be readily understood in English because of the obscurity of their connection with the concrete first imposition of the original. (Despite this disadvantage, English does have that very useful property whereby nouns can be used as verbs or adjectives etc., and inversely.) Take, for example, the word "quiddity"; unless we translated this word, even for ourselves into something like the "what-it-is-ness" of a thing, this word relates only in the most tenuous fashion to ordinary speech and we run the risk of emptying that word of its concreteness and definiteness and of letting it degenerate into a symbol (a sign falling somewhere between the name and the infinite name). This is so because the first imposition of "quiddity" in English, the essence in the substantial order, corresponds to a secondary imposition in the Latin original, and it is only by constant recourse to first impositions that we can avoid the Humpty-Dumpty world of semantic confusion. Ignoring

the first imposition of a word is as unsatisfactory a procedure as ignoring the bottom steps of a ladder.

Aristotle was not faced with this difficulty; for Greek is among those languages which are especially apt as instruments for the determination of the intellect; and Aristotle was aware, as is clear from Book Delta of the *Metaphysics*, that philosophical language is formed not by the addition of new, or the formation of portmanteau words but by multiple impositions of the same concrete common word. Aristotle took, for example, the ordinary Greek words for timber and shape and, giving them new impositions, used them to explain absolute becoming through his doctrine of what we know as " matter and form "—words whose meaning we find it impossible to grasp, as St. Thomas has pointed out, unless we make use of the analogy of timber or some new raw material and shape or figure, unless we use words as concrete in their first impositions as ὕλη and μορφή in Greek.

Thus it is not true that a later imposition need forego the wealth of immediacy and concreteness given by the first imposition. If we use the first imposition of a word and its common use as principles to manifest later, more abstract meanings, we lose nothing. Agreement on the original meanings of words should be possible even among philosophers of widely differing backgrounds. This is not to say that metaphysics depends on etymology, for it is not in etymology itself that we seek the first imposition; the first imposition, the original meaning of a word depends on some simple sense experience, thanks to which we are in the presence of a first principle; just as touch gives confused knowledge when compared with that of sight, but gives far more certain knowledge, so also does the first imposition of a word give confused but certain knowledge when compared with a later imposition. The demand of the logical positivist for immediate and direct verification in experience is met at the level of the first imposition of a word.

The neglect of the common use of words means a neglect of what we know best in favor of what we know less well. That this is true is evident from the fact that it is the multitude who both determine what is best known in a thing and, consequently, give such and such a meaning to its name. We follow " the many " in our use of words because nature inclines us to this. (Cf. *In I de Coelo*, Ch. 1, i. e., n. 6). A neglect in observing common usage is equivalent to intellectual tyranny: just as in moral matters the laws of a tyrant follow not nature but the tyrant's own will, so the will of the individual rather than that of the multitude becomes the principle of the meaning of every word. " There's *glory* for you! "

If it be true that one word may have many meanings, a difficulty that comes to mind is this: it seems that a word's plurality of significations is a fertile source of error and confusion. St. Thomas states the difficulty thus:

That name by which many things are signified is an ambiguous sign, and consequently an occasion of error—as is evident for equivocal names. But every fallacy must be removed. . . . Therefore. . . .

He answers:

It must be said that we have an ambiguous sign, offering the occasion of fallacy, when it signifies many things, one of which is not ordered to the other. But when it signifies many things in a certain order, so that there is a certain unity, then the sign is not ambiguous, but certain; just as the name "man" signifies soul and body insofar as from them human nature is constituted. (*Summa Theol.*, III, q. 60, a. 3. ad 1.).

Further, there is sufficient evidence in the *Metaphysics*, especially in Book Delta, to enable us to see that a word having many meanings need not be discarded as being necessarily a source of ambiguity. For if there is an order between the meanings there is no reason why one who is cognizant of this order should not use that word with exactness and precision in different contexts. "Form," for example, has more than one meaning; but this is no reason why one cannot use "form" meaning figure in one context, and "form" meaning substantial form or species, in another, without being accused of ambiguity—so long as he is clear in his own mind about what he means.

In general then, Aristotle uses the simple, common, concrete words and imposes new meanings on them for purposes of investigating the things signified. The translator is thus faced with the alternatives of reproducing in as basic terms the original words of the text and of leaving implicit what was implicit (because analogical) in the original; or of making explicit (and univocal) what was there contained implicitly. William of Moerbeke chose the first alternative; Professor Hope, for the most part, favors the second, preferring in his "idea by idea" translation to *interpret* and make explicit Aristotle's analogical words. Thus, in effect, he makes of his translation a commentary—a legitimate procedure, no doubt, but one that is based on the assumption that he always knows not only what Aristotle says but also what Aristotle means. Professor Hope must therefore be presumed to have the *habitus* of metaphysics, since he is patently not acting as a slave to the text in its pure materiality. Here, for example, are some of his translations of *οὐσία* (*substantia*): "being, fundamental being, primary being, formal being, essential being, being of a thing, very being of a thing, essential character, nature, 'what'"—"primary being" is the most common translation. (The word "substance" or "substantive" is in a few places his translation for *ὑποκείμενον* (*subjectum*); elsewhere he translates this word by "ontologically" or "subject matter.") I wonder why Professor Hope does not translate *συμβεβηκός* (*accidens*) by "secondary being" to contrast with *οὐσία* rather than by "the acci-

dental"; failing this, I can see no superiority in the translation "primary being" over the traditional "substance." The word *αἰτία* (*causa*) he translates: "explanation, explanatory factor, crucial factor, definitive factor, primary factor, fundamental factor, basic agent, reason, reason why, cause" —"explanatory factor" being the usual translation. I can see no advantage in putting *αἰτία* on the level of discourse ("explanation," etc.); nor in translating *αἰτία* by "roots and branches" as in the context: "mathematics has its principles, elements, roots and branches" for *τῶν μαθηματικῶν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ καὶ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἴτια.* (1025b5).

By ignoring the literal, accepted translations for many philosophical terms, Professor Hope has occasionally gone in the direction of more concretion with translations such as: "by-products, patterns, 'this-such,' stark opposites," where the corresponding Latin translations are: "*contingentium gratia, exemplaria, tale aliquid contraria*"; but more often he has preferred the abstract to the concrete word: "perception" for *αἴσθησις* (*sensus*) (1010b2), and "appearance" for *φαντασία* (*phantasia*) (1010b3), in the context: "As to truth, we must say that not everything which appears is true. First, because, granted that a *perception* when it perceives its own object is not false, an *appearance* is not the same as a *perception.*"); "available" or "normally" for *πέφυκε* (*aptum natum*) (1022b23, 25); "in general" for *κατὰ πασᾶν ἡλικίαν* (*secundum omnem aetatem*) (1022b28) (in the context: "so blindness is a privation, not *in general*, but when sight fails to come to those who would naturally have it"); "form is unity-in-multiplicity" for *ἕν ἐπὶ πολλῶν* (*unum in multis speciem dicunt*) (1040b29); "present" for *τὸ νῦν* (*nunc*) (1002b6); "intelligence" for *φρόνησις* (*prudentia*) (980b21). Occasionally, when Aristotle uses a word in a technical sense, in a later imposition as determined elsewhere, Professor Hope prefers to give the meaning of the first imposition of that word "in other words"; "kind" for *γένος* (*genus*) (983b5) and for *εἶδος* (*species*) (984a17); "neatly" for *εὐφυῶς* (*naturaliter*) (987b34); "something general" or "general terms" or "general propositions" or "generality" for *καθόλου* (*universale*) (1000a1, 1001a22, 1018b33, 1028b32). Sometimes, too, Professor Hope will translate by words used today in a different technical sense than was Aristotle's usage; "limit" for *πέρας* (*terminum, finis*) (994b15); "things *in process*" for *κίνησις* (*motus*) (1046a2); "factual evidence" for *φαίνεσθαι* (*apparentia*) (986b32).

In Book Delta of the *Metaphysics*, where the order is particularly important and the function of the book is not at all attained unless this order is manifested, the interpretations of Professor Hope and St. Thomas are, for the most part, scarcely consonant. In approximately half the chapters the order and divisions of the "*intentiones rerum*" differ. Professor Hope is, however, aware of St. Thomas' commentary, as is evident from an occasional reference.

This reviewer is of the opinion that the sparseness of footnotes, especially explaining the translations of important terms, lends an air of gratuitousness to certain of the interpretations—especially when compared with those of St. Thomas. Furthermore, the relative lack of footnotes presumes a degree of acquaintance with the *Metaphysics* which will, I believe, seldom be had by the ordinary college or even graduate student. A reference to "the Italians" (987a10), for example, might well call for a footnote, since this is obviously, with the inclusion of the Index, to be a volume of the *Metaphysics* sufficient in itself for most purposes. I wonder, too, whether the "Index of Technical Terms" might be even more useful if the Greek terms were given in alphabetical order rather than divided according to classes ("Being"; "Categories"; etc.).

I found the book relatively free of grammatical or typographical errors but I was brought up short by a few expressions which call for improvement: the argument, "However, if unity and being are not genera, they cannot be principles (if any genus is a principle)" is fallacious; (998b27) "there is no definition or demonstration of the primary being of sensible things" (1039b28) is misleading; "We have *examined* this more *clearly* in our writings on nature" (986b30) is rather unhappy.

To sum up, this reviewer gets the impression that Professor Hope is unaware of the exactness and precision of Aristotle's use of words; and does not use to the full those qualities of English, especially the interchangeability of the parts of speech, which make it—compared with French, with its Latin words of advanced culture—eminently suitable for purposes of translation. He has sacrificed intelligibility to what he conceives of as the need for ridding Aristotle of "verbiage"; and has produced a "soft," over-facile translation, seeming to be more interested in "presenting" Aristotle "idea by idea" than in letting Aristotle speak for himself.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Truth. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by Robert W. Mulligan, S. J. Chicago: Regnery, 1952. Vol. I, questions I-IX. Pp. 472. $7.00.

Only a very few years ago the potential student of St. Thomas, who desired to become acquainted with the thought and words of the Master himself and was not content to know him second-hand through textbooks and manuals, found it necessary to do most of his reading in Latin. However, it is now possible to acquire a small library, consisting of *summae*, disputed questions, and *opuscula*, all in our own language.

There are those who will deplore this trend: who will see in it a decline in scholarship and a threat to precise statement of doctrines. But surely the truth is not bound to any one language. It is true that the translator is faced with difficulties in his endeavor to give a faithful rendition of the original thought in a new language, but these very difficulties can be made an occasion for a deeper peneration of the truth itself. A repetition of formulas is not possible; the formulas must be translated into words which are intelligible and which are, above all, in conformity with things. In this we have the example of St. Thomas himself. He was in great measure responsible for the translation of the works of Aristotle into Latin, for his own use and for the use of others.

This latest publication is welcome as is every new translation of St. Thomas and it is doubly and triply welcome, since it is of one of the most important of all the works of the Angelic Doctor and is based on the definitive Leonine text. This volume, the first of three in the complete translation of the *De Veritate*, contains questions I to IX. These questions deal with: Truth, God's Knowledge, Ideas, The Divine Word, Providence, Predestination, The Book of Life, The Knowledge of Angels, and The Communication of Angelic Knowledge. These questions are of perennial interest and are of special value in this day when so many are absorbed in speculation on the epistemology and psychology of knowledge.

The style of the translation flows smoothly throughout and does not intrude itself upon the consciousness. This is perhaps the highest compliment that can be paid to a translation—to say that as soon as one starts reading, one is immediately absorbed with the thought and is unaware that he is reading a translation. With a very few exceptions in this present work, the reader becomes immersed in the problem and the solution of the problem, not adverting to the words used to convey the thought.

These few exceptions involve particular words, as for example, the use of "joining and separating" in place of the usual "composing and dividing." The latter, taken over directly from the Latin, have been used almost exclusively to describe the second operation of the intellect and seem to have acquired a very precise meaning not yet associated with the words "joining and separating." However, if there are good reasons for using the new words, they should surely be accepted. But what is more questionable is the alternate use, sometimes in the same paragraph, of "joining and separating" and then of "composing and dividing," as translations of the identical Latin phrase. This is open to misinterpretation, leading one to wonder if there might be some shade of difference in the meaning of the two English phrases.

Perhaps more serious is the translation of *ens in sui natura* as "a real being" in the context: ". . . it is not necessary that what is known should be a real being at the time in which it is known."

There is one English sentence which could convey an entirely false meaning. It is: ". . . the soul, inasmuch as it judges about things, is not acted upon by things, but rather, in a sense, acts *upon them*," for: *sed magis quodammodo agit*. This "acts *upon them*" seems to imply that the action of the intellect is transient, which is certainly not the meaning of St. Thomas. Elsewhere in *Truth*, he says very clearly that "no action of a cognitive power can be said to pass outside in the way in which acts of physical powers do, which go from the agent into the patient."

Faults and inadequacies, such as these examples mentioned, are few in number and would not prevent a wholehearted recommendation. As has already been said, any lack of precision that may creep into even the most conscientious translation will not prove great obstacles to one who is attending to the thought and looking for the truth.

All the value of this great work of St. Thomas, all the depth and sweep of thought, is here and in excellent English form. Its value for the student is enhanced by the listing, with each article, of parallel readings: references to other parts of *Truth* and to the other works of St. Thomas on the same subject. The book, itself, with its style of type, good format, and quality of paper, is pleasant to the senses, just as the thought contained gives joy to the intellect.

The Spiritual Director. By Father Gabriel of St. Mary Magdalen, O. D. C. Trans. by a Benedictine of Stanbrook Abbey. Westminster: Newman, 1952. Pp. 131. $2.50.

This work by one of the greatest living authorities on Carmelite Spiritual Theology is entitled *S. Giovanni della Croce, Direttore Spirituale*, in the Italian original (1942). This latter title expresses more aptly the plan of

the author: to investigate the writings of St. John of the Cross with a view towards presenting as a whole the teaching and practice of the Saint with respect to the guidance of souls.

In his preface the author writes: "With the publication of *The Spiritual Director* we intend to complete, with a study of a more general order, the exposition of the teaching of St. John of the Cross contained in the two preceding volumes. In those we dealt with two selected features of the contemplative spiritual life which have special reference to the office of spiritual director: the transition from discursive meditation to contemplation, and the attitude of the soul towards visions and revelations. We now consider the question of spiritual training in a more general way" (p. 1). The two volumes in question are *Acquired Contemplation*, a general instruction on the attitude and practice of souls who are experiencing periods of spiritual aridity, and *Visions and Revelations*, the teaching of St. John of the Cross with respect to particular phenomena sometimes encountered in the spiritual life.

It is the intention of the author to make clear, under the guidance of St. John of the Cross, the qualities and abilities required in a priest in order that he may be a good spiritual director. Fr. Gabriel is not willing to accept holiness alone as the sole qualification for so high an office as that of directing souls, but insists that there is required "an intellectual and technical training; that is to say, a whole *ensemble* of principles and rules which the direction must apply if it is to be fruitful" (p. 9). The author objects to the attitude of some priests who think that it is sufficient to be kind, to say a few pious words to the penitent, and to leave the rest to God who will supply any further needs. The work is divided into four parts: I. The Father of Souls; II. The Mystical Theologian; III. The Training of Souls; IV. The Friend of Christ Crucified.

The first chapter begins with an interesting biographical note concerning the role St. John played in the beginnings of the Carmelite reform as the associate of St. Teresa of Avila. There follows a consideration of the gifts and moral qualities necessary for the work of direction, stressing especially the seriousness of the work and such qualities in St. John of the Cross as gentleness, compassion, patience, and courteousness. "The holier the confessors," says the Saint, "the gentler they are and the less easily scandalized" (p. 25).

Noteworthy in this first chapter is the author's treatment of St. John's dealings with women penitents. Fr. Gabriel himself gives us some observations well worth meditation. After pointing out the serious danger which may follow upon a purely human attraction between priest and women penitents, the author adds: "But even without going to this extreme, there is no doubt that when a priest allows himself to be captivated with a penitent he loses his freedom and authority. Even by a very human psychological phenomenon, it often happens that their roles

are reversed, and the spiritual daughter directs the Father, makes him consent to all she wants, and share all her opinions; until there comes a day when they disagree. . . . And happily he to whom such disagreement does come. It will open his eyes, and he will then perceive the spiritual ruin caused by his imprudence" (p. 27). Special emphasis is placed upon the total, all-inclusive effort which St. John demanded of his penitents once he was certain they were sincerely attempting the ascent of Mount Carmel.

The Second chapter considers St. John precisely as a Mystical Theologian. His was the task of facing squarely such age-old problems of the spiritual life as: the manner of treating souls who are ready to be led from discursive meditation to a simpler method of prayer; the general lack of competent, willing directors of souls; the attitude to be taken toward visions and revelations. The author points out that true to his concept that the ideal director is both a scientist and an artist, St. John moves along two parallel lines: the psychological and the theological. It is fundamental to spiritual direction to determine if the soul is truly experiencing an effect of divine action. Since human experience is of a psychological nature and is expressed in psychological terms, the rules for good direction must also have a psychological character (p. 47).

The Saint never forgot, however, that his rules for direction must also have a theological character. He knew all too well that it was precisely the working of divine grace which had to be recognized in the psychological state under observation. Psychology and theology must joint forces. In the remaining pages of the chapter, the author relates how the Saint welded these two elements into a sound, effective system of spiritual direction. This very conjoining of psychology and theology, writes Fr. Gabriel, contributed to Spiritual Theology a genuinely scientific asset. Few would disagree.

The interior life is a life of love, of love between a soul and its Creator. Chapter III sets forth the elements which constitute, in the mind of the Saint, the essentials for the fostering of such a life of love. In a little work called *Spiritual Cautions which must be used by the true religious against the enemies of the soul*, the Saint unfolds a great plan of all-inclusive self-denial, principally for those who have already advanced far along the road to perfection. To this plan, set forth in the *Cautions* with such psychological skill, St. John gave scientific form and theological basis in the *Ascent of Mount Carmel* (p. 84). The author points out that fundamentally the work of complete self-abnegation proposed in the *Cautions* is the work of the theological virtues. A treatment of the place of the Cross of Christ in St. John's teachings, following by a synthesis of his methodology completes this chapter.

In the opinion of this reviewer, the final chapter of this little work is by far the best. The author shows us the role of Christ, human and divine, in the spirituality of St. John of the Cross. Of special interest is Fr.

Gabriel's approach to the problem of the place of the Sacred Humanity of Christ in the spirtual life, especially with respect to the soul wrapped in contemplation. If the soul remains in a *simple gaze* of faith upon the Divinity, how can it still keep itself in contact with the Sacred Humanity? (p. 110) Can we agree with those who hold that on this question St. John of the Cross is at odds with St. Teresa of Avila? The latter clearly teaches that the soul must never abandon the humanity of Christ, while St. John, when he urges the souls towards obscure contemplation, seems to necessarily deprive it of Our Lord. What is the true teaching of St. John of the Cross on this point?

Having posed the problem thus, Fr. Gabriel set out to demonstrate in a masterly fashion the true teaching of the Saint. The result is the work of a master craftsman, thoroughly familiar with every aspect of his art. This chapter, indeed, supports the claim of those who regard the author as the greatest living authority on the doctrine of St. Teresa of Avila and St. John of the Cross. As the official spokesman of the Teresian School and professor of spiritual theology at the International College of St. Teresa of the Discalced Carmelites at Rome, Fr. Gabriel is well qualified for the task he set out to do. He has done it well. His work can be recommended without qualification to all seeking light on the problems of spiritual direction.

If the work from the hand of the author is excellent, the work from the hand of the printer is much less than excellent. American publishers would do well to confine their printing to American presses. There is an ever-growing complaint against the poor printing from certain foreign printers. The complaint, in most cases, is a just one, especially in view of the high prices we are compelled to pay for the poorly printed works.

Mary in the Documents of the Church. By Paul F. Palmer, S. J. Westminster: Newman Press, 1952. Pp. 129. $2.25.

When François Mauriac's recent *The Stumbling Block* appeared, it was given—for a brief, quasi-theological tract—a rather astonishing amount of attention in the secular press. The French novelist's main point, it would seem, was an objection to popular forms of devotion to the Blessed Virgin, which tended, he felt, to confuse even " cradle Catholics," and to keep away from the Church non-Catholics who objected to Mary's being given a high place in the Church's liturgical and dogmatic framework. This little work would seem to have appeared providentially to invalidate Mauriac's complaint, by demonstrating upon what solid theological and traditional grounds the Church bases her attitude toward the Mother of God. Actually, as Fr. Palmer notes in a foreword, he was inspired to present this book by

the opposition manifested in non-Catholic theological circles by the definition of the dogma of the Blessed Virgin's Assumption into Heaven.

What we are here given is a splendid anthology of dogmatic and homiletic literature dealing with the Mother of God, surveying the Church's attitude toward her from the formulation of the Apostles' Creed to the official definition of the dogma of the Assumption. The approach is both chronological and in terms of the evolution of Marian theology—so, e. g., the chapter headed "The Tradition of the West" surveys Marian thought from the end of the 4th to the beginning of the 7th century, under these headings: Mary Ever Virgin; Mary's Fulness of Grace; Mary the Mother of God; Mary the Mother of Men; Christ's Attitude Toward His Mother. Especially interesting, and all too brief, is the collection of texts on "Devotion to Mary in the East," and the chapter on "Mary, Mediatrix and Co-Redemptrix" is, of course, extremely useful in our day, when so much attention is directed to that phase of Mariology. A final chapter on the dogma of the Assumption consists of the text of Pius XII's Constitution, *Munificentissimus Deus*. There is appended an alphabetical list of Mary's titles, from "Adam's deliverance" through "Workshop of the Incarnation," with references to their appearance in the documents quoted.

Besides providing, in small compass, a firm foundation for the special attention that the Catholic pays to Mary's place in the scheme of Redemption, this book will be most helpful to preachers as an anthology of Mariological texts and acclamations.

Shakespeare and Catholicism. By H. Mutschmann and K. Wentersdorf. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1952. Pp. 446 with index. $6.00.

This excellent work is a scholarly, comprehensive, and orderly treatment of the various theories of Shakespeare's religion. The first of these is that Shakespeare was a pagan, and is based on certain sentiments found in the plays of the "pessimistic period," which may be called un-Christian.

This theory is rejected for the following reasons: the Elizabethan writers borrowed largely from the authors of ancient Greece and Rome and of the Renaissance; these plays of Shakespeare likewise contain many Christian elements; the un-Christian sentiments expressed in them belong to the characters and not to Shakespeare himself; even if Shakespeare moved temporarily in the world of pagan ideas, he always returned to a Christian point of view; and, after all, Shakespeare was a poet-dramatist and not a Christian apologist.

The second theory is that Shakespeare was a Puritain. This theory is based on nothing tangible; nor has it been taken seriously by any scholar. It is rejected by reason of the sarcastic and unedifying remarks Shake-

speare has in his plays about the Puritans, and the continual and favorable references he makes to Catholic doctrines and practices, which were anathema to the Puritans.

The third theory is that Shakespeare was an Anglican. This theory is based on the fact that Shakespeare is nowhere mentioned in contemporary records as a Catholic recusant; and also on the fact that he was christened in an Anglican church, was married by an Anglican license, had his children christened in an Anglican church, and was buried in an Anglican church. It is rejected in regard to the first point because the absence of Shakespeare's name from any recusancy list published so far merely indicates that he was not an openly confessed Catholic. Besides, there is a contemporary reference to Shakespeare that expressly connects him with the Jesuit priest, Robert Parsons, in which the two men are referred to significantly as, "the Papist and his poet." It is rejected in regard to the second point because in Shakespeare's England there were not a Protestant Church and a Catholic Church side by side with equal rights, to which the people could adhere as they chose. For the practice of the Catholic religion was completely suppressed; Catholic priests were forbidden to carry out their spiritual ministrations under pain of the severest penalties; and the faithful who accepted these ministrations were likewise heavily punished. Hence no other way was open for a Catholic who wished to have his child's birth and baptism officially recorded and to avoid difficulties with the Protestant authorities than to have it christened in an Anglican church. Indeed, in Stratford itself there are many cases of children of avowedly Catholic parents, who were christened in the parish church.

Again, the circumstances of Shakespeare's application for a marriage license instead of being married by banns strongly suggest that he desired it precisely in order not to be married by the local Anglican vicar, but by a Catholic priest who, strangely enough, still officiated in the neighboring village of Temple Grafton; and in any case, by means of the license, he was able to have his marriage placed officially on record without being married at the Stratford parish church itself. And finally, Shakespeare's burial in the church at Stratford has no bearing on the question of his religion because Catholics, including well-known recusants, were often buried inside Anglican churches, and this applies in particular to the Stratford church, which provided a resting place for Protestants and Catholics alike. Accordingly, there is no positive evidence whatever that Shakespeare was an Anglican.

The fourth theory is that Shakespeare was a Catholic. This theory is based, first of all, on the statement of the seventeenth-century Anglican clergyman and antiquarian, Richard Davies, that the poet "died a Papist." Nor is there any valid reason for doubting the veracity of this statement, although some, who would not have Shakespeare a Catholic at any cost, have tried to destroy its value by resorting to calumny against its author.

This theory is based, secondly, on Shakespeare's Catholic parentage, education, and upbringing; the circumstances of his marriage, which, as mentioned above, was probably by a Catholic priest; and of his close association with Catholics during both his professional career at London and his later retirement at Stratford. It is based, thirdly, on the Catholic spirit which permeates his dramatic works. For these are filled throughout with allusions, strictly in conformity with Catholic thought, to sanctifying and actual grace; to the sacraments of baptism, confession, the Eucharist, holy orders, matrimony, and extreme unction; to the Viaticum; to consecrated churches, altars, and bells; to holy fonts, vestments, oil, water, and crosses; to the pax or pyx; to miracles; to prayer, the sign of the cross, and the rosary; to mortal and venial sin; to purgatory and limbo; to suffrages for the dead; to indulgences; to the invocation of the Saints, and the special intercession of the Blessed Virgin; to statues and pictures of Saints; to the veneration of relics; to pilgrimages; to the blessing of houses and the marriage-bed.

Now this large and varied element in Shakespeare's plays proves two things: first, that he had a sure and thorough knowledge of the doctrines and practices of the Catholic Church, viewing them, so to speak, from within, and not from without, and that he held them in love and veneration; secondly, that he deliberately introduced them into his writings despite the prevailing fashion of ridiculing everything Catholic, and despite the resentment he might arouse in the civil and Protestant authorities by so doing. The theory that Shakespeare was a Catholic is based, fourthly, on his favorable portrayal of the Catholic Church, together with its clergy and religious, namely, the See of Rome, the Pope, the friars, the nuns, and the monasteries; and on his very unfavorable portrayal of the Protestant clergy, whom he virtually reduces to the condition of clowns. And finally, this theory is based on Shakespeare's adverse attitude towards the Protestant doctrines concerning free-will, predestination and election, justification by faith alone, and Holy Writ versus Sacred Tradition.

In conclusion, then, we may say that a careful reading of this volume gives a fuller meaning to the observation of Chateaubriand, that "if Shakespeare was anything at all, he was a Catholic," and also to Carlyle's description of Shakespeare as "the noblest product of the Catholicism of the Middle Ages," although, of course, Shakespeare must divide this honor with Dante. Nor need we to add that the Catholic Church could not ask for greater literary exponents of the beauty of its doctrines and practices.

Aristotle's Syllogistic, from the standpoint of modern formal logic. By Jan Lukasiewicz. London: Oxford University Press, 1951. Pp. 150.

The outstanding work of Jan Lukasiewicz in the history of formal logic has long been known to American readers only indirectly, and thus it is a

pleasure to see his latest work communicated directly in the English idiom. The only sad note is the reminder of the tragic circumstances that led to such an event: the destruction of his Polish manuscripts and entire library in the summer of 1939, the impossibility of continued intellectual work during the war, the slow resumption in a strange land where the people, though extremely hospitable, yet could not dispel the loneliness of exile. That Prof. Lukasiewicz finally saw this work through to completion is a tribute to his intellectual stamina as much as to his desire to have others benefit from his extensive researches on Aristotle.

The burden of the author's thesis is this. Aristotle's contribution to formal logic has long been misunderstood. Traditional philosophers, not knowing modern mathematical logic, have failed to grasp the special character of his syllogistic; at the other extreme, symbolic logicians, taking their knowledge of Aristotle from manuals posterior to the *Port Royal Logic*, have been ignorant of his true system. To remedy both defects, he details the textual basis for a correct understanding of Aristotle (Chapters I to III), reconstructs the entire system in modern symbolic form (Chapter IV), and finally shows how the system can be made formally complete through the introduction of a solution to the problem of decision not known to Aristotle (Chapter V).

Some of the emendations offered to historians of logic by Prof. Lukasiewicz are worthy of note. For instance, he claims that Aristotle founded logic by his introduction of variables (pp. 7 and 12), although he was not formalistic in his presentation of it. (p. 16) He also shows how the Stagirite formulated all his syllogisms as implications (pp. 2 and 20), and restricted his syllogistic by omitting empty and singular terms. (p. 4) Then he notes that the fourth figure was known and accepted by Aristotle in all its moods, although not explicitly mentioned in his division of figures. (p. 23) He further maintains that the perfect moods of the first figure were Aristotle's axioms (p. 44), and that the *dictum de omni et nullo* is nowhere introduced as a principle of syllogistic. (p. 48) Finally, he points out that Aristotle employed a rule of rejection which was based on exemplification by concrete terms (p. 70); this can only be formalized and made adequate to handle the decision problem by the introduction of a modern rule of rejection, such as Slupecki's. (p. 131)

Not all of the author's results turn out favorably for Aristotle, however. Thus he indicates that the latter was often inexact in his formulation of syllogisms (p. 18), and even defined the major, middle and minor terms in the first figure wrongly. (p. 28) He says that the Aristotelian theory of proof was unsatisfactory, supposing as it did that the categorical syllogism was the only instrument of proof, and then states, "Aristotle did not realize that his own theory of the syllogism is an instance against this conception." (p. 44). He points out again that Aristotle rejected a thesis of modern propositional logic when he declared that the conclusion 'if B is

not great, B itself is great . . . is impossible.' (*An. Pr.* ii, 4, 57^{b}3) The author holds that "Aristotle's final remark is erroneous. The implication 'If not—β, then β,' the antecedent of which is the negation of the consequent, is not impossible; it may be true. . . ." (p. 50)

It is apparent from this that the subtitle of Prof. Lukasiewicz's book must be taken seriously. The presupposition throughout is that modern formal logic is beyond question the true logic, and that it can be used to pass judgment on Aristotle. But the validity of modern formal logic is gratuitously assumed; or perhaps it would be better to say that if the author has good reasons for holding it, he does not give them in this book.

We cannot agree with the writer's concluding opinion, moreover, that the influence of Aristotle's logic on philosophy was disastrous in that it produced the prejudice (*sic*) that "every proposition has a subject and a predicate." (p. 131) He goes on to say, "This prejudice, together with the criterion of truth known as *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, is the basis of some famous but fantastic philosophical speculations." (p. 132) These statements occur in what must be, to an Aristotelian, a most disappointing conclusion to an otherwise excellent book. It is regrettable that Prof. Lukasiewicz does not give further elucidation of his concept of truth, together with what he considers to be its best criterion.

Cosmology. An Introduction to the Thomistic Philosophy of Nature. By Kenneth Dougherty, S. A. Peekskill: Graymoor Press, 1952. Pp. 186. $3.00.

This modest book, pleasing in format and concise in presentation, exposes the principles of the science of nature according to the mind of St. Thomas. It is written pointedly for the American college student and anticipates his difficulties, particularly the major one of making the transition from the methodology of the modern positive sciences to the search for essential principles characteristic of natural philosophy. The author employs the device of contrasting the two techniques, at the same time making abundant use of the findings of modern science to illustrate his philosophical doctrine.

The book is divided into two parts, which are preceded by a critique of cosmology in the study of nature. The first part deals with the intrinsic principles of mobile being, and works up to the hylomorphic thesis through a study of quantity, quality and motion. The second part, briefer in extent, considers the extrinsic principles of mobile being, and permits the author to develop theses on creationism, the cosmogonical problem, purposive finality, and the end of the universe. One topic that the writer fails to mention is nature and its relation to the first principles of the science. Otherwise the treatment is adequate at each point and well

ordered, despite the fact that matter is occasionally borrowed from metaphysics and theodicy to complete the presentation.

Without doubt, the original formulation and the precise order of Aristotle offers the most proper way of developing a strict science of nature. Professors who have convinced themselves of this will not find Fr. Dougherty's text, or any present-day manual for that matter, of particular help in their course. But those who have compassion on the limitations of young minds, and are looking for simpler, easier ways of presentation at the expense of the classical development, will find this text a useful aid in introducing modern collegians to the science of cosmology.

L'Encyclique "Humani Generis" et les Problèmes Scientifiques. By Camille Muller. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1952. Pp. 36. $0.58.

This little book is the slightly modified reproduction of an article which appeared in the review "Synthèses," 5e année, No. 57. It offers comments addressed to unbelievers as well as to believers on those passages of the encyclical *Humani Generis* which treat of the sciences and which explain principles of interest to all intellectuals.

The author, a professor at the University of Louvain, acknowledges that the encyclical is a more than justified appeal to prudence in regard to the crucial problems which are discussed. But, because many important questions are only briefly touched upon, this timely instruction may be difficult for the less competent and for those unfamiliar with papal documents to assess properly. It is clear, however, that the encyclical does not restrict liberty of scientific research, and is entirely disposed to take account of established facts. The Church is prudent in doubtful matters, but we can be sure that our Faith will never require us to reject a really demonstrated truth. The paragraphs of the encyclical which treat of the positive sciences in relation to Christian faith raise problems chiefly in regard to the method of scientific research, the value of the evolutionary hypothesis, and the monogenetic origin of the human race.

We are reminded that the point of view of scientific research is not directly considered in the encyclical. However, the author explains, it is evident that biological evolution is a scientific question, which, as such, is not the object of theology. Even a Catholic scientist should study this question in a scientific way, without previous examination of the data which theology might offer. Only an experienced scientist can judge the value of a scientific hypothesis, and even he must distinguish carefully between fact and explanation, whether sufficient or not. We are told that the encyclical attaches insufficient value to the evolutionary hypothesis, which the author seems to hold as in some way certain, and possibly it does not exclude some less strict form of monogenetic theory.

How some of these comments are to be reconcilled with the letter and spirit of the encyclical is not entirely clear.

Il Codice Latino 14546 della Bibliotheca Nazionale di Parigi con gli Opusculi di San Tomaso. By Giovanni Felice Rossi, C. M. Piacenza: Collegio Alberoni, 1952. Pp. 127. L. 700.

Encouraged by a request of Father Clement Suermondt, O. P., then President of the Leonine Commission, Father Giovanni Rossi, C. M. has published the result of twenty-two years of study of a manuscript Codex 14546, containing the text of 36 *Opuscula* of Saint Thomas, now in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. This manuscript came from the Abbey of St. Victor in Paris; and was made sometime in the late 13th century, probably immediately after the death of Saint Thomas. Father Rossi first consulted the manuscript while preparing a doctoral dissertation in 1931 at the *Collegium "Angelicum"* in Rome, and later prepared a critical edition of Saint Thomas' Commentary on the *Ave Maria*, using in large part this codex. In recent days this codex has been the source of several critical editions of the *opuscula*, being indeed the principal source of the latest edition of the *Opuscula Omnia*, that of Father Perrier, O. P. It was the appearance of this last work that prompted Father Suermondt to request that Father Rossi make public the result of his many years of study. This he did in several articles which appeared in *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza) and which are reprinted in this volume.

The work reads easily and bears its learning very well. Father Rossi writes of something he knows well; and it might almost be said, loves very much. He traces the origin of the manuscript and gives a vivid description of the *scriptoria* and libraries of the mediaeval abbeys. He traces its history, the corrections made by editors, and finally its confiscation and burial in the Bibliothèque Imperiale, later the Nationale in Paris. It lay in the Bibliothèque for a hundred years, was catalogued by Deslile in 1896; and since that time has been consulted and photographed many times, and used in the preparation of the numerous editions of the *Opuscula* of Saint Thomas.

In his work, Father Rossi describes the codex in some detail, discerning those things which are of various hands, those written when the manuscript was first copied and those added by later correctors or copyists. He summarizes the critical judgements which have been made by a variety of experts and editors from P. A. Ucelli in 1877 to John Pauson in 1950. All in all, this book is the perfect study of a mediaeval codex, and can be read with profit by anyone interested in the history of a typical manuscript.

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